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Abstract
I study questions related to risk premia in real bond markets. First, I document novel evidence that
factors explaining excess returns for nominal Treasuries are also common to the real term structure. This
suggests that sources of bond predictability should be interpreted in the context of the real consumption
risks as opposed to the dynamics of inﬂation. Next, I investigate the role of monetary policy as a
source of time-varying priced risk. I use both high-frequency and low-frequency approaches to show that
monetary policy is non-neutral in the sense of aﬀecting bond risk premia. I conclude by studying a general
equilibrium term structure model with multiple agents who disagree about the unobservable model for
the economy. These agents are induced to engage in speculative trading because of their beliefs, which in
turn generates endogenously time-varying risk premia. My results show that speculation can help explain
low short term interest rates, time-varying expected returns, and path-dependence in the cross-section of
yields.
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Chapter 1
Real and Nominal Yields
The consensus among ﬁxed income researchers is that expected returns on long term nominal bonds in
excess of short dated securities are predictable ahead of time. This is consistent with this view that short
term interest rates are pro-cyclical, driven by the properties of expected fundamentals, while long term
interest rates are counter-cyclical, driven by the properties of risk premia. Well studied forecasting fac-
tors include forward spreads (Fama and Bliss (1987)), the slope of the yield curve (Campbell and Shiller
(1991a)), and an aﬃne function of the forward curve (Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005a)). However, there
exists little consensus about the economic source of this predictability.
In this chapter I document that since the advent of inﬂation protected securities, for both U.S. and
U.K. bond markets, there appears to be very little diﬀerence between real and nominal risk premia. This
suggests the dominant source of predictable variation in expected excess returns must be a risk due to
the real stochastic discount factor.
Understanding the properties of real bonds is an important question that has so far received relatively
little attention. In this respect, I contribute along a number of dimensions. First, I document that Sharpe
ratios on real bonds are at least as large as nominal bonds over the sample period 2000.1 − 2011.12, at
close to 0.43 across maturity. Excluding the 2008 crisis Sharpe ratios on TIPS (0.55) are 50% higher
than Sharpe ratios of nominal Treasuries (0.35). This diﬀerence is large enough that if one were to con-
struct a tangency portfolio based on sample averages, volatilities, and correlations, this portfolio would
be almost dominated by TIPS.1 This empirical puzzle is even more striking in terms of magnitude than
the Mehra and Prescott (1985) puzzle for equities. Second, I show that the real term structure is upward
sloping and the slopes in both markets are strongly correlated. For the sample period 2000.1-2011.12
the correlation of 10-5 yields spreads is 0.74 and excluding observations around the collapse of Lehman
Brothers the correlation rises to 0.90. This is intriguing since the slope of the yield curve is known to
capture information about the joint dynamics of investor preferences and risk factors.
Moving to joint dynamics of risk premia I compare the ability of today’s term structures to forecast fu-
ture term structures. Re-visiting the classic expectations hypothesis test of Campbell and Shiller (1991a)
I show that real and nominal projection coeﬃcients are negative, and quantitatively similar in both eco-
nomic and statistical terms. Next, I build real (CP rt ) and nominal (CP
$
t ) return forecasting factors by
1The exact portfolio weights are 90% TIPS, 10% equity, and 0% nominal bonds
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adapting the approach of Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005a). Real CP rt inherits many of the properties of
nominal CP $t . Firstly, both factors load on the forward curve with a ‘tent’ shaped pattern, which is
increasing in magnitude across maturity implying a single factor structure for real-nominal risk premia.
Secondly, both factors contain substantial information about expected excess returns: in the U.S a single
factor explains 9% of the variance of 3-month returns on 10-year real bonds, and 15% of the variance of
3-month returns on 10-year nominal bonds. Thirdly, both CP rt and CP
$
t are counter-cyclical peaking in
2002 and again in 2008/2009. Excluding the crisis period the correlation between the series is 0.56, while
the full sample correlation is 0.46, meaning that expected excess returns, and hence risk premia, display
large co-movement across markets.
Next, I examine the cross-sectional properties of yields. Using principle components extracted from
real and nominal curves separately, I ﬁnd the covariance matrix of nominal yields is well explained by the
covariance matrix of real yields. I ﬁnd 76% of the variance of a nominal U.S level is explained by the real
level, and 60% of the nominal U.S slope is explained by the real slope. Taken together this implies 75%
of the variance of the nominal term structure is explained by the ﬁrst two principle components of the
real term structure. This ﬁnding is consistent with evidence from the UK. Since variations in nominal
yields can be decomposed as variations in the real yields, expected inﬂation and inﬂation risk premia, this
implies that the role of inﬂation is relatively small.
Considering projections of yields on fundamentals I study residual components orthogonal to growth
rates. Remarkably, the information contained in these residuals is almost identical across markets. Con-
sidering principle components of the residuals across maturity I obtain a ‘level’ and ’slope’ factors that
are moving in lockstep. This result is important since it suggests that factors common to both term
structures are unrelated to GDP growth or inﬂation. I examine the robustness of these ﬁndings across
a number of dimensions. Collecting inﬂation expectations from a number of distinct survey sources I
study the diﬀerence between long term nominal and real yields after adjusting for inﬂation. Between
2000.1 − 2011.12 the inﬂation risk premium in the U.S has averaged just -14 basis points, while in the
U.K the average inﬂation risk premium is similarly small. Since liquidity considerations complicate the
measurement of real risk premia, I examine the ability of liquidity proxies to explain a small inﬂation risk
premium. I reject this as an alternative. Finally, I examine the link between factors extracted from real
bonds and well studied nominal risk premium proxies: encouraging for a real risk premium explanation,
information available from the real bonds explains 57% of the variance of a Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005a)
factor, and 33% of a volatility premium factor from Le and Singleton (2013a).
Finally, I conclude by reviewing speciﬁcations for the stochastic discount factor that introduce either
time-varying quantities of risk, or time-varying prices of risk, or both. For both the U.S and U.K I proxy
for the conditional variance of fundamentals from survey data following Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013),
estimate a consumption surplus proxy following Wachter (2006), and consider dispersion in beliefs mea-
sures along the lines of Buraschi and Whelan (2012a). Through projections on risk factors I ﬁnd evidence
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that the dominant source of risk is the conditional volatility of gdp growth, lending support for a real
quantity of risks explanation.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section I reviews stylised facts across real and nominal
markets. Section II reviews what three alternative asset pricing models say about real and nominal bonds.
Section III proposes observable proxies for the risk factors associated with these economies. Section IV
concludes by discussing underlying economic sources for real risk premia.
I. Empirical Results
A. Yield Data
U.S inﬂation protected Treasuries were ﬁrst issued in 1997 which adjust to the all urban consumer price
index with a 3-month lag. In the early years of issue this market suﬀered signiﬁcant liquidity problems
(see, for example Roll (2004)) and our sample focuses on the period 2000.01 - 2012.12 from which I collect
nominal and TIPS zero coupon bonds estimated by Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2006, 2010) (GSW).
GSW construct zero coupon yields by ﬁtting the Nelson-Siegel-Svensson functional form to market quoted
coupon bonds and is publicly available from the Federal Reserve Board site. I also use short-term nominal
interest rates with 3 and 6-month maturities from the Fama-Bliss T-bill ﬁles available from CRSP.
Nominal zero coupon yields are available in the U.K since 1971 while inﬂation linked gilts have been
on issue since 1985. Both the coupon payments and the principal are adjusted to the General Index of
Retail Prices with a variable lag depending on the sample period.2 I obtain both sets of prices from the
Bank of England site which are estimated with a penalty based spline (Anderson and Sleath (2001)). At
the short end of the nominal curve I obtain 3 and 6 month LIBOR rates from Bloomberg.
Studying real versus nominal risk premia requires observations on short term real rates. Unfortunately,
short term inﬂation linked bills are not issued by either the U.S or the U.K. I proxy for these following
Campbell and Shiller (1996) who estimate a VAR model including the ex post real return on a 3-month
nominal bills, the nominal bill yield, and lagged annual inﬂation rate.
[ insert ﬁgure 1.1 about here]
Solving the VAR forward I build ex-ante forecasts for date t 3-month real rates, which are displayed
with their nominal counterparts in ﬁgure 1.1. The left panel displays estimates for the U.S while the right
panel displays estimates for the U.K. I ﬁnd short term real and nominal rates are positively correlated over
this sample, and that U.S real rates were negative in the years 2002 - 2004, in 2008, and 2010 onwards.
For the U.K real rates dropped into the negative region in the aftermaths of the ﬁnancial crisis.
2see www.dmo.gov.uk/index.aspx?page=gilts/about_gilts for details.
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B. Slopes
The U.S nominal term structure slopes upward, from 3.5% at 5-years to 4.5% at 10-years. This is well
known. Less well known is that the real curve is also upward sloping, from 1.7% at 5-years to 2.2% at
10-years. Yield curves in the U.K are ﬂatter but both slopes are again upward sloping. Figure 1.2 plots
the time series dynamics for U.S real (left panel) and nominal (right panel) slopes between 10-years and
{5, 6, 7, 8, 9}-years. The series indicate that both term structures were ﬂat between the years 2000− 2001
/ 2006− 2007, steep in years 2003− 2004 / 2008, and remained so until the of the sample. The dynamics
of the two slopes track each other closely, the full sample correlation between the 10−5 year slopes is 0.74,
and excluding the massive negative shock to long term real yields in the crisis is 0.90. This is intriguing
because the slope of the term structure is revealing about the joint dynamics of investor preferences and
risk factors.
[ insert ﬁgure 1.2 about here]
C. Sharpe Ratios
I construct 3-month excess returns on both real and nominal bonds maturing between 5 and 10-years
from 3
rx
(n)
t+0.25 = p
(n−0.25)
t+0.25 − p
(n)
t − y
(0.25)
t
where p
(n)
t is a log price of a real / nominal n-year bond, and y
r/$,(0.25)
t is the real / nominal 3-month rate.
Figure 1.3 displays time series for (annualised) realised excess returns on 5-year bonds. The co-movement
is large. In the U.S, excluding (including) the crisis the correlation is 0.83 (0.64) and for the U.K is 0.75
(0.46). Both real bond return series display massive negative returns in the aftermath of Lehman brothers
which are not present on the nominal curves.4 The term structure of excess returns is upward sloping
in the U.S from 1.10% to 1.75% for nominal bonds, and 1.20% to 1.65% for real bonds, between 5 and
10-years. Real and nominal excess returns in the U.K are around 1% lower but again upward sloping.
U.S nominal Sharpe ratios are relatively ﬂat from 0.44 to 0.38 and close to 0.43 across maturity on the
real curve.5 Excluding the crisis, for the sample period 2000.1 - 2008.1, the Sharpe ratio on nominal
bonds was much lower at ∼ 0.35 across maturity, while the Sharpe ratio on TIPS was higher at ∼ 0.55
across maturity. This is an important statistic since positive Sharpe ratios on real bonds provide an
important moment from which to benchmark competing models. For example, in the long run risk model
of Bansal and Yaron (2004) the Sharpe ratio on real bonds is negative when agents have a preference
for early resolution of uncertainty. Moreover, in the habit model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) the
3 Studying real versus nominal (return) risk premia requires observations on short term real rates. Unfortunately, short
term inﬂation linked bills are not issued by either the U.S or the U.K. I proxy for the short term real rates following
Campbell and Shiller (1996) as discussed above.
4 Fleckenstein, Longstaﬀ, and Lustig (2010) also point this out
5 Using a no-arbitrage model Duﬀee (2010) estimates Sharpe ratios on nominal bonds to be (statistically) downward
sloping. In general, statistical comparisons of Sharpe ratios rely on assumptions about the data generating process. For a
generalised method of moments approach to this problem see Christie (2005).
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Sharpe ratio on real bonds is negative when the risk free real rate is pro-cyclical.
[ insert ﬁgure 1.3 about here]
D. Real Campbell and Shiller (1991a)
Campbell and Shiller (1991a) study the information content in long-maturity yields spreads for future
interest rate changes on long return bonds; thus examine the information content contained in date t
yields for expected returns. The Campbell-Schiller projection coeﬃcients are the loadings in the following
regression
y
(n−m)
t+m − y
(n)
t = const+ βnm
(
m
n−m
)
(y
(n)
t − y
(m)
t ) + errort+m (1.1)
Absent of a time-varying risk premium all variation in the real yield spread is due to variation in ex-
pected future real short rates, which implies βnm = 1 for all n,m. For the nominal Treasury curve
Campbell and Shiller (1991a) ﬁnd that, not only is βnm = 1, but is in fact negative. They conclude that
there exists an element of predictability in bond returns and that this is due to current yield spreads
embedding information about term premia, thus compensation for risk.
[ insert table 1.3 and 1.4 about here]
Table 1.3 reports the estimates for equation 1.6 for the U.S, while table 1.4 reports estimates for the
U.K. The regression uses 3-month overlapping observations, which I correct for using a GMM-correction
with 3 Newey-West lags, for n = {60, 72, 84, 96, 108, 120}-months and m = 3-months. Mirroring the
results of Campbell-Schiller I ﬁnd negative projection coeﬃcients for all maturities. For the U.S both
real and nominal loadings are statically signiﬁcant at close to the 1% level. The magnitude of the
nominal projection coeﬃcients are larger than the real coeﬃcients and increasing in maturity while the
real projection coeﬃcients are ﬂat across maturity. For example, the nominal (real) coeﬃcient is −0.20
(−0.19) on a 6-year bond and −0.29 (−0.19) on a 10-year bond. In terms of predictable variation, the
R2’s ranging between 7% - 12% for nominal bonds and 9% - 10% on real bonds. Considering the U.K
projection coeﬃcients I ﬁnd a very similar pattern, which is important since some authors have argued
rejections of the expectation hypothesis is a U.S based phenomenon.
E. Real Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005a)
Figure 1.3 showed the dynamics of realised excess returns on real and nominal bonds have large co-
movements. This section examines whether the dynamics of expected excess returns are also co-moving.
Given a date t cross-section of bond yields all information regarding future interest rates (and thus ex-
pected returns) is summarised in the shape of the term structure today. Linear combinations of yields suf-
ﬁce to characterise risk factors through yield curve inversion.6 Building on this notion Cochrane and Piazzesi
6Speciﬁcally, assume N bond yields are measured without error. Then, stacking these yields into the vector yN =
AN + BNXt, I can solve for the risk factors through inversion as Xt = (B
N )−1
(
yN −AN) so long as the matrix BN is
non-singular.
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(2005a) show that an aﬃne function of forward rates embeds substantial information for the dynamics of
excess returns. The Cochrane-Piazzesi return forecasting factor, CPt, is a tent-shaped linear combination
of forward rates that predicts excess returns on bonds with R
2
statistics as high as 43% (in their sample
period) and has been shown to capture ∼ 99% of the time-variation in expected returns.
I adapt the bond risk premium estimates proposed by Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005a, 2008) for inﬂation
protected securities. Speciﬁcally, I project 3-month excess returns on 3-month forward rate spreads.
Common factors are then formed from real and nominal forward rates by factorizing the ﬁrst stage
regression as
rxt+1 = α+ γ
′(f
[5 7 10]
t − y
(0.25)
t ) + t+0.25
CPt = γ
′(f
[5 7 10]
t − y
(0.25)
t )
[ insert ﬁgure 1.4 about here]
Real CP rt inherits many of the properties of nominal CP
$
t . Firstly, ﬁgure 1.4 shows a tent shaped factor
structure is clearly visible on both real and nominal curves, for both the U.S and the U.K. Interpreting the
‘shape’ of the factor loadings is debatable since, as argued by Dai, Singleton, and Yang (2004), including
yields of close maturity on the right hand side introduces collinearity problems. More importantly, the
magnitude of the tent shape is increasing in maturity implying that a single factor predicts increasing
risk premia on long term bonds. Secondly, while embedding substantial information about future returns
CP rt explains less than 1% of the variance of contemporaneous yield changes.
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[ insert ﬁgure 1.5 about here]
Figure 1.5 plots time-series for real and nominal risk premium proxies, which display countercyclical
behaviour peaking in 2002 and again in 2008/2009. Excluding the crisis period the correlation between the
series is 0.56 while the full sample correlation is 0.46. This means that both realised and expected returns
co-moving across markets. I evaluate the statistical signiﬁcance of this ﬁnding by projecting returns onto
CP rt and CP
$
t in second stage regression
rx
$,(5:10)
t+0.25 = αn + bnCP
$
t + 
(n)
t+0.25
rx
r,(5:10)
t+0.25 = αn + bnCP
r
t + 
(n)
t+0.25
Tables 1.5 (US) and 1.6 (UK) report point estimates, t-statistics, and R2’s computed via a 2-stage
GMM approach that corrects for generated regressors. For the both countries real and nominal loadings
are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The magnitude of the nominal loadings are close to the real
loadings. In the U.S ranging from 0.71 (5-years) to 1.22 (10-years) for nominal expected returns, and from
0.81 (5-years) to 1.15 (10-years) for real expected returns. In terms of relative predictability, nominal U.S
7 I do not report this result to save space but refer the reader to table 8 of the NBER version of Cochrane and Piazzesi
(2005a) for details.
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bonds appear marginally more predictable than real bonds, with R2’s of ∼ 16% compared to ∼ 9% for
real bonds. In the U.K this result ﬂips, where real bonds appears more than twice as predictable, with
nominal R2’s from 4% to 10% compared to real R2’s from 19% to 21%.
The results of this section suggest a large proportion of the variation in nominal bond risk premia
is common to the real term structure, and that the dominant source of bond predictability should be
interpreted in the context of the real stochastic discount factor, as opposed to the dynamics of inﬂation.
[ insert tables 1.5 and 1.6 about here]
F. The Cross-section of Yields
Variations in nominal yields can be decomposed as variations in the real term structure, expected inﬂa-
tion plus inﬂation risk premia. The previous section argued the existence of a common risk premium
component across real and nominal markets. In this section I try to learn about the joint dynamics of
real and nominal markets by decomposing term structures into a component explained by conditional
ﬁrst moments of economic growth and an orthogonal unexplained component.
Litterman and Scheinkman (1991) decompose term structures into level, slope and curvature factors
via a decomposition of the covariance matrix of yields.8 For the sample period 2000.1−2011.12 I perform
this decomposition for real and nominal yields including maturities n = 3, . . . , 10. Table 1.7 reports the
results for U.K and U.S yield curves. As expected, one ﬁnds a level factor explains the vast majority
of variation: ∼ 97% for U.S real and nominal curves, and ∼ 99% for U.K real and nominal curves.
Generally, the variance explained by the level factor would be lower, between 85% − 90%, but here I
discard maturities less than 3-years which contribute orthogonal variation. A slope factor is also present
in both term structures, loading negatively on maturities 3, 4, 5, 6, positively on maturities 7, 8, 9, 10;
explains around 2% of variation in the U.S and 1/2 % of variation in the U.K. The key question I want to
address, however, is whether nominal term structure factors are explained by real term structure factors.
I regress nominal PCs on corresponding real PCs:
Level$t = αl + βlLevel
r
t + ε
l
t
Slope$t = αs + βsSlope
r
t + ε
s
t
Curvature$t = αc + βcCurvature
r
t + ε
c
t
The ﬁnal row reports the R2 from these regressions. Considering level projections I ﬁnd 76% of the
variance of U.S nominal level factor is explained by the real level factor, and 60% of the nominal slope
factor is explained by the real slope factor. Taken together this implies 75% of the variance of the nominal
term structure is explained by the ﬁrst two principle components of the real term structure. This pattern
8Stacking yields of diﬀerent maturities, y
(n)
t , one ﬁrst decomposes the covariance matrix of yields as QΛQ
. The diagonal
elements of Λ contain eigenvalues and columns of Q contain eigenvectors. Ordering the eigenvalues from largest to smallest
as λ1, λ2, λ3 with associated eigenvectors q1, q2, q3, the ﬁrst three PCs are given by xit = q

i y
(n)
t .
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is repeated for the U.K. The explanatory power of nominal factors by real factors can be understood as
a latent interpretation for the co-movement between real and nominal forward spreads (ﬁgure 1.2).
[insert table 1.7 about here ]
Macro-ﬁnance term structure models attempt to link latent factors to economic fundamentals (see,
for example, Diebold, Rudebusch, et al. (2006) or Dewachter, Lyrio, and Maes (2006)). This approach
is related to a vast literature that studies the relationship between inﬂation expectations and the level
of the term structure, or the ability of the slope of the term structure to predict future real economic
activity. These models have been successful in explaining large persistence across-maturities in terms of
highly persistent fundamentals but from an equilibrium perspective cannot explain time-variation in risk
compensation. For example, consider a regression of yield levels on survey expectations about growth
rates
y
r,$(3:10)
t = const+ βgEt[g] + βπEt[π] + εr,$(3:10)
Tables 1.8 and 1.9 reports point estimates and statistics. For the U.S, expected inﬂation explains 48%
and 35% of nominal yield variation at 5 and 10-years maturities and is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%
level, while gdp growth rate is insigniﬁcant. Obviously, this implies that more than half of the variation in
nominal yields is orthogonal to conditional ﬁrst moments of fundamentals. Projections of real yields show
much smaller explanatory power by conditional ﬁrst moments. Put simply, between 85% and 90% of the
variation in real yields is orthogonal to the expected path of the economy. In the U.K the proportion of
explained variance is larger, at > 60% for both real and nominal yields, but again a signiﬁcant component
remains unexplained.
[insert tables 1.8 and 1.9 about here ]
The residual in this regression contains substantial information that one can use to learn about the
stochastic discount factor. Bikbov and Chernov (2008) extract a similar set of residuals from a no-
arbitrage model and link them to monetary and ﬁscal shocks based on their correlation with a measures
of liquidity and measures of government debt. Duﬀee (2013) ﬁnds that nominal yield residuals of this
type account for in excess of 60% of all yield variation but is unlikely to be explained by Treasury speciﬁc
supply and demand eﬀects. I repeat the principle component decomposition on εr(3:10) and ε$(3:10) after
removing expectations of fundamentals. Associated eigenvector loadings are displayed in ﬁgure 1.6. In
both countries yield sensitivities to factors are remarkably similar in shape and magnitude, displaying
familiar level, slope, and curvature patterns; I denote the ﬁrst two principle components UNL and UN S.
[insert ﬁgure 1.6 , 1.7, and 1.8 about here ]
Figures 1.7 and 1.8 shows the time-series dynamics these factors are highly correlated. Since expected
fundamentals are orthogonal to UN this suggest the presence of a signiﬁcant common risk premia. In
fact, both real and nominal UNL and UN S are moving in near lockstep and must be common factors to
real and nominal term structures. In the U.S the level factor is rising between 1990− 2000 and declining
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between 2000 − 2012 and by construction this cannot be explained by inﬂation. During the 2008 crisis I
observe a massive spike in the level of the term structure which is orthogonal to the expected path of the
macroeconomy. The slope factor is high in bad times (1990/1991, 2001/2002, 2008/2009) and low in good
times (1992 − 1997, 2003 − 2007).
G. The Inﬂation Risk Premium
How large is the inﬂation risk premium? The preceding sections argued that the dominant source of pre-
dictable variation in nominal excess returns belonged to the real stochastic discount factor. This ﬁnding is
interesting since extant literature largely explains time-variation in nominal excess returns through com-
pensation for inﬂation risks and not compensation for real consumption risks. However, this also implies
that the inﬂation risk premium should be small. I examine the robustness of our ﬁndings by studying
the diﬀerence between long term yields on nominal versus real bonds after adjusting for expected inﬂation.
Before the availability of inﬂation protected securities estimation relied upon one of two methods:
(i) combining macroeconomic fundamentals such as price indices or the money supply, with structural
models for the real and nominal pricing kernels; or (ii) building hypothetical indexed bond yields from
ex-post observations of nominal yields and inﬂation. For example, using a real business cycle model,
Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005) derive a closed form solution linking the inﬂation risk premium to the money
supply and productivity shocks to estimate the inﬂation risk premium while Campbell and Shiller (1996)
use a VAR approach. More recent evidence has utilised the availability of inﬂation indexed securities.
Ho¨rdahl, Tristani, and Vestin (2008) solve and calibrate a general equilibrium model with habit persis-
tence and nominal rigidities while Grishchenko and Huang (2012) use a regression based approach to
measure the inﬂation risk premium. Both authors report positive estimates a few basis points in magni-
tude.
Computing compensation for inﬂation shocks requires a proxy for the market’s assessment of average
future inﬂation : Et
[
1
τ
∑τ
i πt+i
]
. These tables 1.10 and 1.11 display summary statistics for year-on-year
log growth rates recorded at monthly frequencies for a cross-section of consumer price indices for both
the U.S and U.K. These table suggest something important. Excluding energy prices, the annual growth
rate of inﬂation over a broad set of price indices has averaged 2.0% in the U.S and 2.5% in the U.K in
the last 25 years. Under the assumption that inﬂation linked Treasuries are good proxies for real rates a
back of envelope calculation says that the unconditional inﬂation risk premium should be small, ∼ 0.24%
for 5-year U.S bonds, and ∼ 0.26% for 5-year U.K bonds.
In order to provide a conditional estimate of the inﬂation risk premium I collect long horizon inﬂation
forecasts from a set of sources. For the U.S I obtain 10-year forecasts for the average rate of consumer price
inﬂation from (i) Survey of Professional Forecasters, (ii) BlueChip Economic Indicators, (iii) Consensus
Economics, (iv) the Oﬃce for Management and Budget Responsibility; and (v) The Congressional Budget
Oﬃce. For the U.K I use long horizon forecasts for average growth rates of the retail price index from
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Consensus Economics. For each survey source, the dataset represents semi-annually reported inﬂation for
each of the next 5-years plus an average for the following 5-year period.
Figure 1.9 computes the 10-year inﬂation risk premium implied by the inﬂation adjusted diﬀerence
between nominal and real yields. The left panel displays estimates for the U.S across each of the 5 sources
for long term inﬂation expectations, while the right panel displays estimates for the U.K backed out from
Consensus Economics. The U.S full-sample inﬂation risk premium is -14 basis points and statistically
diﬀerent from zero. This estimate is much smaller but arguably consistent with the structural estimate
provided by Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005) who estimate a massive 150 basis point inﬂation risk premium
on the 10-year bond during at the end of monetary policy experiment (1982) but a steadily declining
premium that reached 40 basis points in 2000, the start of our sample. The time series properties display
two notable episodes, around 2002 and late 2008 / 2009 where the inﬂation risk premium reached −100
basis points. These periods coincide with known deﬂationary scares. On November 6th 2002 the Fed cut
its overnight rate an aggressive 50 basis points to a 40-year low of 1.25% in a bid to stimulate slowing con-
sumer spending. In a speech to the Economic Club of New York City one month later, Alan Greenspan,
the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, noted that ‘a major objective of the recent heightened level
of scrutiny is to ensure that any latent deﬂationary pressures are appropriately addressed well before they
became a problem’. In the aftermath of Lehman brother’s collapse, a second deﬂation scare was widely
reported in the press leading Nouriel Roubini to argue that the current economic state was at risk of
‘stag-deﬂation’, a recession coinciding with a period of deﬂation.9
In the U.K I ﬁnd the 10-year inﬂation risk premium was close to zero between 2001 - 2008. In
subsequent years the retail price index fell dramatically while long term inﬂation expectations remained
relatively stable. As a result, breakeven rates dropped below expected inﬂation leading to an estimated
−150 basis point inﬂation adjusted spread. This did not escape the attention of Bank of England, whose
February 2009 Inﬂation report carried a section discussing likely impact of deﬂation and warned the retail
price index would continue to fall in coming months.10
[insert ﬁgure 1.9 about here ]
H. Liquidity Explanations
Several authors have documented liquidity issues in the U.S TIPS market. D’Amico, Kim, and Wei (2008)
argue that the TIPS liquidity premium was as high as 120 basis points in 1999 and trended down to 10
basis points in 2004. The liquidity of the TIPS market complicates measurement of the inﬂation risk pre-
mium since illiquid securities command lower prices hence higher yields masking the true spread between
real and nominal yields. One might worry that the observed co-movement between real and nominal
9Alan Greenspan’s full speech can be found here: www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002/20021219/.
Nouriel Roubini ﬁrst coined the term stag-deﬂation in a Forbes article found here:
www.forbes.com/2008/10/29/stagnation-recession-deflation-oped-cx_nr_1030roubini.html.
10See page 33 here: www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/inflationreport/ir09feb.pdf
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risk premia were in fact due to a co-movement between liquidity risk premia and nominal risk premia
that is revealed through inﬂation protected markets. In this section I examine this alternative and reject it.
I propose a liquidity adjustment to the inﬂation indexed bonds that uses a regression model along the
lines of Grishchenko and Huang (2012) and Pﬂueger and Viceira (2013). Absent an indexation mis-match,
hypothetical real yields and inﬂation indexed bonds are linked by a premium Ly(t, T ):
yTIPSt = y(t, T ) + Ly(t, T ). (1.2)
This implies that observed break-even rates are complicated by a liquidity distortion
beL(t, T ) = y$(t, T )− yt − L
y(t, T ) = Et
[
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τ
τ∑
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πt+i
]
+ IRP dy (t, T ) (1.3)
where IRP dy (t, T ) denotes the distorted inﬂation risk premium on an T maturity bond. Given an observ-
able proxy for liquidity I can in principle recovering the true inﬂation risk premium by adding back in the
liquidity premium: IRP y(t, T ) = IRP dy (t, T ) + Ly(t, T ). I employ three independent variables to form
this adjustment:
1. Noiset : the yield curve ﬁtting error, deﬁned as a root mean squared error between market quoted
real par yields and those implied by a Nelson-Siegel-Svensson model. The measure is the TIPS coun-
terpart to the noise measure studied in Hu, Pan, and Wang (2010) who argue that hidden liquidity
states for the overall ﬁnancial market can be extracted by the amount of arbitrage opportunities
present in U.S Treasuries. Since arbitrage forces tend to smooth out yield curves times of abundant
arbitrage capital should be times of low average ﬁtting errors. As such, ‘noise’ should be informative
about liquidity conditions in the TIPS market. For the U.S I compute the diﬀerence between im-
plied par-yields from the GSW dataset and market traded quotes published on the Federal Reserve
board site. For the U.K I obtain an analogous measure estimated by the Macro Analysis division
of the Bank of England.
2. Turnt : I construct a measure of relative transaction volume for inﬂation linked market for both
the U.S and the U.K. The measure is taken to be the ratio of inﬂation index turnover relative
to the total Treasury market turnover and is potentially informative about TIPS market liquidity
conditions when agents face search frictions in the sense of Duﬃe, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2005).
For the U.S this data is available from the Federal Reserve board and in the U.K form the Oﬃce of
National Statistics.
3. BidAskt : The spread between the prices to buy and sell simultaneously market quoted bonds. The
spread compensates dealers for inventory risk, order costs, and the cost of trading against informed
investors, and is a general measure of the overall liquidity of the market. Bid-Ask spreads are
available from Bloomberg.
Figure 1.10 displays time series for U.S liquidity proxies.
20
[Insert ﬁgure 1.10 about here]
Monthly expectations of long term inﬂation expectations are unavailable from surveys. I employ a
Phillips curve VAR with the state vector xt = [CPIU, IP,EMPL,UNEM ] where I include year-on-year
log growth rates in the the industrial production index (IP), the Index of Help Wanted Advertising in
the Newspapers (HELP), the civil U.S. employment (EMPL), and unemployment rate (UNEM). For the
U.K the state vector includes the Retail Price Index, to which inﬂation linked Gilts are adjusted, the
unemployment rate, and the growth rate in retail sales. For both sets of forecasts I estimate the VAR
recursively using a 10-year history of monthly observations preceding date t.
Given long term inﬂation rates for 5, 7 and 10-year maturities I run the regression
−1×
(
y$(t, T )− yTIPS(t, T )− Et
[
1
τ
τ∑
i
πt+i
])
= α+ β1Noiset + β2 log Turnt + β3BidAskt + εt.
Assuming the liquidity variables are not explaining variation in the IRP one can think of the constant
in this regression having two components, one due to inﬂation and a one due to liquidity such that
α = αLIQ +αIRP . Our approach to separate these components is to normalise the ﬁtting liquidity factor
such that it’s in sample minimum reaches zero. The resulting time series is the ﬁtted value
L(t, T ) = αliq + βˆ1Noiset + βˆ2 log Turnt + βˆ3BidAskt
The left panel of ﬁgure 1.11 plots the estimated liquidity adjustment for 5, 7, and 10 year maturities.
The time-series conﬁrms the ﬁndings of Grishchenko and Huang (2012) and Pﬂueger and Viceira (2013)
who both document the existence of a liquidity premium in the early years of our sample (2000 - 2003),
followed by a massive liquidity shock in excess of 100 basis points during the 2008/2009 ﬁnancial crisis.
Given this liquidity adjustment for each inﬂation forecast i I recover an estimate of the ‘true’ inﬂation
risk premium as follows
IRP i(t, T ) = IRP d,i(t, T ) + Li(t, T ) = beL(t, T )− Eit
[
1
τ
τ∑
i
πt+i
]
+ Li(t, T )
The right panel of ﬁgure 1.11 plots the liquidity adjusted inﬂation risk premia. For the U.K I obtain
results that are quantitively the same as the U.S counterpart but omit these in order to save space.11
The adjusted estimates suggest that the ﬁndings presented above are unlikely to be driven by liquidity
diﬀerentials. For the 10-year maturity, the sample average across each of the three inﬂation forecasts
is −6.5 basis points and statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level, consistent with the unadjusted
estimates. More importantly, the dynamics of adjusted versus unadjusted inﬂation risk premia are also
consistent with the 2002/2008/2009 deﬂation scare interpretation clearly visible. The overall size of the
inﬂation risk premium remains small which I take as evidence in favour of a real risk premium story being
the dominant driving source for nominal return predictability.
11 These results are available on request.
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[Insert ﬁgure 1.11 about here]
Alternative Risk Premium Proxies
The previous section showed that UL and US are priced risk factors and that US is a factor responsible for
time-variation in risk premia. Here, I examine the link between these factors and risk premium proxies
that have been suggested by the extant literature. I consider two proxies, the ﬁrst is the 3-month real and
nominal Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005a) factors discussed above. The second is a volatility state ﬁltered
by Le and Singleton (2013a) from a no-arbitrage term structure model that has the interpretation of a
time-varying quantity of risk factor.
Table 1.12 reports point estimates and t-statistics from a regression of risk premium proxies on UL and
US . The ﬁrst and second rows reports regressions Vt with on the left hand side. The sample period using
nominal term structure factors is 1990.1 − 2007.1 and for real term structure factors is 2000.1 − 2007.1.
The remaining rows report projections of adapted Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005a) factors over the com-
mon sample period 2000.1 − 2007.1.
Two results emerge. The ﬁrst is that US is positively related to these risk premium proxies. The
second, more surprising observation, is that the nominal risk premium factors are explained equally well
by the real U ’s as they are by the nominal U ’s. Both regressions show that Vt is positively related to
the slope factors with t-statistics that are signiﬁcant the 1% level, while the level factor loading is close
to zero and insigniﬁcant. In both sample periods the unspanned slope explains a large fraction of the
variance of Vt with an R
2
of 60% and 33%, respectively. In an unreported regression using the nominal
factors over the period 2000.1 − 2007.1 I obtain a near identical result. While this regression uses prices
on the left and right, importantly the risk premium factor is extracted from the cross-section of nominal
yields yet is explained by a factor living in the space of real yields.
The remaining rows report projection adapted Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005a) factors over the com-
mon sample period 2000.1 − 2007.1. A large proportion of CP $t is explained by U
r,$
L , U
r,$
S , where all
t-statistics are signiﬁcant at 1%. More importantly, the predictable variation due to nominal factors is
almost the same that due to real factors, with R
2
’s are 67% and 57%, respectively. Second, and symmet-
rically, both real and nominal slope factors are explaining CP rt in a similar fashion, with R
2
’s are 32%
and 37%, respectively.
In terms of equilibrium models, these ﬁndings suggest that speciﬁcations for the nominal term structure
must account for the fact that a dominant component of the dynamics of excess returns must come from
a source of risk that belongs to the real term structure. In the next section I discuss possible explanations
for what this source of risk might be.
[insert table 1.12 about here ]
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II. Equilibrium Implications
Many asset pricing models are capable of generating positive nominal Sharpe ratios through compensation
for inﬂation risks. It is not so easy to generate upward sloping real curves. Backus, Gregory, and Zin
(1989) make this point clear within the context of a monetary Mehra and Prescott (1985) economy with
CRRA preferences. These authors argue to generate real Sharpe ratios as large as those observed in the
U.S Treasury market risk aversion should be around 10. More troubling, however, the real term structure
is upward sloping only if consumption growth is negatively autocorrelated. Since quarterly consumption
growth has small positive autocorrelation the average risk premium for inﬂation protected markets should
be negative. I review brieﬂy three alternative economies that introduce time-varying quantities of risk or
time-varying prices of risk, and study which has better potential to explain the joint behaviour of real
and nominal interest rates.
A. Long Run Risk
Long run risk economies introduce time-varying quantities of risk in combination with non-separable
preferences. In power utility models risk aversion (γ) and elasticity of intertemporal substitution (1/ψ)
are tightly restricted: they are the reciprocal of each other. This implies that investors who are averse
to consumption volatility across states must also be averse to consumption volatility over time. It is not
clear why this should be the case. Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989) develop generalised expected
utility building on the Kreps and Porteus (1978) preferences, allowing for separation of these concepts.
Epstein-Zin (EZ) preferences deﬁne utility recursively by
Ut =
{
(1− δ)c1−γt θ + δ(Et[U
1−γ
t+1 ])
1
θ
} θ
1−γ
where 0 < δ < 1 determines the rate of time preference, and θ ≡ 1−γ1−1/ψ . The special case γ = 1/ψ
corresponds to time-separable power utility.
The representative maximises lifetime utility subject to the standard budget constraint Wt+1 =
Rw,t+1 (Wt −Ct), where Wt is the representative agent wealth that includes human capital, and Rw,t+1
is the return on the wealth portfolio. The real stochastic discount factor implied by this formulation is:
mt+1 = log(Mt+1) = θ log(δ)−
θ
ψ
Δct+1 + (θ − 1)rw,t+1,
where rw,t+1 is the real log return on the wealth portfolio, andΔ ct+1 is log consumption growth.
One important pricing implication of EZ preferences is that state variables that aﬀect consumption
dynamics will be priced through the the return on the wealth portfolio rw,t+1. Bansal and Yaron (2004)
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consider an economy with forecastable consumption growth subject to time-varying conditional volatility:
Δct+1 = μc + gt + σcc,t+1,
gt+1 = ρgt + σtg,t+1
σ2t+1 = σ
2 − ν(σ2 − σ2t ) + σww,t+1
where all shocks are i.i.d orthogonal. Ignoring a convexity term the risk premium on real bonds is given
by
Et[hprx
(n)
t,t+1] = βn,cλcσ
2
c + βn,gλgσ
2
t + βn,wλwσ
2
w
where the betas are determined endogenously from the joint dynamics of the SDF and returns. The mar-
ket price of consumption shocks is γ as in power utility. If the covariance between consumption shocks
and expected consumption shocks is positive (negative) then real bonds are a hedge (risky). The market
price of consumption growth risk is positive when agents have a preference for the early resolution of un-
certainty, which is the case when γ > 1/ψ. The market price of volatility risk is negative with preference
for early resolution.
Through time-varying quantities, long run risk economies also generate implications for return pre-
dictability. Recently, Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013) extend the benchmark economy to study nomi-
nal yields in the presence of time-varying inﬂation uncertainty. In equilibrium, both real and nominal
yields are increasing in economic uncertainty. The implications for consumption risk is identical to
Bansal and Yaron (2004). However, due to a non-neutrality assumption inﬂation risk is priced on the real
curve, and since it signals lower real uncertainty in the future its sign is the opposite to consumption risk.
Implications: Long run risk and economic uncertainty have the eﬀect of decreasing (increasing) average
real bond risk premia when agents have an early (late) preference for the resolution of uncertainty. This
is because the beta on consumption growth is negative and the beta on volatility shocks is positive.
Therefore, the shape of the real yield curve is revealing about the preference the resolution of uncertainty,
one of the key ideas motivating recursive utility. Moreover, when agents have a preference for early (late)
resolution of uncertainty, real bond risk premia will be decreasing (increasing) in the conditional variance
of expected consumption growth. If inﬂation is non-neutral as in Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013), the
eﬀect of inﬂation volatility is opposite to real volatility.
B. Habit
Habit economies introduce variation in risk premia through an alternative channel: time-varying prices of
risk. When investors form habits, current utility depends not only on current consumption, but also on a
reference point that depends on past consumption. The key insight to habit formation is that marginal
utility is volatile even when consumption is smooth, because utility is derived from consumption relative
to some ‘standard of living’, and prices of risk vary counter-cyclically.
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Habit models come in ratio or diﬀerence form. In addition, habit formation can be internal, in which
consumption choices factors eﬀects on future habit, or external where the habit has no aﬀect on con-
sumption policy and in this sense is a true ‘externality’. For ease of exposition and since ratio models
imply constant risk premia I focus on external diﬀerence models as in Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and
Wachter (2006).
The representative agent maximises the following objective
Et
∞∑
i=0
δi
(Ct+i −Ht+i)
1−γ − 1
1− γ
where γ denotes the utility curvature parameter andHt is the habit level. Consumption growth is assumed
to follow a random walk
δct+1 = g + εc,t+1 , εc,t+1 ∼ N(0, σ
2
c )
Current utility depends on past consumption through an autoregressive process for the surplus ratio
St =
Ct−Ht
Ct
. To ensure utility is well deﬁned most models follow Campbell-Cochrane by specifying a
AR(1) process for the log surplus ratio (st = logSt)
st+1 = (1− φ)s¯ + φst + λ(st)εc,t+1
where φ is the persistence of habit, and λ(st) is the sensitivity function that controls the response of
habit to consumption innovations. The local coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is time-varying given by
γ∗(t) = −CtUCC/UC = γ/St. Risk aversion rises as St declines, that is, bad states occur after negative
consumption shocks as consumption is pushed towards the standard of living. In habit models counter-
cyclical risk aversion is generated endogenously. The stochastic discount factor is given by
Mt+1 = δ
(
St+1
St
Ct+1
Ct
)
Taking logs and using the dynamics of consumption and surplus the riskfree real rate is given by
rt = − log(δ) + γg − γ(1− φ)(st − s¯)−
γ2σ2C
2
[λ(st) + 1]
A drop in consumption surplus has two eﬀects on the real risk free rate: (i) marginal utility is high in
bad times, when surplus is low, but since surplus is mean-reverting so is marginal utility. Consumers
anticipate marginal utility will fall in the future and would like to smooth intertemporally, borrowing
against the future driving up the risk free interest rate; and (ii) Precautionary savings lowers borrowing
costs since surplus and its conditional volatility are negatively correlated. As uncertainty rises, investors
are more willing to save and this drives down the risk free rate.
Habit models introduce additional ﬂexibility to the risk free rate which is useful in matching the ob-
25
served stability of the risk free rate. For example, Campbell and Cochrane (1999) choose the sensitivity
function so that intertemporal substitution and precautionary savings eﬀects oﬀset exactly so the risk-
less rate is constant. Indeed, Backus, Chernov, and Zin (2011) argue that a key ingredient in matching
discount factor entropy bounds is the ability to oﬀset variation entering short rates. When short rates
are constant so are bond risk premia. Building on the Campbell-Cochrane economy, Wachter (2006)
generalises the oﬀsetting eﬀect of intertemporal smoothing versus precautionary savings so that the risk
free rate can be written as
rt = const− b(st − s¯)
The free parameter b has an economic interpretation. When b < 0, intertemporal smoothing dominates
and interest rates are low in high marginal utility states, and when b > 0 precautionary savings dominates
and interest rates are high in high marginal utility states. Bond prices in Wachter (2006) are unavailable
in closed form but up to a second order Taylor expansion bond risk premia can be written as
Et[hprx
(n)
t,t+1] ∼ δ(1 + rt)
γ∗(t)
Ct
covt[(Ct+1 −Xt+1), r
(n)
t+1]
Implications: The real bond risk premium depends on the covariance between bond returns and surplus
consumption levels. If the covariance are positive (negative) they pay oﬀ in good (bad) times and are
risky (insurance). The average slope of the term structure depends crucially on whether real rates are
pro-cyclical or not. In particular, if real rates are low in bad times then bond returns will be high and
covary negatively with surplus; thus, the real term structure should be downward sloping. Furthermore,
a decrease (increase) in consumption, given habits, will decrease (increase) the surplus ratio and increase
(decrease) expected excess returns.
C. Heterogeneous Agents
Mehra and Prescott (1985) assume the existence of a representative agent who consumes aggregate con-
sumption. Since aggregate consumption is smooth, so is marginal utility. Habit and long run risk models
tackle this problem by introducing time-non-seperable preferences. An alternative possibility is that ag-
gregate consumption is a poor proxy for individual consumption. Indeed, using panel data Zeldes (1989)
and Parker and Preston (2002) show that the consumption of stockholders is more volatile, and more
more correlated with market returns, than non-stockholders. Attanasio and Low (2004) report that per
capita volatility of consumption is up to twelve times larger than aggregate consumption.
Models with heterogeneous agents address the smoothness in aggregate consumption by allowing
investors to form individual consumption policies based on their beliefs. The key insight of this literature
is that, if agents can trade, the equilibrium SDF is aﬀected by disagreement. Consider two agents, a and
b, each representing its own class with separate (absolutely continuous) subjective probability measures
on the data generating process, denoted as dPat and dP
b
t . Given a ﬁltered probability space the diﬀerence
in beliefs between the two agents can be conveniently summarized by the Radon-Nikodym derivative
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ηt =
dPbt
dPat
, so that for any random variable Xt that is Ft-measurable,
Eb(XT |Ft) = E
a (ηTXT |Ft) , with ηt = 1. (1.4)
In the literature, the Radon-Nikodym derivative ηt is either assumed as an exogenous process or ob-
tained as the outcome of an optimal learning problem in which agents have diﬀerent prior beliefs.12
Independent of its microfundations, disagreement among agents aﬀects the distribution of consump-
tion in equilibrium, for T < ∞. Agents trade to equate ex-ante expected marginal utility of con-
sumption, Eau′(caT |Ft) = E
bu′(cbT |Ft). Thus, using (3.16), any frictionless equilibrium requires that
Eau′(caT |Ft) = E
a(ηTu
′(cbT |Ft)) so that innovations in ηt necessarily imply a diﬀerent allocation of state-
contingent consumption cat and c
b
t between the two agents. Optimists will trade to shift consumption
to states of the world in which their subjective probabilities are the highest, in exchange for a lower
consumption in those states they deem less likely.
Indeed, in equilibrium, agents must have diﬀerent individual stochastic discount factors, which need
to satisfy Mat = ηtM
b
t . Thus, ex-post marginal utilities will not be equal since ex-ante beliefs drive a
wedge between agent speciﬁc consumption. In some sense, subjective beliefs generate endogenous risk
since they make individual consumption stochastic even when aggregate consumption is smooth and can
thus generate long run risk. On the other hand, the pricing measure inherits a time-varying price of risk,
so provide provide micro foundations for time-varying risk aversion as in a habit economy.
Equilibrium Consumption
The link between equilibrium asset prices and disagreement depends on the aggregation properties of the
model. In complete markets, Cuoco and He (1994) show how the competitive equilibrium solution can
be obtained from the problem of a central planner. 13 A representative agent U∗ can be constructed as
a stochastic weighted average [1, λt] of the marginal utilities of the two agents:
U∗(ct, λ) :=max {tua(ca(t)) + λttub(cb(t))}
s.t (i)
∑
i
cit = ct∀t
Normalising the weight on agent a, a necessary condition for a social optimum is u′a(ca(t)) = λtu
′
b(cb).
From the ﬁrst order condition of the individual agent problems this implies λt =
u′a(ca(t))
u′b(cb(t))
= αaM
a(t)
αbMb(t)
.
Imposing the aggregate resource constraint (ct = c
a
t + c
b
t) one obtains individual consumption policies and
12Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006), Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009), and
Buraschi and Whelan (2012a), all study economies in which the process ηt arise from investors’ diﬀerent prior knowledge
about the informativeness of signals and the dynamics of unobservable economic variables. See Kurz (1994) for a discussion
on the microfundations of disagreement. Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009) label the process ηt ‘sentiment’.
13Constantinides (1982) extends Negishi (1960)’s results and proves the existence of a representative agent with heteroge-
neous preferences and endowments but with homogeneous beliefs. In an incomplete market setting with homogeneous agents
Cuoco and He (1994) show a representative agent can be constructed from a social welfare function with stochastic weights.
Basak (2000) discuss the aggregation properties in economies with heterogeneous beliefs but complete markets. He shows
that a representative can be constructed from a stochastic weighted average of individuals marginal utilities.
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the stochastic discount factors for the representative
cat =
ct
1 + η
1/γ
t
, cbt = ct
η
1/γ
t
1 + η
1/γ
t
M∗t = tc
−γ
t H(ηt)
where H(η) =
(
1 + η
1/γ
t
)γ
.
Eﬀective Risk Aversion
In equilibrium, agents must have diﬀerent individual stochastic discount factors. This implies an ex-
post wedge between marginal utilities which is generated by beliefs about fundamentals, rather than
fundamentals themselves, resulting in a ‘distortion’ H(ηt) to the pricing measure with respect to the
standard CRRA kernel. As in a habit economy, the local curvature of the representative investor’s utility
function is now time-varying and given by
γ∗(t) = −ct
Ucc
Uc
= γ
(
1 +
cat + c
b
t
cat
H(η)−2
)
which is strictly larger than γ. For equal consumption shares this reduces to
γ∗(t) = γ(1 + 2−(1+γ)).
This shows that, contrary to the Mehra and Prescott (1985) puzzle, it is possible for small risk aversion
to generate large local curvature at the representative level. The intuition is the following. When agents
have low risk aversion, they are very willing to engage in speculative trades based on their beliefs, which
generates large endogenous risk to the counterparty whose forecasting model performs poorly ex-post.
For very large levels of risk aversion, agents are very unwilling to trade and the economy collapses to
the degenerate single agent case. Motivated by this observation, table 1.13 collects discount factors and
risk free rates from popular models in the literature, and classiﬁes them as (i) myopic (γ = 1); (ii) risk
sharing(γ > 1) ; (iii) speculative (γ < 1) ; or (iv) frictions based models.
Subjective Discount Factors
The real state price densities for agent n = a, b will be given by
dMnt
Mnt
= −r(t)dt− κc,n(t)dWˆ
c
t − κx,n(t)dWˆ
x
t
where Wˆ ct are subjective consumption shocks, and Wˆ
x
t are shocks from any signals that aﬀect the Radon-
Nikodym derivative of agents beliefs. For example, in Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006) agents learn about the
the growth rate of consumption from publicly available signals. Since the dynamics of disagreement aﬀect
equilibrium allocations disagreement on the informativeness of signals can have real economic eﬀects. In
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a nominal context, Illeditsch, Gallmeyer, Heyerdahl-Larsen, and Ehling (2009) and Buraschi and Whelan
(2012a) derive optimal ﬁlters in which shocks to the inﬂation get priced on the real discount factor because
inﬂation contains information about future real growth. In these economies, disagreement about inﬂation
can have real economic consequences; thus, represents a form of inﬂation non-neutrality.
The second column of table 1.13 presents a lists of discount factors from the literature. The shared
property of these models is that belief dynamics break the tight link between risk compensation and second
moments of fundamentals. When agents have subjective beliefs, individual consumption is stochastic even
if aggregate consumption is i.i.d. Investors consume more (less) in states of where they perceive high
aggregate cash ﬂows, at a lower (higher) marginal utility, because they believe these states as more (less)
likely. Real prices of risk are time-varying and special cases of:
κc,a(t) = γσc + ω
b
tψ
g
t κc,a(t) = γσc − ω
a
t ψ
g
t
κx,a(t) = ω
b
tψ
x
t κx,b(t) = ω
a
t ψ
x
t
where ψxt is disagreement on publicly available information useful for learning. An important insight is
that the belief adjustment to risk prices contain two components, one which is backward looking depend-
ing on past trades (ωnt ) and one which is forward looking (ψt) that depending on the future (perceived)
investment opportunity set.
Real and nominal short rates are obtained as an application of Ito’s lemma to either stochastic discount
factor
rt = δ + γ
(
ωagˆ
a
t + ωbgˆ
b
t
)
−
1
2
γ(1 + γ)σ2c +
1
2
(γ − 1)
γ
ωaωbΨ
′
tΨt
r$t = rt +
(
ωaπˆ
a
t + ωbπˆ
b
t
)
− σ2q
where ωi(ηt) = c
i
t/ct is investor’s i total consumption share, andΨ t is a vector of disagreements that
includes consumption growth and any signals used to learn the state of the economy. In the absence
of heterogeneous beliefs short term interest rates are given by the Lucas solution. This includes terms
reﬂecting time preference, precautionary savings demand, and a wealth/substitution eﬀects.14 In the het-
erogeneous case, short rates include two new components. The ﬁrst is a belief distortion due to speculative
trading that took place in the past. This term biases observed short rates towards the belief of the agent
who has greater purchasing power since they are wealthier, or because the other agent is constrained. The
second component is due to a hedging (speculative) demand. Holding the wealth weighted average belief
constant its impact is symmetric and quadratic in disagreement. The magnitude of the eﬀect is largest
when the two agents have equal consumption shares ωa = ωb. The sign of the eﬀect, however, depends
on whether γ is greater or smaller than 1. Investors disagree about the correct model for the economy,
but choose to trade since they expect to gain a larger consumption share tomorrow. Given that today’s
14 The intuition is the standard one. The larger expected consumption growth, the higher the demand for current
consumption, the lower the demand for savings, and the higher the interest rate required to clear the bond market.
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consumption is ﬁxed, interest rates must fall when γ < 1 due to the substitution eﬀect, and must rise
when γ > 1 due to the wealth eﬀect.
Implications: A necessary condition for trade is that agents agree on the price of date t securities,
which in the absence of arbitrage, must be consistent with a set of positive state prices. Since state
prices are probabilities multiplied by marginal utilities, subjective beliefs imply agents choose diﬀerent
levels of consumption. Furthermore, when beliefs are stochastic, so are their consumption streams. In
a heterogeneous agent equilibrium, diﬀerences in beliefs represent a ‘non-fundamental’ source of priced
risk, and thus should be correlated with the cross-sectional and time-series properties of bond markets.
[insert table 1.13 about here ]
III. Risk Factors
A. Economic Uncertainty
In long run risk economies recursive preferences time-variation in risk compensation arises from the dy-
namics of the quantity of risk, i.e. heteroskedasticity in the conditional mean of consumption growth
and/or inﬂation. In equilibrium, bond risk premia depends on the beta of yields on uncertainty, and
prices of risk attached to consumption and inﬂation risk. To construct proxies of consumption and in-
ﬂation uncertainty, I follow a similar approach to Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013) and Le and Singleton
(2013a), who propose using survey forecasts as proxies for macroeconomic expectations.
For the U.S I use BlueChip Financial Forecasts Forecasts (BCFF) to construct expected growth rates.
BCFF is a monthly publication providing extensive panel data on survey data from professional economists
working at leading ﬁnancial institutions and service companies.15 Forecasted variables include Treasury
yields and economic fundamentals. While the exact timing of the surveys are not published, the survey
is usually conducted between the 25th and 27th of the month and mailed to subscribers within the ﬁrst
5 days of the subsequent month. The resulting dataset represents an extensive and unique dataset to
investigate the role of formation of expectations about the macroeconomy.
The horizon of BCFFS forecasts ranges from the end of the current quarter to 5 quarters ahead (6
from January 1997). I obtain a set of constant maturity forecasts (from 1 to 4 quarters ahead) for in-
dividual respondents by interpolating linearly between adjacent horizons. Macroeconomic forecasts are
expressed as annualized percentage changes between subsequent quarters: I obtain compound growth
forecasts by chaining subsequent quarterly forecasts. For instance, suppose that as of April 2000, the
1Q- and 2Q-ahead GDP forecasts of agent n are 5.00 and 6.00, respectively. This means that the agent
expects GDP to increase by
(
1 + 5.00400
)
between April 2000 (the month of the forecast) and June 2000 (the
15The BCFF paper archive was obtained from Wolters Kluwer and entered manually. The digitization process required
inputting around 750,000 entries of named forecasts plus quality control checking and was completed in a joint venture with
the Federal Reserve Board.
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end of current quarter), and by
(
1 + 6.00400
)
between end of June 2000 (the end of current quarter) and the
end of September 2000 (the end of the next quarter). The (annualized) compound growth rate between
April 2000 and September 2000 is obtained as 2 ·
(
1 + 5.00400
)
·
(
1 + 6.00400
)
.
Consensus forecasts for horizons h = 1, 2, 3, 4 are then deﬁned as the cross-sectional median of all
respondents at time t. Next, I use an ARMA(1, 1) model to demean 1-year consensus expectations, and
ﬁt a GARCH(1, 1) to the residuals. The conditional volatilities implied by the GARCH model then serve
as proxies for economic uncertainty.
In the U.K I use Consensus Economics, a comparable survey to BCFF, but which provides forecasts
for gdp growth and the retail price index, to which inﬂation protected GILTS are indexed. The survey
provides two forecast horizons, an average for the remaining months of the current year, and an average
for the following year. I match short and long term forecasts for each contributor and interpolate linearly
as with BCFF. Given an implied constant maturity forecast I compute uncertainty proxies as above.
Figure 1.12 plots the resulting time-series estimates for real and inﬂation volatility for the U.S (left) panel
and the U.K (right panel).
[insert ﬁgure 1.12 about here ]
B. Consumption Surplus
In Lucas economies with habit preferences as in Campbell and Cochrane (1999), predictability arises in
equilibrium because of an endogenously time-varying price of risk. Shocks to the current endowment
aﬀect the wedge between consumption and habit, thus inducing time-variation in the price of risk. The
impact of consumption shocks on interest rates depends on the relative importance of the intertemporal
consumption smoothing and precautionary savings eﬀects. A negative shock to consumption tends to
increase the short term interest rate through the consumption smoothing channel: agents expect surplus
consumption to recover, so they borrow more against future consumption to smooth their consumption
path. At the same time, the shock tends to reduce interest rates through a precautionary savings chan-
nel: the conditional volatility of surplus rises when its level drops, inducing agents to save more. The
endogenous process for log surplus follows a complicated non-linear autoregressive process, however, up
to an approximation follows an exponentially weighted average of consumption as one would expect from
an external habit model.
Following Wachter (2006) I construct a proxy of consumption surplus st as a weighted average of 10
years of monthly consumption growth rates:
st =
120∑
j=1
φjΔct−j ,
where for U.S surplus I set φ = 0.95 to match the the monthly autocorrelation of S&P price/dividend ratio,
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and in the U.K φ = 0.83 to match the the quarterly autocorrelation of FTSE100 price/dividend ratio.
Consumption data for the U.S is seasonally adjusted, real per-capita consumption of nondurables and
services (from the Bureau of Economic Analysis), and for the U.K quarterly real per-capita consumption
expenditure (from Global Insights). For the U.K I linearly interpolate to obtain a monthly time-series.
[insert ﬁgure 1.13 about here ]
C. Diﬀerences in Belief
I obtain proxies for heterogeneity about real growth and inﬂation from BCFF and Consensus Economics
surveys. From matched individual forecasts I can proxy the for belief dispersion in a number of ways. For
example, the left panel of ﬁgure 1.14 plots time-series for the cross-sectional standard deviation, inter-
quartile range, and entropy for real GDP forecasts.16 The large co-movement in dispersion measures
suggests the underlying distribution is relatively stable and free some outliers. The right panel com-
pares dispersion in gdp (ψg) and inﬂation (ψπ) forecasts, computed from cross-sectional mean-absolute-
deviations, to an political uncertainty (UnCt) factor studied in Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2013).
17
[insert ﬁgure 1.14 about here ]
Both real and inﬂation dispersion has a business cycle component, peaking in each of the previous
three NBER recessions (1990/1991, 2001, 2007/2009). This is interesting as large disagreement is often
reported at this stage of the cycle. Comparing UnCt to our measures for belief dispersion I ﬁnd positive
co-movement with both ψπ (correlation = 0.42) and ψg (correlation = 0.48), which is somewhat surprising
given that the weight assigned to forecaster disagreement about inﬂation in this index is just 1/6. The
remaining components of the index are 1/2 a broad-based news index, 1/6 a tax expiration index and
1/6 a government purchases disagreement measure. Taken together these measures suggest the existence
of a common component in the formation of expectations, which is important since systematic variation
is required for priced return predictability. Moreover, macroeconomic disagreement is correlated with a
broad measure of political uncertainty which could be important from a policy perspective, depending on
the real economic eﬀects of investor heterogeneity.
[insert ﬁgure 1.15 about here ]
Figure 1.15 plots disagreement series for U.K gdp and retail price inﬂation computed from the mean-
absolute deviation in the cross-section. The U.K has witnessed two recessions in the last 20 years, in
1990/1991 and 2008/2009. Repeating the pattern found in the U.S, disagreement peaks during these
periods lending additional support to a link between heterogeneity and bad times. A ﬁnal comment is
worth mentioning. Figure 1.15 plots the dispersion in inﬂation forecasts standardised by the consensus
(median) estimate, which shows that between late 2008 and 2010 disagreement about the future path of
16Entropy is estimated as p× log(p) from a histogram ﬁtted to the cross-sectional belief distribution.
17The economic uncertainty proxy plotted here is available for down from www.policyuncertainty.com
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inﬂation was nearly 10 times its historical average. This implies that even though the level of inﬂation
was at a 20-year low, there were extreme views in the survey, some people expected rapid inﬂation while
others expected rapid deﬂation. If investors truly risk share based on their beliefs then this is a time
when risk premia is exchanged through insurance contracts.
IV. Understanding Equilibrium Risk Compensation
Section III proposed proxies for the state variables associated time-varying prices of risk, quantities of
risk, and subjective beliefs. Using the common factors extracted from real yields I try to learn about risk
premium dynamics via running regression of unexplained yield portfolios on risk factors. For the residual
slope factor I run
UN $S = const+ β1volt[g] + β2volt[π] + γsurplust + φ1DiBt(g) + φ2DiBt(π) + εt
where volt[g] and volt[π] are expected gdp and inﬂation conditional volatilities, surplust is consumption
surplus ratio, and DiBt(g) and DiBt(π) are the cross-sectional dispersion in gdp and inﬂation forecasts.
[insert table 1.14 and 1.15 about here ]
Tables 1.14 and 1.15 report results grouped by asset pricing model. For each model, I consider the slope
factor studied above since this account for observable variation in bond risk premia. Motivated by the
large correlation between real and nominal factors in the sample period 2001.1−2007.1 but mindful of the
statistical implications over short sample periods I run regression using UN $S on the left for the sample
1990.1 − 2007.1
First, considering long run risk explanations I ﬁnd the volatility of growth is positively related to the
slope factor, while the volatility of inﬂation is negatively related. The left and right hand sides in this re-
gression are standardised so the point estimates imply a 1 standard deviation shock to volt[g] raises the left
hand side 61 basis points The point estimate on volt[g] is 0.61 (t = 4.25) and volt[π] is −0.19 (t = −2.71)
so that the economic signiﬁcance The R
2
is 32%, explaining a large fraction of variation in the slope factor
which meaning that the volatility of growth drives up returns on long term bonds. I note that the signs
on our volatility proxies are opposite to the signs obtained by Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013). However,
these are the signs one should expect if the real term structure is risky (upward sloping) and compensation
for uncertainty in long run risks is primarily due to the real discount factor. On the other hand, this
presents a challenge to the benchmark long run risk model because, as discussed above, if real bonds
command a positive risk premium this implies agents with recursive preferences have a late preference
for the resolution of uncertainty. Unfortunately, with late preference for the esolution of uncertainty long
run risk models cannot explain at the same time the equity risk premium.
Second, considering habit models, surplust loads negatively and is statistically signiﬁcant, with a
t-stat equal to −4.24. A one standard deviation negative shock to surplus lowers the slope factor yields
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46 basis points, consistent with the equilibrium interpretation that low surplus is a bad state of the world,
in bad states real interest rates are low; thus, hedge marginally utility. The R
2
in this regression is 21%.
It is encouraging to ﬁnd a clear link between a consumption based risk factor and time-variation in bond
risk premia. However, given the obviously pro-cyclicality of the short term real risk free rate (see ﬁgure
1.1) and estimated sign on consumption surplus, this implies benchmark external habit models are unable
to explain an upward sloping real term structure.
Third, considering heterogeneous belief models, belief proxies explain 9% of the slope factor variation,
which is driven entirely by real disagreement which loads positively with t-stats equal to 3.13. The signs
on real disagreement are consistent with an economy where γ < 1, in which case wealth eﬀects dominates
causing agents speculate on their beliefs, increasing endogenous risk and driving up the volatility of long
term bonds. In the case of equity markets this channel is studied in detail by David (2008) and in the
case of bond markets by Buraschi and Whelan (2012a).
The bottom two rows presents a horse race of risk factors. I note that point estimates on volt[g]
/ volt[π] and surplust have the same sign are individually signiﬁcance at the 1% level. However, the
explanatory power of the belief variables is subsumed by the alternative risk factor proxies. Interestingly,
combining models explain 41% of slope variation, suggesting a potential role for both habit and long run
risk economies.
[insert tables 1.14 and 1.15 about here ]
V. Conclusion
This chapter studied the co-movement of risk premia across real and nominal Treasury bond markets. I
documented that factors explaining time variation in expected excess returns of nominal bonds are also
common to the real term structure, and that this ﬁnding is robust to diﬀerent methods for measuring
the dynamics of risk premia. This suggests that the dominant source of bond predictability arises from
the real term structure. I build on this ﬁnding and study the implications for long-run risk, habit, and
heterogeneous agent models, and argue the likely explanation is due to time-varying quantities of risk.
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VI. Appendix: Figures
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Figure 1.1. Real and Nominal 3 month Yields:
Figure displays time series of real and nominal 3-month risk free rates. We proxy for ex-ante real rates following
Campbell and Shiller (1996) using a VAR that includes the ex post real return on a 3-month nominal bills, the
nominal bill yield, and lagged annual inﬂation rate. Solving the VAR forward we build ex-ante forecasts for date t
measurable 3-month real rates. The left panel displays estimates for the U.S while the right panel displays estimates
for the U.K.
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Figure 1.2. Real and Nominal Slopes.
Figure shows yields curve slopes between 10-years and {5, 6, 7, 8, 9}-years for TIPS (left panel) and nominal Trea-
suries (right panel).
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Figure 1.3. Real and Nominal Excess Returns:
Figure displays realised excess returns computed from 3-month holding periods returns in excess of the the 3-month
risk free interest rate. The time-series records returns at the date they are realised. Black lines represents 5-year
real bonds while dark red lines represent 5-year nominal bonds.
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Figure 1.4. Real and Nominal Forecasting Factor Loadings:
Figure displays the γ’s in the following regression
1
3
∑
[5 7 10]
rx
(n)
t,t+0.25 = α+ γ
′(f
[5 7 10]
t − y(0.25)t ) + t,t+0.25
where returns and forward rates are either real or nominal. Each panel displays the factor loadings used to build
3-month real and nominal Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005a) forecasting factors. The left panel displays loadings for
the U.K and the right panel loadings for the U.S. The top panels display nominal loadings and the bottom panels
display real loadings.
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Figure 1.5. Real and Nominal Forward Rate Implied Risk Premia:
In a ﬁrst stage the average 3-month excess returns across for maturities 5−10 are projected on date t forward rates.
The ﬁtted value from this regression is a linear combination forward rates that predicts returns of all maturities.
Red lines show the implied nominal bond risk premium (CP $t ) and black lines the real bond risk premium (CP
r
t ).
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Figure 1.6. Principle Component Loadings of Residual Yield Variation:
Figure displays loadings from a principle component decomposition of the residuals in a regression of yields on
macroeconomic expectations. The left panel reports U.S loadings and the right panel reports U.K loadings. Solid
lines report loadings from nominal yields and dashed lines loadings from real yields.
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Figure 1.7. Unspanned Principle Components: US
Figure displays the ﬁrst two principle components of the component of yields which is orthogonal to macro economic
expectations. In a ﬁrst stage we projection yields onto survey expectations of gdp growth and inﬂation. In a second
stage we take principle components of the residuals. The left panel displays level factors while the right panel
displays slope factors.
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Figure 1.8. Unspanned Principle Components: UK
Figure displays the ﬁrst two principle components of the component of yields which is orthogonal to macro economic
expectations. In a ﬁrst stage we projection yields onto survey expectations of gdp growth and inﬂation. In a second
stage we take principle components of the residuals. The left panel displays level factors while the right panel
displays slope factors.
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Figure 1.9. 10-year Inﬂation Risk Premium:
Figure displays the 10-year inﬂation risk premium computed as IRP (t, T ) = y$(t, T ) − y(t, T ) − Et
[
1
τ
∑τ
i πt+i
]
.
Average expected inﬂation rates are obtained from long horizon surveys from various sources. Left panel shows
U.S estimates and the right panel U.K estimates.
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Figure 1.10. Liquidity Variables:
Figure displays time series of U.S liquidity variables used to build liquidity adjusted inﬂation risk premium esti-
mates. Noiset is the yield curve ﬁtting error, deﬁned as a root mean squared error between market quoted par
yields and those implied by a Nelson-Siegel-Svensson model. Turnt is log ratio of inﬂation linked transaction
volume to nominal transaction volumes. BidAskt is the spread between the prices to buy and sell simultaneously
market quoted TIPS.
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Figure 1.11. Liquidity Factor and Liquidity Adjusted Inﬂation Risk Premia
The left panel plots the estimated an liquidity adjustment factor [5, 7, 10] year maturity bonds. The right panel
displays liquidity adjusted inﬂation risk premia for [5, 7, 10] year maturity bonds.
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Figure 1.12. Long Run Risk Factors
Figure displays the conditional volatility of expected gdp growth and inﬂation. First we ﬁt a time-series model to
survey implied 1-year growth rates. Next we ﬁt a GARCH(1,1) model to the residuals. Blue lines plot the volatility
of expected gdp and green lies the volatility of expected inﬂation. Left panel displays estimates for the U.S and
the right panel estimates for the U.K
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Figure 1.13. Consumption Surplus Ratios
Figure plots consumption surplus factors for the U.S (left panel) and the U.K(right panel). Factors are constructed
using a weighted average of 10 years past monthly log consumption growth rates.
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Figure 1.14. Belief Dispersion: US
Left panel plots cross-sectional standard deviation, inter-quartile range, and entropy in real growth forecasts from
BCFF. The right panel plots the mean-absolute deviation in real growth and inﬂation forecasts, and a political
uncertainty factor.
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Figure 1.15. Belief Dispersion: UK
Left panel plots the Mean-absolute deviation in real growth and inﬂation forecasts from Consensus Economics.
The right panel plots mean-absolute deviation in the cross-section standardised by the consensus estimate.
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VII. Appendix: Tables
Table 1.1. Summary Statistics: US Treasury Curves
The top panel reports statistics for U.S nominal zero coupon bonds, and the bottom panel B reports statistics for
U.S TIPS curves. Both term structures contain 144 observations for each maturity. Interest rates are obtained
from Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2006, 2010).
Maturity 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 Year
Mean 0.0357 0.0379 0.0399 0.0417 0.0433 0.0447
Std Dev 0.0133 0.0121 0.0111 0.0103 0.0096 0.0090
Min 0.0095 0.0120 0.0144 0.0167 0.0187 0.0206
Max 0.0663 0.0664 0.0665 0.0667 0.0668 0.0670
Skew 0.1424 0.1098 0.0801 0.0494 0.0163 −0.0191
Kurtosis 2.4908 2.6886 2.8810 3.0539 3.1982 3.3097
1st Lag Auto 0.9459 0.9373 0.9284 0.9193 0.9105 0.9022
Mean 0.0172 0.0186 0.0197 0.0206 0.0214 0.0221
Std Dev 0.0122 0.0115 0.0109 0.0103 0.0098 0.0093
Min −0.0084 −0.0065 −0.0045 −0.0027 −0.0010 0.0006
Max 0.0428 0.0430 0.0431 0.0430 0.0430 0.0429
Skew 0.1466 0.1561 0.1789 0.2079 0.2398 0.2729
Kurtosis 2.5091 2.5714 2.6320 2.6883 2.7402 2.7877
1st Lag Auto 0.9376 0.9372 0.9362 0.9349 0.9335 0.9320
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Table 1.2. Summary Statistics: UK Treasury Curves
The top panel reports statistics for U.K nominal zero coupon bonds, and the bottom panel B reports statistics for
U.K inﬂation protected curves. Both term structures contain 285 observations for each maturity. Interest rates are
obtained from the Bank of England website.
Maturity 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 Year
Mean 0.0545 0.0553 0.0559 0.0564 0.0568 0.0572
Std Dev 0.0269 0.0262 0.0255 0.0248 0.0242 0.0237
Min 0.0045 0.0068 0.0091 0.0112 0.0133 0.0152
Max 0.1293 0.1283 0.1273 0.1263 0.1251 0.1237
Skew 0.3171 0.3858 0.4533 0.5142 0.5656 0.6067
Kurtosis 2.8269 2.8098 2.7937 2.7718 2.7402 2.6973
1st Lag Auto 0.9840 0.9844 0.9846 0.9848 0.9850 0.9853
Mean 0.0209 0.0212 0.0216 0.0218 0.0221 0.0223
Std Dev 0.0158 0.0152 0.0147 0.0144 0.0141 0.0139
Min −0.0237 −0.0214 −0.0193 −0.0173 −0.0155 −0.0139
Max 0.0480 0.0487 0.0491 0.0494 0.0495 0.0495
Skew −0.9632 −0.8545 −0.7386 −0.6248 −0.5175 −0.4192
Kurtosis 3.2350 3.1433 3.0226 2.8930 2.7651 2.6442
1st Lag Auto 0.9761 0.9776 0.9789 0.9802 0.9813 0.9823
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Table 1.3. U.S Campbell-Schiller Projections
Table replicates the Campbell and Shiller (1991a) projection coeﬃcients from the following regression
y
(n−m)
t+m − y(n)t = const+ βnm
(
m
n−m
)
(y
(n)
t − y(m)t ) + errort+m (1.5)
for n = {60, 72, 84, 96, 108, 120}-months and m = 3-months.
Nominal
Maturity 60 72 84 96 108 120
βnm −0.17 −0.20 −0.23 −0.26 −0.28 −0.29
t-stat (−2.41) (−2.50) (−2.64) (−2.81) (−2.99) (−3.16)
R2 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12
Real
βnm −0.20 −0.19 −0.19 −0.18 −0.18 −0.18
t-stat (−2.49) (−2.44) (−2.43) (−2.45) (−2.49) (−2.55)
R2 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Table 1.4. U.K Campbell-Schiller Projections
Table replicates the Campbell and Shiller (1991a) projection coeﬃcients from the following regression
y
(n−m)
t+m − y(n)t = const+ βnm
(
m
n−m
)
(y
(n)
t − y(m)t ) + errort+m (1.6)
for n = {60, 72, 84, 96, 108, 120}-months and m = 3-months.
Nominal
Maturity 60 72 84 96 108 120
βnm −0.38 −0.39 −0.40 −0.40 −0.41 −0.42
tstat (−3.70) (−3.78) (−3.84) (−3.89) (−3.93) (−3.96)
R2 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.22
Real
βnm −0.23 −0.22 −0.20 −0.19 −0.18 −0.16
tstat (−2.55) (−2.41) (−2.30) (−2.19) (−2.10) (−2.01)
R2 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07
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Table 1.5. Real and Nominal Cochrane-Piazzesi Regressions: US
Table reports regression of 3-month excess returns on n-year real and nominal bonds on a forecasting factor
constructed from an aﬃne combination of date t forward rates (CPt):
hprx
(n)
t = Et[p
(n−3)
t+3 ]− p(n)t − r3mt = const + βCPt + ε(n)t,t+3.
t-statistics, reported in ( )’s, are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity using the Hansen and Hodrick
(1983) GMM correction with 3 Newey-West lags. Sample Period: 2000.1 - 2011.12. The left panel reports point
estimates from nominal bond returns on nominal CP $t and the right panel reports real bond returns on real CP
r
t .
const CP $t R
2
const CP rt R
2
hprx
(5)
t 0.06 0.71 0.16 0.02 0.81 0.08
( 0.16) (4.47) (0.03) (2.44)
hprx
(6)
t 0.03 0.85 0.17 0.01 0.90 0.08
(0.07) (4.53) (0.01) (2.55)
hprx
(7)
t 0.00 0.98 0.17 -0.01 0.98 0.09
(0.00) (4.47) (-0.01) (2.63)
hprx
(8)
t -0.02 1.08 0.17 -0.01 1.05 0.09
(-0.04) (4.34) (-0.02) (2.69)
hprx
(9)
t -0.03 1.16 0.16 -0.01 1.11 0.09
(-0.05) (4.17) (-0.01) (2.74)
hprx
(10)
t -0.03 1.22 0.15 0.00 1.15 0.09
(-0.05) (3.98) (0.00) (2.76)
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Table 1.6. Real and Nominal Cochrane-Piazzesi Regressions: UK
Table reports regression of 3-month excess returns on n-year real and nominal bonds on a forecasting factor
constructed from an aﬃne combination of date t forward rates (CPt):
hprx
(n)
t = Et[p
(n−3)
t+3 ]− p(n)t − r3mt = const + βCPt + ε(n)t,t+3.
t-statistics, reported in ( )’s, are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity using the Hansen and Hodrick
(1983) GMM correction with 3 Newey-West lags. Sample Period: 2000.1 - 2011.12. The left panel reports point
estimates from nominal bond returns on nominal CP $t and the right panel reports real bond returns on real CP
r
t .
const CP $t R
2
const CP rt R
2
hprx
(5)
t 0.18 0.53 0.04 0.03 0.81 0.19
(0.52) (2.50) (0.11) (2.81)
hprx
(6)
t 0.12 0.74 0.06 0.00 0.93 0.20
(0.31) (2.92) (-0.01) (3.00)
hprx
(7)
t 0.04 0.94 0.08 -0.02 1.01 0.21
(0.10) (3.25) (-0.06) (3.14)
hprx
(8)
t -0.04 1.12 0.09 -0.02 1.06 0.21
(-0.09) (3.46) (-0.06) (3.25)
hprx
(9)
t -0.12 1.28 0.10 -0.01 1.09 0.20
(-0.25) (3.54) (-0.02) (3.34)
hprx
(10)
t -0.18 1.39 0.10 0.02 1.10 0.19
(-0.37) (3.49) (0.05) (3.42)
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Table 1.7. Principle Component Decomposition
Table reports eigenvalue decomposition of the covariance matrix of of yields. The ﬁrst two rows report the per-
centages explained by each orthogonal factor for nominal and real yields, respectively. The ﬁnal row report the
percentage explained (R2) from a regression of nominal factors on real factors. Sample period 2000.1-2011.1
U.S Treasuries Level Slope Curvature
% of cov(y$t ) explained 97.00 1.94 0.06
% of cov(yrt ) explained 97.61 2.37 0.02
% Nom factor explained by real factor 0.76 0.60 0.22
U.K Treasuries
% of cov(y$t ) explained 99.41 0.58 0.01
% of cov(yrt ) explained 99.51 0.47 0.01
% Nom factor explained by real factor 0.76 0.19 0.01
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Table 1.8. Real - Nominal Yields and Macroeconomic Expectations: US
Table reports regression of 5 and 10-year yields on 1-year expected gdp growth and inﬂation. The top panel reports
regressions using nominal yields while the bottom panel reports real yields. t-statistics reported in ( ) are corrected
for generalised heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Sample period 2000.1 − 2011.12.
const Et(g) E(π) R
2
y
$(5)
t −3.43 −0.03 2.96 0.48
(−2.23) (−0.14) (3.41)
y
$(10)
t 0.63 0.07 1.51 0.35
(0.62) (0.49) (2.90)
y
r(5)
t −0.61 −0.46 1.45 0.16
(−0.33) (−1.75) (1.46)
y
r(10)
t 0.37 −0.14 0.94 0.11
(0.29) (−0.80) (1.38)
Table 1.9. Real - Nominal Yields and Macroeconomic Expectations: UK
Table reports regression of 5 and 10-year yields on 1-year expected gdp growth and inﬂation. The top panel reports
regressions using nominal yields while the bottom panel reports real yields. t-statistics reported in ( ) are corrected
for generalised heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Sample period 2000.1 − 2011.12.
const Et(g) E(π) R
2
y
$(5)
t 4.92 1.17 −1.34 0.63
(6.86) (5.52) (−2.74)
y
$(10)
t 5.29 0.82 −1.10 0.64
(10.17) (5.60) (−3.15)
y
r(5)
t 4.07 0.49 −1.36 0.61
(9.66) (3.01) (−5.00)
y
r(10)
t 3.37 0.40 −0.99 0.63
(10.92) (3.56) (−5.30)
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Table 1.10. Summary Statistics: US Consumer Price Inﬂation
Series are for All Urban Consumers and contain 276 observations. Series acronyms given by (i) AUCNS: All
Items, (ii) APPNS: Apparel, (iii) ENGNS: Energy, (iv) MEDNS: Medical Care, (v) TRNNS: Transportation, (vi)
UFDSL: Food, (vii) SAS: Services.
Maturity AUCNS APPNS ENGNS MEDNS TRNNS UFDSL SAS
Mean 0.0268 0.0027 0.0417 0.0445 0.0280 0.0272 0.0319
Std Dev 0.0123 0.0207 0.1064 0.0160 0.0489 0.0133 0.0101
skew −0.3477 0.6365 −0.6901 1.5539 −1.0225 0.4928 0.3688
kurt −0.3477 0.6365 −0.6901 1.5539 −1.0225 0.4928 0.3688
Min −0.0212 −0.0407 −0.3298 0.0245 −0.1538 −0.0067 0.0071
Max 0.0610 0.0607 0.2986 0.0924 0.1353 0.0656 0.0628
1st Lag Auto 0.9390 0.9430 0.9198 0.9842 0.9145 0.9496 0.9837
Table 1.11. Summary Statistics: UK Consumer Price Inﬂation
Series are for All Urban Consumers and contain 296 observations. Series acronyms given by (i) D7BT: All Items,
(ii) D7BU: Food and non-alcoholic beverages, (iii) D7BW: Clothing and footwear, (iv) D7BZ: Health, (v) D7C2:
Transport, (vi) D7C7: Good and Services, (vii) D7CH: Energy.
Maturity D7BT D7BU D7BW D7BZ D7C2 D7C7 D7CH
Mean 0.0275 0.0298 −0.0282 0.0350 0.0363 0.0310 0.0528
Std Dev 0.0172 0.0274 0.0364 0.0246 0.0256 0.0152 0.0910
skew 1.4089 0.6491 0.2678 0.6308 0.3619 0.8934 1.1422
kurt 1.4089 0.6491 0.2678 0.6308 0.3619 0.8934 1.1422
Min 0.0054 −0.0238 −0.1087 −0.0340 −0.0259 0.0047 −0.0761
Max 0.0816 0.1231 0.0535 0.1079 0.1069 0.0750 0.3327
1st Lag Auto 0.9807 0.9587 0.9652 0.8720 0.9308 0.9463 0.9100
Table 1.12. Risk Premium Proxies on Term Structure Factors
Tables reports regressions of a volatility state from Le and Singleton (2013a) and 3-month Cochrane-Piazzesi factors
extracted from real (CP rt ) and nominal (CP
$
t ) yields. t-statistics reported in brackets are corrected for generalised
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
U$L U
$
L R
2
UrL U
r
L R
2
Vt 0.00 1.80 0.60 0.26 1.94 0.33
(0.05) (8.44) (1.51) (4.52)
CP $t 0.32 0.75 0.67 0.30 0.73 0.57
(6.80) (4.85) (5.00) (3.78)
CP rt 0.05 1.02 0.32 0.09 1.27 0.37
(0.90) (5.03) (1.31) (5.53)
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Table 1.13. Heterogenous Agent Models: In Xiong and Yan (2010), agents disagree on the long-term properties of the inﬂation process assumed
to be controlled by the central bank. Since πt is observable, rt is aﬀected neither by ηt nor ψt. The parameter μˆd is the belief of the representative
agent, where μˆd ≡ 1
1+ζη
1/γ
t
μad +
ζη
1/γ
t
1+ζη
1/γ
t
μbd, and μˆ
i
d = E
i [β′gt|t]. Let the consumption shares be ωa(ηt)= ca(t)/Dt, with ωa(ηt) =1 − ωb(ηt); when
u(ct) =
c1−γt
1−γ , in equilibrium ωa(ηt) =
1
1+ζη
1/γ
t
. The variable Xi deﬁnes the wealth of agent i = a, b. In Ehling et. al. (2012) the function
V (ht) depends on the habit surplus ht and f(.) is the sharing rule. The stochastic process λt in Chen, Joslin, and Tran (2012) is a jump intensity.
Mt = u′(Ct)H(η)t rt
Myopic Models (γ = 1)
Detemple and Murthy (1994) M∗t (1 + ζηt) (X
a/X)μad + (X
a/X)μbd − σ
2
d
Xiong and Yan (2010) as above πt + δ + μd − σ2d
Risk-sharing Models (γ > 1)
Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006) M∗t
(
1 + ζη
1/γ
t
)γ
[δ + γμˆd −
1
2
γ(γ − 1)σ2d]︸ ︷︷ ︸
r∗(ηt)
+ 12
γ−1
γ ωaωbψ
2
g,t
Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009) as above as above
Buraschi, Trojani, and Vedolin (2009) as above as above
Chen, Joslin, and Tran (2012) as above
[
δ + γμd −
1
2γ
2σ2d
]
− λtf(ηt,Ψt, γ)
Ehling, Gallmeyer,
Heyerdahl-Larsen, Illeditsch (2012) M∗tB
(
1 + ζη
1/γ
t
)γ
V (ht) r
∗(ηt) + v(h¯− ht) +
1
2 (1−
1
γ )f(t)(1 − f(t))ψ
2
π,t
Speculative Models: (γ < 1)
David (2008) M∗t
(
1 + ζη
1/γ
t
)γ
r∗(ηt) +
1
2
(γ−1)
γ ωaωbψ
2
g,t
Buraschi and Whelan (2012) as above r∗(η) + 12
(γ−1)
γ ωaωb(ψ
2
g,t + ψg,tψπ,t + ψ
2
π,t)
Frictions
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) M∗t → Optimist
Hong, Sraer, Yu (2013) M∗t → Optimist r
∗(ηt) → Optimist
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Table 1.14. Risk Premium Factors on Equilibrium Proxies: US
Table reports regressions U$S factor on equilibrium risk factor proxies. First, we run the regression:
y
(3:10)
t = const + βgEt[g] + βπEt[π] + error
(3:10)
t
The residuals in this regression are the variation in yields unexplained by macro expectations. In a second stage
we perform a principle component decomposition of errort. t-statistics, reported in ( )’s, are corrected for auto-
correlation. R
2
reports the adjusted R2. All right hand variables are standardized. A constant is included by not
reported. Sample Period: 1990.1 - 2007.1
volt(g) volt(π) surplust DiBt(g) DiBt(π) R
2
UrS 0.61 −0.19 0.32
(4.25) (−2.71)
UrS −0.46 0.21
(−4.24)
UrS 0.32 −0.03 0.09
(3.13) (−0.34)
UrS 0.51 −0.25 −0.36 −0.05 −0.08 0.41
(3.03) (−3.40) (−2.76) (−0.42) (−0.90)
Table 1.15. Risk Premium Factors on Equilibrium Proxies: UK
Table reports regressions U$S factor on equilibrium risk factor proxies. First, we run the regression:
y
(3:10)
t = const + βgEt[g] + βπEt[π] + error
(3:10)
t
The residuals in this regression are the variation in yields unexplained by macro expectations. In a second stage
we perform a principle component decomposition of errort. t-statistics, reported in ( )’s, are corrected for auto-
correlation. R
2
reports the adjusted R2. All right hand variables are standardized. A constant is included by not
reported. Sample Period: 1990.1 - 2007.1
volt(g) volt(π) surplust DiBt(g) DiBt(π) R
2
UrS 0.08 −0.22 0.03
(0.75) (−3.12)
UrS −0.21 0.04
(−1.59)
UrS −0.03 0.52 0.25
(−0.35) (4.32)
UrS −0.03 −0.33 −0.05 0.01 0.57 0.35
(−0.30) (−5.65) (−0.42) (0.12) (4.97)
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Chapter 2
Monetary Policy and Bond Risk Premia
Monetary policy and bond prices are connected via two channels. Firstly, central banks use the nominal
short-term rate as a primary policy instrument. Secondly, the absence of arbitrage opportunities implies
that bond yields reﬂect risk neutral expectations about future short rates. Hence, both institutional
features (short rate as a policy instrument) and economic restrictions (no arbitrage) enforce a fundamen-
tal link between monetary policy and entire term structure of interest rates. Indeed, a large literature
documents strong responses in yields to news about monetary policy (see, for instance, Kuttner (2001a),
Fleming and Piazzesi (2005), and Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005)). However, little is known about
whether there is a link between monetary policy and bond risk premia.
Empirically, measuring the actions of monetary policy is a challenging task. A ﬁrst diﬃculty is re-
lated to the fact that a signiﬁcant component of policy actions reﬂects the systematic response of the
policy instrument to the macro-economic environment, rather than exogenous policy shocks. In practice,
researchers make identifying assumptions to be able to disentangle the systematic component from the
monetary policy shock. Needless to say, the dynamic properties of the resulting decomposition are highly
dependent on these assumptions (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999)). A second diﬃculty is that
data on short-term target changes is unlikely to capture the richness of policy decisions. For instance,
market participants may fully foresee target rate changes, but be considerably surprised about the path
of future policy as inferred from the statements of the members of the policy committee: in these cir-
cumstances, a measure of monetary policy shocks based on the policy instrument alone may signiﬁcantly
under-estimate the extent of exogenous variation in monetary policy. This concern is particularly impor-
tant for our setting, since monetary policy is known to inﬂuence long term yields more via path than target
surprises (Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005)). This possibility is widely understood by policymakers:
The current funds rate imperfectly measures policy stimulus because the most important
economic decisions, such as a family’s decision to buy a new home or a ﬁrm’s decision
to acquire new capital goods, depend much more on longer-term interest rates, such as
mortgage rates and corporate bond rates, than on the federal funds rate. Long-term
rates, in turn, depend primarily not on the current funds rate but on how ﬁnancial
market participants expect the funds rate and other short-term rates to evolve over time.’
(Bernanke (2004)).
The ﬁrst half of this chapter takes a high-frequency (event study) approach to question the link be-
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tween monetary policy and bond risk premia. Using a sample of 164 FOMC meetings (January 1990
- June 2008) I document that Treasury yields react strongly to the expected path of policy and that
this channel is linked to changes in a daily risk premium proxy. In the second half I address the same
question from a low-frequency (time-series) perspective. I develop a novel measure of market participants’
expectations about the path of monetary policy, available at monthly frequency, and show this measure
contains signiﬁcant information about bond return predictability.
I summarise my high-frequency ﬁndings as follows:
The Federal funds futures market is remarkably accurate at predicting changes to the Federal funds
target rate. The futures markets was correct in predicting no change in the eﬀective rate in 67 out of
72 occasions, while it was correct at predicting a change in 66 out of 92 occasions. The market does,
however, make mistakes. On 26 occasions the market forecasted a change while the FOMC left the rate
unchanged. On 5 occasions the futures market predicted no change while in fact there was a change, and
on 3 occasions the market forecasted a change with the wrong sign (20-Dec-1991, 18-Apr-2001, 17-Sep-
2001). It is interesting to note that on each of these occasions the forecasting error committed was the
same: futures contracts were forecasting an increase in the rate while the FOMC reduced the rate, and
at the same time these events occurred during recessions.
Updating the ﬁndings of Kuttner (2001b) I ﬁnd that raw target changes have limited impact on
Treasury yields beyond 1-year maturity. However, decomposing target changes into expected versus un-
expected components I ﬁnd that unexpected changes are strongly signiﬁcant in explaining changes in
Treasury yields at maturities between 1 and 5 years, while there is no statistical eﬀect due to expected
changes for these maturities. These results conﬁrm the conclusion of Kuttner (2001b) that the reason
raw target changes appear unimportant is due to the polluting eﬀect of the expected component.
A number of authors have argued that market beliefs about the timing and path of policy de-
cisions are an important channel for explaining changes in long term bond yields (see, for example,
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) or Gurkaynak (2005)). I study the
evidence on Fed timing by decomposing the change in the 1-quarter Federal funds futures rate around
FOMC meetings into two components. The ﬁrst component is the ‘target shock’ deﬁned as the change
in the front month rate, and the second component is the ‘timing’ shock’ deﬁned as the diﬀerence be-
tween the change in the 3-month rate and the front month rate. Regressing the 1-day change in bond
yields around FOMC announcements on target and timing shocks I ﬁnd timing is highly statistically
signiﬁcant and increasingly important for long-term bonds. Next, I review the evidence presented by
Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) that expectations about the entire path of monetary policy mat-
ter on announcement days. I combine two datasets that include information about policy expectations
over the coming year, and estimate two orthogonal factors associated with movements to the front-end of
the futures curve, and a second linked to future policy decisions: I label these factors ‘surprise’ and ’path’,
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respectively. Regressing the 1-day change in bond yields around FOMC announcements on surprise and
path shocks I ﬁnd that while 3 month bills are more sensitive to target shocks, long-dated bonds are more
sensitive to path shocks. For the 5 year bond, the slope coeﬃcient on the path shock is 2.5 times larger
than the slope coeﬃcient on the target shock. For the 10 year bond, only path shocks are statistically
signiﬁcant, with a t-statistic of 3.31. These results conﬁrm that target rate changes are not the most
important component driving long-term yield changes.
What is the channel via which bond yields react to monetary policy? I test the conjecture that mon-
etary policy aﬀects compensation for risk by constructing a daily risk premium proxy along the lines of
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005b). Adapting their methodology I obtain forward rate loadings on 1-year
excess returns at monthly frequency and apply these loadings to the daily forward curve. The resulting
time series (CPt) represents a risk premium proxy available before and after FOMC meetings. I then run
regressions of changes in CPt on target and path factors and ﬁnd a strong correlation between changes
in risk premia and policy shocks. The t-statistics are −2.46 and 2.8, on target and path, respectively.
Moreover the signs are economically intuitive. The loading on the target factor is negative: unexpected
drops to the target rate are correlated with an increases in risk premia, i.e., the risk premium is larger in
bad states. The coeﬃcient on the path factor is positive: an unexpected increase in the expected future
target rate increases risk premia, consistent with the result of a positive link between the path factor and
long term yields.
I summarise my low-frequency ﬁndings as follows:
I construct an empirical proxy for path shocks from the residuals of a Taylor rule estimated on sur-
vey expectations. Central to this analysis is a new data set that includes joint expectations about the
target rate (fed fund rate) and economic fundamentals (GDP and inﬂation). This data set is compiled at
monthly frequency and is available in a panel data form so that, for each individual, I have observations
on the expected counterparts to both the left and right-hand side of the Taylor rule. Importantly, this
dataset allows us to empirically identify a measure of path shocks without making assumptions about
the data generating process in the mind of agents. While real-time and truly forward-looking, the use
of survey forecasts may introduce additional concerns. In order to ensure that the survey biases are
quantitatively negligible I conduct a host of quality checks. When I compare the properties of subjective
macro expectations to those obtained from traditional econometric benchmarks, I ﬁnd that the errors of
consensus forecasts are in absolute value lower than their econometric counterparts. This is especially
true for the Fed fund rates forecasts. This result is interesting and highlights the potential importance of
structural breaks in the conduct of policy decisions. Another advantage of the panel structure of the data
is that it circumvents the need to use pre-aggregated consensus data, which may in itself bias the results.
Indeed, I compare models based on pre-aggregated consensus data, or panel data, using (i) pooled OLS,
(ii) ﬁxed eﬀects, (iii) random eﬀects, and ﬁnd that a panel data approach is preferable to procedures
based on pre-aggregated consensus data.
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To understand the relative importance of target versus path shocks I consider three alternative
shocks: (i) the residuals from an orthogonalised monthly VAR (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(1996)); (ii) the daily change to the 1-month Federal funds futures rates around FOMC announcements
(Bernanke and Kuttner (2005)); and (iii) the daily change in the 6-month euro-dollar rate around FOMC
announcements (Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002)). An intriguing yet robust ﬁnding is that target shocks are
negatively correlated to path shocks. This is interesting since one learns that short-term policy actions
are linked to the formation of expectations about future policy actions. Moreover, path shocks are on
average countercyclical, diﬀerent than target shocks, which are procyclical. This observation is consistent
with a term structure of interest rates in which the short end is pro-cylical driven primarily by target
shocks and the long end is counter-cyclical driven primarily driven by risk compensation.
Finally, I ask whether path shocks represent an empirically important source of variation in bond risk
premia. Summarising, I ﬁnd that path shocks feature strong co-movement with risk premium factors based
on yield curve information such as the slope of the yield curve, or those proposed by Cochrane and Piazzesi
(2005b) and Le and Singleton (2013b). In classical return predictability regressions I ﬁnd that a one stan-
dard deviation change to path shocks predicts an ∼ 0.40 standard deviation change to expected excess
returns on 5-year bonds. The statistical signiﬁcance is also large: the null of no predictability is always
rejected at the 1% level and path shocks alone account for 15% of the variance of excess returns. I show
that this evidence is: (i) robust across a variety of Taylor rule speciﬁcations; (ii) present both in full
sample and in subsamples that exclude the ﬁnancial crisis; and (iii) survives after controlling for the
contemporaneous levels of macroeconomic activity.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. After a brief overview the existing literature, Section I
discuses the mechanics of the Federal funds market and studies the reaction of the nominal Treasury curve
to FOMC decisions. Section II describes the data used in the subsequent low frequency analysis. Section
III reviews the details behind the construction of monetary policy shocks, while Section IV presents the
key evidence on bond return predictability and monetary policy in the time-series.
Literature Overview
This paper surveys two streams of related literature. The ﬁrst studies the high frequency identiﬁca-
tion of monetary policy shocks and their impact on returns and volatilities of Treasury securities. This
literature uses FOMC announcements to identify shocks to market participant’s expectations about the
current and future monetary policy stance. The canonical study is Kuttner (2001a) who is the ﬁrst
to separate expected versus unexpected components of monetary policy from federal funds futures and
shows that unexpected shocks explain a large fraction of yield changes around FOMC announcements.
Fleming and Piazzesi (2005) ﬁnd that the impact of surprise components on yield changes depends on
the slope of the term structure. Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005), on the other hand, show that
target rate shocks represent only a part of the information set used by market participants around an-
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nouncements. The authors that proxies for news about the future path of policy that is orthogonal to
front month shocks but explains a large fraction of the variance of daily changes in long dated Trea-
suries. The eﬀects of monetary policy are not limited to U.S bond markets. In the context of equities,
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) ﬁnd that unanticipated cuts to target rate result in large positive shocks
to the stock market; Basistha and Kurov (2013) document a large intra-day response of energy futures
prices to the surprise component of announcements; and Andersson (2007) shows a feedback between U.S
and euro area policy announcements.
The second stream studies the low-frequency impact of monetary policy on the term structure. This
literature has two approaches. The ﬁrst links reduced-form term structure models with the conjecture that
the monetary authorities controls the path of the short rate. Under no arbitrage, yields are risk neutral
expectations of future short rates; thus, introducing a map between the time-series properties of monetary
policy and long term interest rates. Some notable applications of this approach include Piazzesi (2005),
Ang, Dong, and Piazzesi (2007) , or Mo¨nch (2008), and Chun (2011).1. A second, more challenging, ap-
proach studies monetary policy from a general equilibrium perspective. Real business cycle models that in-
clude reactions functions to the real economy and/or endogenous inﬂation dynamics have greatly advanced
our understanding of the economic drivers of nominal yields. For recent examples see Kung (2014) and
Gallmeyer, Holliﬁeld, Palomino, and Zin (2007b) who study Taylor rules with representative agents hav-
ing Epstein-Zin preferences, or Buraschi and Jiltsov (2007a) and Campbell, Pﬂueger, and Viceira (2013)
who combine habit formation and monetary policy.
I. High Frequency Identiﬁcation
A. The federal funds rate
The federal funds rate is the interest rate at which depository institutions actively trade balances held at
the Federal Reserve, called federal funds, with each other, usually overnight, on an uncollateralized basis.
Institutions with surplus balances in their accounts lend those balances to institutions with deﬁcits. The
eﬀective federal funds rate is a weighted average of all federal funds transactions for a group of federal
funds brokers who report to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York each day. The nominal rate is a target
set by the governors of the Federal Reserve, which they enforce primarily by open market operations. The
eﬀective Fed funds rate generally lies within a range of that target rate, as the Federal Reserve cannot
set an exact value through open market operations.
[ insert ﬁgure 2.1 about here ]
Figure 2.1 shows the evolution over time of the target rate, the Fed funds rate, and Treasury yields at 6
month, 2 year and 5 year maturities from 1982. Three results emerge. First, the target is persistent which
1Piazzesi (2005) studies bond prices when target rates follow a jump process; Ang, Dong, and Piazzesi (2007) explore no-
arbitrage restrictions implied by a variety of Taylor rule speciﬁcations; and Chun (2011) studies the link between inﬂation,
GDP forecasts and bond yields in a forward looking Taylor rule speciﬁcation that incorporates surveys
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the literature refers to as interest rate smoothing. Moreover, target changes are often followed by addi-
tional changes in the same direction, which the literature refers as policy inertia. For a detailed discussion
of Federal funds-rate targeting procedures related to smoothing and inertia see Goodfriend (1991). Sec-
ond, cycles of monetary policy easing are associated with large spreads between long term and short term
bonds. As the target rate is lowered during recessions the short term treasury rate tracks its path (the
short end is pro-cyclical) while the spread between long and short maturity bond yields often moves in the
opposite direction (the term premium is counter-cyclical). This has motivated an extensive literature that
investigates the behaviour of bond risk premia using time series methods and low frequency data. A third
piece of evidence relates to the high frequency component of changes in yields around FOMC meetings
when the Fed changes the target rate. An important literature emerged to study these aﬀects. Notable
contributions to the FOMC announcements literature at daily frequencies include Cochrane and Piazzesi
(2002) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) who study the response of Treasury yields and equities, respec-
tively, while Fleming and Piazzesi (2005) and Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) study asset pricing
implications using intra-day data.
B. The federal funds futures market
The Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) began oﬀering federal funds futures contracts in October 1988.
Unlike T-bill futures contracts, where the contract is for the T-bill rate on a speciﬁc day, the federal
funds futures contract is the simple average of the daily eﬀective federal funds rate during the month
of the contract. The CBOT oﬀers futures contracts ranging from the current month to 24 months out.
Contracts have a nominal value of $5 million, and their settlement price is equal to 100 minus the average
of the eﬀective federal funds rate for the month of the contract. Hence, a market price of 96.5 for a
one-month contract on September 15 means that the current futures rate for October is 3.5 percent (100
– 96.5). Hamilton (2009) studies the properties of daily changes in the prices fed funds futures contracts
and concludes that they provide an excellent measure of markets expectation of near-term changes in Fed
policy. In the following I utilise changes in daily contracts to review the evidence on the ‘high frequency’
impact of policy decisions on the yield curve.
To illustrate the nature of my empirical experiment I spell out some federal funds rate algebra. Suppose
that at time t the Fed has a planned FOMC meeting. The day before, at time t−1, the prevailing eﬀective
Fed fund rate is r0t−1 and the price of the front-month Federal funds rate future contract is f
0
t−1. Then,
the equilibrium Fed fund future price is equal to the weighted average of the current eﬀective rate and
the expected Fed fund rate over the remaining life of the contract plus a risk premium η0t−1
f0t−1 =
d
m
r0t−1 +
m− d
m
Et−1
[
r0t
]
+ η0t−1,
where r0t is the target rate announced after the FOMC meeting, d is the day of the month, and m is the
number of days in the month. Since immediately after the FOMC announcement the price of the front
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month contract is
f0t =
d
m
r0t−1 +
m− d
m
r0t + η
0
t ,
I can compute the surprise component e0t ≡ r
0
t − Et−1r
0
t as
e0t =
m
m− d
[
f0t − f
0
t−1
]
−
m
m− d
[
η0t − η
0
t−1
]
.
Assuming that over an interval of one day the risk premium variation mm−d
[
η0t − η
0
t−1
]
is negligible, I can
use the dynamics of Fed fund futures to identify the expected and unexpected components of target rate
changes: e0t 
m
m−d
[
f0t − f
0
t−1
]
.
r0t − r
0
t−1 = Et−1(r
0
t − r
0
t−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected
+ e0t︸︷︷︸
Unexpected
.
The expected component is obtained as a residual, i.e.
[
r0t − r
0
t−1
]
−e0t . Table 2.1 and ﬁgure 2.2 summarize
the results. The ﬁrst three columns of Table 2.1 report summary statistics for the change in the total
Fed fund rate, the expected, and unexpected components, respectively. I ﬁnd that a large component
of changes in Fed fund is anticipated by the market. Indeed, the variance of the expected component
is 0.0457 while the variance of the unexpected component is 0.0353. I also ﬁnd that during this period
the mean unexpected change in Fed fund rate has been negative impling that, on average, the Fed
has surprised markets by reducing rates more aggressively than the market expected. This feature can
be visualized by plotting the cumulative unexpected shocks over time. Indeed, since 1990 the overall
cumulative unexpected shock in Fed fund rates has been −5% (ﬁgure 2.3)
[ insert ﬁgure 2.2 and 2.3 about here ]
[ insert table 2.1 about here ]
Our sample includes 164 FOMC meetings. The futures market predicted no change in the eﬀective
rate (or less than 10bp) in 72 occasions. In 67 out of these 72 occasions, the Fed indeed did not change
the target rate. The left panel of ﬁgure 2.4, plots these events; the red bars indicate those occasions in
which future markets predicted no-change while a change occurred. Moreover, future markets predicted
a change in the eﬀective rate (for at least 10bp) in 92 occasions. In 66 out of these 92 cases, indeed the
target rate was changed. However, in 26 of these meetings the FOMC decided to leave the rate unchanged.
The right panel of ﬁgure 2.4 shows these events; the red bars indicate those occasions in which future
markets predicted a change while a change did not occur. Moreover, in 3 of these 66 occasions the future
market forecasted the change with the wrong sign. The dates of these meetings are: (i) 20-Dec-1991, (ii)
18-Apr-2001, (iii) 17-Sep-2001. Interestingly, in all these events the type of forecasting error committed
by the market was the same: future contracts were forecasting an increase in the rate while the FOMC
decided to reduce the rate. All these events occurred during recessions. The evidence from the second
event is quite revealing, due to the magnitude of the forecasting error and its timing. March 2001 marks
the end of an economic expansion period that, according to NBER, started in March 1991 and lasted
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exactly 10 years, the longest in the NBER’s chronology. Nonetheless, on 18 April 2001 future markets
were forecasting an increase of at least 50 basis points. Instead, the FOMC decided to drop the rate by
50 basis points to address the start of an economic recession. The forecast error committed around the 17
September 2001 FOMC event is more idiosyncratic in nature since it is related to an emergency meeting
held by the Fed following the September 11 events when markets were closed.
In summary, the implied expected change in the target rate by the futures market is remarkably
accurate. However, I ﬁnd that the average absolute magnitude of the unexpected component is signiﬁcant
and similar in size to the expected component.
[ insert table 2.4 about here ]
C. The impact on Treasury bond yields
The distinction between expected and unexpected components in the dynamics of Fed funds rate becomes
immediately apparent when I investigate the link between Fed decisions and changes in Treasury bond
yields. I use data on (implied) zero coupon bond yields from January 1990 to June 2008 and regress
the 1-day change in bond yields around FOMC announcements on the target changes. I use nominal
and TIPS zero coupon bonds estimated by Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2006, 2010) (GSW) and short-
term nominal interest rates with 3 and 6-month maturities from the Fama-Bliss T-bill ﬁles available from
CRSP.2 The results are summarized in table 2.2. The top panel shows that most of the impact of the total
change in Fed fund rates on Treasury yields is limited to maturities up to 1 year. After this maturity,
the eﬀect is somewhat muted and the slope coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant. However, when I
decompose the total change in two components (bottom panel), one ﬁnds that unexpected changes are
strongly signiﬁcant in explaining changes in Treasury bond yields at maturities between 1 and 5 years.
On the other hand, for these maturities the eﬀect of the expected component is indistinguishable from
noise. Thus, the reason raw target changes are not signiﬁcant for longer maturities is due to the polluting
eﬀect of the expected component. This is conﬁrmed by the substantially larger R2 obtained when I run
the regression on the two terms separately. In addition to statistical signiﬁcance, the results show that
at short maturities most of the magnitude of yield changes is due to unexpected variations in the target
Fed fund rate. The marginal impact of the unexpected component on the 3 month T-bill rate is twice as
large as the expected component.
[ insert table 2.2 about here ]
D. The Timing of Expected Fed Interventions
The previous results show that on ﬁve occasions futures market predicted no change in the target rate
while in fact there was a change. Moreover, in three cases futures markets predicted changes in target
2GSW construct zero coupon yields by ﬁtting the Nelson-Siegel-Svensson functional form to market quoted coupon bonds
and is publicly available from the Federal Reserve Board site
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rates with the wrong sign. One possible interpretation is that markets may have forecasted incorrectly the
timing of decisions that were relatively inevitable. Both Gurkaynak (2005) and Bernanke and Kuttner
(2005) discuss this channel as a particularly important component to explain changes in medium and long
term bond yields as these are sensitive not only to the target rate decided at the next FOMC meeting
but also to future policy decisions. To investigate this conjecture ﬁgure 2.5 plots unexpected changes in
the front month futures contract (y-axis) with respect to changes in the 1-quarter (3rd month) contract
(x-axis). The red line in the plot is the 45 degrees lines; the blue line is the least squares ﬁt. I ﬁnd that the
slope coeﬃcient is far from being one. Moreover, for large positive front month changes the least square ﬁt
is below the 45 degrees line suggesting that the three month contract responds less than the front month
contract. Similarly, for large negative front month changes, changes in the three month contract plots
above the 45 degree line. The R2 of a linear regression is 70%, suggesting that unexpected changes in the
target rate obtained from the dynamics of the front-month future contract are not perfectly correlated
with changes at longer horizons. A possible reason is that the market interprets the information content
of FOMC decisions in the context of the timing of future policy decisions. While these decisions are useful
signals, their information content to infer future target rate decisions likely depends in the state of the
business cycle and the market surely looks at other signals, such as statements by policy makers.
[ insert ﬁgure 2.5 about here ]
Thus, in what follows I distinguish between two components of the change in the 1-quarter contract.
The ﬁrst component is the change in the front month contract (the ‘target’ shock); the second component
(the ‘timing’ shock) is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the shock to the 4 month shock and to the front-
month contract (the vertical distance of the data points from the 45 degree line). Figure 2.6 summarizes
some stylized features of ‘target’ and ‘timing’ shocks. I ﬁnd that the economic magnitude of ‘timing’
shocks are comparable to ‘target’ shocks. Moreover, in several occasions target and timing shocks are
negative correlated, moving in opposite directions.
[ insert ﬁgure 2.6 about here ]
This is a potentially important channel to explain the dynamics of long-term yields. To investigate
this channel, I run a regression using the same data and sample period of Table 2.2. Indeed, I ﬁnd that
the timing factor is as important as the target factor explaining variations in the Treasury bond market
(see Table 2.3). Moreover, when I compare the R2 of Table 2.2, Panel B, to those in Table 2.3 I ﬁnd that
the timing factor substantially increases the explanatory power for long-term bond, with the R2 for the
5 year note increasing from 10% to 17%.
[ insert table 2.2 and 2.3 about here ]
E. Target versus Path shocks
Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) conjecture that the surprise component of target rate changes con-
veys only part of the news about monetary policy on announcement days: market participants update
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their beliefs by interpreting statements about monetary policy which give information about the path of
future policy. Following this intuition the authors construct a ‘path factor’ from high frequency data that
is by construction orthogonal to surprise shocks to the front months. Indeed, the important role played
by the timing shocks suggests that monetary policy shocks may be characterized by diﬀerent frequency
components. To review this evidence more formally, I combine two datasets that include data containing
information about policy expectations over the coming year. The ﬁrst two time series provide information
on futures on the front-month and three-month-ahead Federal funds contracts. The remaining three time
series includes data on longer maturity Eurodollar future contracts with maturities of two-, three-, and
four-quarter-ahead. At these maturities Eurodollar futures are signiﬁcantly more liquid than Federal fund
futures contracts. Over a period of 12 months there are an average of 8 FOMC meetings. Thus, this data
includes price information that is sensitive to the decisions in the following eight FOMC meetings. Figure
2.7 shows the magnitude of the ﬁve original shocks over time. It is apparent that in several occasions
small shocks to the front month future were contemporaneously associated to large shocks to longer dated
futures.
[ insert ﬁgure 2.7 about here ]
I stack the shocks to these ﬁve contracts around each FOMC announcements in a T × 5 matrix and
perform a principle component decomposition. The decomposition of the variance explained by the ﬁrst
three principal components (PCs) Ft is summarized in table 2.4. Indeed I ﬁnd that a single factor can
only explain 62% of the total variance of the shocks to the term structure of future rates around FOMC
meeting. A second factor is needed to explain about 33% of the remaining variation across maturity. This
is strongly suggestive of a multi-dimensional factor structure underlying the evolution of future monetary
policy.
[ insert table 2.4 about here ]
Since the identiﬁcation of the principal components is only linked to their relative explanatory power
for the overall variance, one does not have an interpretation of what the factors might be. To help eco-
nomic understanding, following Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005), I perform a rotation of the ﬁrst
two PCs. Let the original PCs Ft = [PC1, PC2]. I deﬁne the new rotated factors Zt = FtU , where the
matrix U is such that Z2t is orthogonal to the shocks to the front month future, E(Z
2
t e
0
t ) = 0. Because
this rotation generates a component that is orthogonal to e0t , I label the second factor Z
2
t as the patht
factor. By construction, this factor includes information that aﬀects the expected path for monetary
policy but is orthogonal to decisions about the current target rate. This also implies that the dynamics
of e0t can only be explained by Z
1
t . Thus, I label the ﬁrst rotated principal component Z
1
t the supriset
factor. Moreover, to identify the factors uniquely, I impose that Zit have unit variance and E(Z
1
t Z
2
t ) = 0.
Figure 2.8 summarizes the diﬀerence between the target shock Z1t and the path shock Z
2
t . I ﬁnd that
target and path shocks move in the same direction in 94 of the 164 FOMC meetings. On the other hand,
in 70 occasions, they moved in opposite directions.
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[ insert ﬁgure 2.8 about here ]
The result conﬁrms my conjecture about the existence of two distinct components in monetary policy
shocks. The ﬁrst associated to movements in the front-end of the future curve and a second one linked
to future policy decisions. Similar to the importance of distinguishing between expected and unexpected
components in Fed funds decisions, it is likely that long dated Treasury bonds are more sensitive to path
shocks than to target shocks.
To investigate I run a contemporaneous regression of changes in Treasury yields on both types of
shocks. Table 2.5 summarizes the results. Indeed, I ﬁnd that while the yield on the 3 month T-Bill is
more sensitive to target shocks, both economically and statistically, the opposite is true for long-dated
Treasury bonds. For the 5 year bond, the slope coeﬃcient on the path shock is 2.5 times larger than the
slope coeﬃcient on the target shock. For the 10 year bond, only path shocks are statistically signiﬁcant,
with a t-statistics of 3.31. This conﬁrms that target rate changes in themselves are not the most important
component driving long-term bond changes.
[ insert table 2.5 about here ]
F. Risk Premia
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005b) argue that risk premia are revealed by the cross-sectional shape of the
yield curve. In what follows I adapt their methodology to investigate the extent to which FOMC an-
nouncements aﬀect risk premia. Let rx
(n)
t+12 be the 12-month excess return on a n-year bond and let
ft = [f
(1)
t , f
(3)
t f
(5)
t f
(7)
t f
(9)
t ] be a vector of ﬁve forward rates. The spanned component of expected risk
premia by running the following regression
rx
(n)
t+1 = αn + β1f
(1)
t + β1f
(3)
t + β1f
(5)
t + β1f
(7)
t + β1f
(9)
t + ε
(n)
t+1
= bn(γ0 + γ1f
(1)
t + γ2f
(3)
t + γ3f
(5)
t + γ4f
(7)
t + γ5f
(9)
t ) + ε
(n)
t+1
from which the CP -factor is deﬁned as CPt = γ
′
1ft. I estimate the previous regression sampling forward
rates at monthly frequency then apply the factor loadings to the daily forward curve to obtain a 1-year
risk premium proxy at daily frequency. Figure 2.9 compares the behavior of the CP -factor at monthly
and daily frequency. It can be noticed that in the sample period up to 1990, the daily series shows
substantially higher volatility than then monthly one, ans especially so in the 80s.
[ insert ﬁgure 2.9 about here ]
In table 2.6 I report results of a regression that studies the contemporaneous link between the changes
in the CPt factor and the Target and Path factors:
ΔCPt = const+ βsupriset + γpatht + εt
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Indeed I ﬁnd a strong correlation between changes in risk premia and the two monetary policy factors.
The t-statistics are −2.46 and 2.8, respectively. Moreover the signs is economically intuitive: unexpected
drops in the target rate is correlated with an increases in risk premia. The magnitude of this eﬀect is
larger in bad states of the world. The slope coeﬃcient on the path factor is positive: an unexpected
increase in the expected future fund rates increases risk premia. This is consistent with the earlier result
of a positive link between the path factor and long term yields and supports the null hypothesis of a
signiﬁcant risk premium channel.
[ insert table 2.6 about here ]
II. Data : Low Frequency Identiﬁcation
This section describes the data sets I use to identify the ‘low frequency’ component of monetary policy
shocks. The sample I study is available at monthly frequency and runs from January 1990 to August
2012.
A. Survey data
I use survey forecasts from BlueChip Financial Forecasts Indicators (BCFF) to construct a new mea-
sure of monetary policy shocks. BCFF is a monthly publication providing extensive panel data on the
expectations of professional economists working at leading ﬁnancial institutions and service companies.
Forecasted variables include Treasury yields and economic fundamentals. While the exact timing of the
surveys is not published, the survey is usually conducted between the 25th and 27th of the month and
mailed to subscribers within the ﬁrst 5 days of the subsequent month. The resulting dataset represents an
extensive and unique dataset to investigate the role of formation of expectations about monetary policy
shocks.
The horizon of BCFFS forecasts ranges from the end of the current quarter to 5 quarters ahead (6 from
January 1997). I obtain a set of constant maturity forecasts (from 1 to 4 quarters ahead) by interpolat-
ing linearly between adjacent horizons. Macroeconomic forecasts are expressed as annualized percentage
changes between subsequent quarters: I obtain compound growth forecasts by chaining subsequent quar-
terly forecasts.3
The resulting dataset of forecasts can be described as follows. Let Zt denote the time-t realization of
the economic or ﬁnancial variable of interest, and let En [·|Ωn,t] denote the expectation operator under the
subjective measure of agent n and conditional on her time-t information setΩ n,t. The data manipulations
3For instance, suppose that as of April 2000, the 1Q- and 2Q-ahead GDP forecasts of agent n are 5.00 and 6.00, respectively.
This means that the agent expects GDP to increase by
(
1 + 5.00
400
)
between April 2000 (the month of the forecast) and June
2000 (the end of current quarter), and by
(
1 + 6.00
400
)
between end of June 2000 (the end of current quarter) and the end of
September 2000 (the end of the next quarter). The (annualized) compound growth rate between April 2000 and September
2000 is obtained as
[(
1 + 5.00
400
) · (1 + 6.00
400
)]2
.
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described above allows us to obtain Zen,t,h, the forecast of Zt+h made by agent n at time t:
Zen,t,h
Δ
= En [Zt+h|Ωn,t] , (2.1)
for quarterly horizons out to 1 year, h = 3, 6, 9, 12 months. Notice that this representation allows for
incomplete information (Ωn,t), and diﬀerence in priors about the data-generating process (the expectation
is taken under the subjective measure); the only assumption is that forecasts be rational in the sense of
Muth (1961). I also construct consensus forecasts ZeC,t,h, deﬁned as the cross-sectional mean of the
forecasts by all respondents at time t:
ZeC,t,h
Δ
=
1
N
N∑
n=1
Zen,t,h, (2.2)
where N denotes the size of the cross-section of forecasters.
The forecasts used here are real GDP (Real GNP until February 1992), Consumer Price Inﬂation, and
the Federal Funds rate. Since real GDP, CPI, and federal funds rates are available at diﬀerent frequencies
(quarterly, monthly and daily, respectively), the quarterly values that the survey participants are asked
to forecast are deﬁned in diﬀerent fashions. Let GDPq(t), CPIm(t,j), and FFd(t,j) denote, respectively:
(i) the seasonally adjusted value of real GDP at the end of the quarter that includes month t; (ii) the
seasonally adjusted value of CPI at the end of the j-th month of the quarter that includes month t; and
(iii) the value of the federal funds rate at the end of the j-th day of the quarter that includes month
t (assumed to be 90, for simplicity). For each horizon h, survey participants are asked to forecast are
gq(t+h), the quarter-over-prior-quarter percent change of seasonally-adjusted real GDP, expressed as an
annualized rate:
gq(t+h)
Δ
=
(
GDPq(t+h)
GDPq(t+h−1)
)4
− 1; (2.3)
πq(t+h), the quarter-over-prior-quarter percent change of the intra-quarter average of seasonally-adjusted
CPI, expressed as an annualized rate:
πq(t+h)
Δ
=
(
1/3
∑3
m=1 CPIm(t+h,j)
1/3
∑3
j=1CPIm(t+h−1,j)
)4
− 1; (2.4)
and, fq(t+h), the average of intra-quarter daily federal funds rates:
fq(t+h)
Δ
= 1/90
90∑
j=1
FFd(t+h,j). (2.5)
I denote the time-t forecasts of agent n for gq(t+h), πq(t+h), and fq(t+h) by g
e
n,t,h, π
e
n,t,h, and f
e
n,t,h, respec-
tively. Figure 3.10 and 2.11 show the dynamics of the 1-year ahead consensus forecasts for the federal
funds rate, inﬂation, and GDP growth.
66
[Insert ﬁgures 3.10 and 2.11 about here.]
I construct expected output gaps as follows. From the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) I obtain
real GDP from and interpolate linearly to obtain monthly values. Then, I ﬁt a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter
(with a smoothing parameter of 14,400) to log output yt = log(Yt) and estimate the mean growth rate
of the economy g∗t as the average log diﬀerence of output. I construct potential output Y
∗
t by taking
the (exponential of the) trend component of the ﬁltered series, and construct conditional estimates of
future potential output (common across agents) as E[Y ∗t+h|Ωt] = Y
∗
t exp (g
∗
t · h · 3).
4 Next, I obtain
estimates of actual output using individual GDP growth forecasts, En[Yt+h|Ωn,t] = Yt ·
(
1 +
gen,t,1
400
)
·(
1 +
gen,t,2
400
)
. . .
(
1 +
gen,t,h
400
)
. Finally, I construct the percentage projected output gap for horizon h as
xen,t,h = E
n[xt+h|Ωn,t] =
(
En[Yt+h|Ωn,t]
E[Y ∗t+h|Ωt]
− 1
)
· 100. Since this deﬁnition of gap may suﬀer from look-ahead
biases, I also construct real time output gaps by ﬁtting the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter and estimating mean
growth rates recursively over a 10-years look-backwards rolling window. The results are only marginally
aﬀected.
B. Quality of survey data
Survey data forecasts feature a number of advantages over forecasts implied by econometric approaches
such as VARs (vector autoregressions). First, the speciﬁcation of the VAR may not coincide with the
data generating process in the mind of the agents. Second, agents may, contrary to the econometrician,
observe a structural break in the sample of interest. Third, even if both the econometrician and the agents
observe the data generating process, VAR forecasts still suﬀer from estimation error. Survey data allows
obtaining direct measures of agents’ expectations, dispensing with the need to posit and estimate a data
generating process for the variable of interest.
I summarize the cross-sectional and time-series properties of BCFFS expectations by comparing their
performance to an econometric benchmark. In particular, I ﬁrst construct the sample equivalents of the
forecasts for federal funds, real GDP growth rate, and CPI growth rate. Next, I assume that the quantities
of interest [Δft, gt, πt]
′ follow a ﬁrst-order VAR. I ﬁt the VAR recursively using a 25 years rolling
window (100 quarterly observations), and use the estimated parameters to construct the benchmark
forecasts. Since macro-economic data are released with a month lag, I always drop the last observations
when estimating the VAR to ensure that forecasts are based on the actual real-time information set of
agents. Finally, I compare the forecasting errors of BCFFS versus VAR(1) expectations. Figure 2.12
summarizes the magnitude of BCFFS forecast errors (1 quarter horizon) relative to VAR forecast errors.
The plots on the left represent the errors from a cross-sectional perspective: they show the time series of
the number of agents in the cross-section whose forecast error is, in absolute value, less than the absolute
value of the VAR forecast error. The plots on the right, on the other hand, summarize the forecasting
ability of consensus (mean) forecasts: they show the diﬀerence between the absolute value of the VAR
4The construction of this expectations implicitly assumes that output is lognormally distributed and ignores a Jensen’s
inequality term, which is quantitatively negligible.
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forecast error and the absolute value of the average BCFFS forecast error, so that a value above zero
means that, on a speciﬁc quarter, the consensus forecasts performs better than the VAR forecast. The
ﬁgure suggests that there is a strong time-series component in the ability of BCFFS surveys to beat VAR
forecasts. Overall, the errors of consensus forecasts are, in absolute value, less than the forecast error of
the VAR 85% (FF), 43% (GDP), and 65% (CPI) of the times.
[Insert Figure 2.12 about here.]
C. Macroeconomic activity data
I construct a proxy for the level of macroeconomic activity by following Ludvigson and Ng (2009b) and
Buraschi and Whelan (2012b). Ludvigson and Ng (2009b) ﬁnd strong evidence linking bond returns to
variations in the level of economic growth rate factors by running return predictability regressions on
the principle components from a large panel of real, nominal, and price-based variables. The identity
and sources of the dataset are described in Ludvigson and Ng (2009b); following Buraschi and Whelan
(2012b), I drop all price based information in order to interpret the resulting panel as a pure growth rate
factor. Examples of price variables removed include: S&P dividend yield, the Federal Funds (FF) rate;
10 year T-bond; 10 year - FF term spread; Baa - FF default spread; and the dollar-Yen exchange rate. A
small number of discontinued macro series are replaced with appropriate alternatives or dropped.5 I take
the ﬁrst principle component of the resulting dataset of 99 macro series as a proxy for the conditional
mean of consumption growth, gt.
6
D. Bond data
I use Fama-Bliss data from CRSP of zero coupon bond prices (available at monthly frequency) with
maturities between 1 and 5 years. The following notation is adopted. Deﬁne the date t log price of a
n-year discount bond as p
(n)
t . The yield of a bond is deﬁned as y
(n)
t = −
1
np
(n)
t . The date-t 1-year forward
rate for the year from t + n − 1 and t + n is f
(n)
t = p
(n)
t − p
(n+1)
t . The log holding period return is the
realised return on an n-year maturity bond bought at date t and sold as an (n − 1)-year maturity bond
at date t+ 12:
r
(n)
t+12 = p
(n−1)
t+12 − p
(n)
t . (2.6)
Excess holding period returns are denoted by:
rx
(n)
t+12 = r
(n)
t+12 − y
(1)
t . (2.7)
III. Overview of identiﬁcation schemes
This section describes the methodology I use to construct monetary policy shocks. First, I provide a brief
overview of the alternative approaches employed by the literature. Second, I introduce my identiﬁcation
5Further details of the construction and macro series included are given in the appendix of Buraschi and Whelan (2012b).
6gt explains around 90% of the unconditional variance of the panel of macroeconomic activity series.
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scheme based on a Taylor rule and a panel of forecast data. Third, I report the statistical properties of
the constructed series.
Since much of the decisions taken by the monetary authorities reﬂect non-monetary developments in
the economy, the literature that studies the eﬀect of monetary policy is typically concerned with policy
shocks, rather than policy actions per se (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999)). A classic inter-
pretation of monetary policy shocks is that they reﬂect changes in the preferences of the central bank,
which may arise from shift in the weights of the views or political inﬂuence of the members of the policy
committee (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999)).
In general, the strategies that seek to identify monetary policy shocks can be classiﬁed as being based
on a policy rule, or not. The idea behind strategies based on policy rules is to impose as much structure on
the feedback rule as needed to decompose policy actions into systematic and non-systematic components
(policy shocks). In particular, researchers following this approach must make assumptions about the pol-
icy instrument, the functional form of the feedback rule, the arguments of the rule, and, importantly, the
interaction of the arguments of the rule and monetary policy shocks. A common assumption, which under-
lies the entire literature on Taylor rules,7 is that monetary policy shocks are orthogonal to the arguments
of the rule, so that they can be estimated from regression residuals. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(1999) note that the economic content of this assumption is that the macroeconomic variables that the
monetary policy authority looks at in setting policy are predetermined relative to the policy shocks: these
variables do not respond to contemporaneous realizations of monetary policy shocks.
The second family of identiﬁcation strategies, on the other hand, infers monetary policy shocks from
data that suggests exogenous monetary policy actions. An example of this identiﬁcation philosophy is
Romer and Romer (1989), who use historical records to identify large monetary disturbances not caused
by macroeconomic developments. Similarly, Romer and Romer (2004) use quantitative and narrative
records to infer intended funds rates changes around FOMC meetings, and take into account the forecasts
of the Federal Reserve to remove anticipatory components.
A. Constructing a measure of path shocks
As discussed in the high-frequency identiﬁcation sections above there are two types of monetary policy
shocks: target shocks and path shocks. Target shocks represent exogenous variation in the conduct of
monetary policy as reﬂected by the current behavior of the policy instrument (the target rate). Path
shocks, on the other hand, capture variation in the projected path of monetary policy. Intuitively, path
shocks reﬂect the surprises about future policy that can be inferred, for instance, from FOMC statements
or interviews of members of the policy committee. Path shocks, unlike target shocks, cannot be easily
identiﬁed via Taylor rule regressions because the FOMC does not reveal the projected evolution for the
7The literature on Taylor rules is extensive: see, for instance, Taylor (1993), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000),
Ang, Dong, and Piazzesi (2007).
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path of monetary policy;8 this is unfortunate, since path shocks represent the quantitatively most im-
portant source of variation in bond yields, especially for long maturities (Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson
(2005)). My data on federal funds forecasts, however, allows me to measure the projected evolution
for the path of monetary policy from the perspective of market participants; since I also observe mar-
ket participants’ expectations about macroeconomic developments I am able to identify path shocks by
taking the residuals from a policy feedback rule estimated on federal funds and macro forecasts. This
section describes the Taylor speciﬁcation I adopt and discusses the restrictions it implies for forecast data.
Let πt denote the change in the price level from quarter t−1 to quarter t, annualized and in percentage
points. Similarly, let xt denote the output gap in quarter t, in percentage points. As standard in the
literature, the output gap is deﬁned as xt =
(
Yt
Y ∗t
− 1
)
· 100, where Yt and Y
∗
t denote actual and potential
output at time t, respectively. Finally, let ft denote the time t Federal Funds rate, with long run mean f .
The level of the federal funds rate can be decomposed into a systematic component f∗t (the Taylor rule),
and an orthogonal shock ut (the target shock):
ft = f
∗
t + ut (2.8)
= f + β (πt − π) + γxt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Systematic component
+ ut︸︷︷︸
Target shocks
, (2.9)
where ut ⊥ f
∗
t . This characterization has a simple interpretation. The feedback rule f
∗
t captures the
systematic component of monetary policy. In the absence of disturbances to the economy and monetary
policy shocks, the federal funds rate is constant and equal to f . If output deviates from its potential
level, or inﬂation from its target, the central bank intervenes to stabilize the economy: the parameters β
and γ capture the sensitivity to inﬂation and output stabilization, respectively. The target shock ut, on
the other hand, captures the non-systematic component of monetary policy: the orthogonality between
ut and the arguments of the Taylor rule means that it can be estimated as the residual of a simple time
series regression of federal funds onto inﬂation and gap.
In practice, it has been observed that the central bank behaves less responsively to the state of the
economy than implied by the benchmark Taylor rule, consistent with the idea that the central bank may
have preferences over the degree of variability of federal funds rates. Also, the central bank may wish to
respond to macro aggregates that are not realizing at time t. In order to accommodate policy inertia and
backward-/forward-looking policies, the benchmark rule can be extended to include lagged federal funds
8Only recently has there has been a change in the disclosure about future policy actions by the Fed, so-called, forward
guidance.
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and lags/leads in its arguments, so that realized federal funds rates are described by:
ft = ρ(L)ft−1 + (1− ρ)f
∗
t + ut
= ρ(L)ft−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inertia
+(1− ρ)
(
f + β (πt+j − π
∗) + γxt+k
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Systematic component
+ ut︸︷︷︸
Target shocks
, (2.10)
where ρ(L) = ρ1+ρ2L+. . . ρmL
m−1 and ρ = ρ(1) capture the degree of interest rate smoothing. Assuming
that agents know the functional form and parameters of the policy rule, while they can disagree about
the future evolution of macroeconomic variables, the time-t expectation of ft+h of agent n is given by:
En [ft+h|Ωn,t] = E
n [ρ(L)ft+h−1|Ωn,t] (2.11)
+ (1− ρ)
(
f + β (En [πt+h+j |Ωn,t]− π
∗) + γEn [xt+h+k|Ωn,t]
)
(2.12)
+ En [ut+h|Ωn,t] , (2.13)
which, using the notation introduced in the data section, can be re-written as:
f en,t,h = ρ1f
e
n,t,h−1 + . . .+ ρmf
e
n,t,h−m
+ (1− ρ)
(
f + β
(
πen,t,h+j − π
∗
)
+ γxen,t,h+k
)
+ uen,t,h,
or, in its consensus form, as:
f eC,t,h = ρ1f
e
C,t,h−1 + . . .+ ρmf
e
C,t,h−m︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected inertia
(2.14)
+ (1− ρ)
(
f + β
(
πeC,t,h+j − π
∗
)
+ γxeC,t,h+k
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected systematic component
+ ueC,t,h︸ ︷︷ ︸
Path shocks
. (2.15)
This expression shows that the assumption that agents believe in a Taylor rule has two implications.
First, it implies a restriction on the comovement of forecasts of federal funds, inﬂation, output gap, and
monetary policy shocks. Second, it suggests that subjective expectations about future monetary policy
shocks (path shocks) can be recovered from a panel of macroeconomic and ﬁnancial forecasts.
B. Empirical features of the monetary policy shocks measure
All the speciﬁcations examined amount to choices for h, the horizon of the federal funds forecasts, and i,
the horizon of the output gap and inﬂation forecasts, in the general model:
f en,t,h = ρ1f
e
n,t,h−1 + ρ2f
e
n,t,h−2 + (1− ρ)
(
f + β
(
πen,t,i − π
∗
)
+ γxen,t,i
)
+ uen,t,h; (2.16)
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all speciﬁcations include 2 smoothing terms, which are necessary to remove the persistent component of
federal funds forecasts as in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000). I consider three families of speciﬁcations
based on the choice of the horizons of the forecasts for the federal funds and the arguments of the Taylor
rule: 2 are contemporaneous, and 1 is forward looking. For each family, output gap is either constructed
using full sample information (GAP 1), or recursively (GAP 2). This gives a total of 6 speciﬁcations, that
are summarized in Table 2.7.
[Insert Table 2.7 about here.]
In general, these models could be estimated (i) using consensus data, via OLS; or, using panel data,
via: (ii) pooled OLS (POLS); (iii) ﬁxed eﬀects (FE); (iv) random eﬀects (RE). Table 2.7 reports the
test-statistics and p-values for two tests: (i) an F-test for the joint signiﬁcance of individual eﬀects, and
(ii) the Hausman test for the null hypothesis that the diﬀerence between random and ﬁxed coeﬃcients is
not systematic. In all cases, the F-statistic for the joint signiﬁcance of agent dummies rejects the null of
no signiﬁcance; furthermore, the Hausman test always rejects the null of random eﬀects. Taken together,
these results indicate that ﬁxed eﬀects is preferable over estimation procedures based on consensus, pooled
OLS, and random eﬀects.
Given one of the 6 Taylor rule speciﬁcations, I construct a measure of policy path shocks, PathShockt,
by taking the cross-sectional average of the estimated residuals:
PathShockt =
1
N
N∑
n=1
uen,t,h.
Figure 2.13 plots the time series dynamics for each speciﬁcation. The message here is that, regardless
of the speciﬁcation, the statistical properties are very similar and the co-movement across PathShockit
is always very high. In what follows I study the economics of path shocks focusing on speciﬁcation 2,
in both Federal funds and macro forecasts are for the 1-year horizon, and the output gap is constructed
recursively using only information available at date t. However, the quantitative message of the paper is
robust to diﬀerent choices for PathShockit . An online appendix presents an expanded set of results for
i = 1, . . . , 6 for the empirical tests that follow.
[Insert Figure 2.13 about here.]
C. Low-Frequency versus High-Frequency Shocks
To help understand the information content in PathShockt I compare its dynamics with three alternative
measures for monetary policy shocks studied by the literature: (i) the residuals from an orthogonalised
monthly VAR (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996)); (ii) the daily change to the 1-month Federal
funds futures rates around FOMC announcements (Bernanke and Kuttner (2005)); and (iii) the daily
change in the 6-month euro-dollar rate around FOMC announcements (Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002)).
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Firstly, I follow Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996) and construct a monthly VAR: BZt =
A(L)Zt−1 + Σηt. The data vector Zt is given by Zt = [EMPt, CPIt, PCOMt, FFt] where EMPt is
the logarithm of Nonfarm payroll employment, CPIt is the logarithm of the consumer price index, and
PCOMt is growth rate in commodity price index. I identify the system by orthogonalizing the shocks as in
CEE, using the order given by Zt. This implies that shocks to the Fed fund rate has no contemporaneous
eﬀect on the other economic variables. I specify the VAR with L = 6 monthly lags. The estimated policy
shocks are given by
ηcce(t) = i4Σ
−1
[
BˆZt − Aˆ(L)Zt−1
]
(2.17)
where i4 = [0, 0, 0, 1], from which I recover the policy shocks.
The second and third shock measures are based on daily data. As in Bernanke and Kuttner (2005)
I measure the surprise component in target rate changes from the change in the 30-Day Federal Funds
Futures contract price relative to the day prior to the FOMC meeting.9 The contract’s settlement price
is based on the monthly average federal funds rate so the surprise change must be scaled up by a factor
related to remaining duration of the contract. Speciﬁcally, given target change on day d of month m, I
compute the unexpected target rate change as
ηbk(t) =
D
D − d
(
f0m,d − f
0
m,d−1
)
(2.18)
where f0m,d is the current-month futures rate and D is the number of days in the month. Since the eﬀective
federal funds rate tracks the target rate closely ηt provides a timely measure of the surprise component to
target rate changes. For the third measure, I follow Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002) and deﬁne the target
shock ηcp as the daily change in the 3-month euro-dollar rate around target changes
ηcp(t) =
(
e1d − e
1
m,d−1
)
(2.19)
Figure 2.14 shows that while the three series are generally positively correlated their dynamics
shows several periods in which the information content of the three series is rather diﬀerent. Indeed,
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002) argue that ‘If in one year the Fed worries about inﬂation, but in another
year it places more weight on unemployment, market forecasts will adapt, but vector auto-regressions
(VARs) may not adapt and thus may incorrectly interpret anticipated actions to be shocks.’ The ηcee(t)
target shocks assume a time invariant VAR structure. While ‘pure’ unanticipated changes, captured by
ηcp(t) and ηbk(t), proxy temporary variation in the preferences of the Fed, they may not convey long
term information about the expected path of monetary policy. Constructing PathShockt from surveys
allows a real-time assessment of how agents expected the stance of the monetary policy to evolve over time.
To study the link between realised policy shocks and beliefs about future shocks I run regression of
PathShockt on the three target shocks described above. Panel A of table 2.8 reports results for path
9These are traded on the Chicago Board of Trade where the implied futures rate is 100 minus the contract price.
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shocks on target shocks, while panel B reports path shocks on a 6-month lagged summation of past target
shocks. Considering ﬁrst the statistical link I ﬁnd slope coeﬃcients that are consistently negative across
speciﬁcation for ηit. The estimated loads are convincingly signiﬁcant, 5/6 of the loadings are signiﬁcant
at the 1% level. While the R2’s of (noisy) contemporaneous shocks on path shocks are low as expected,
the lagged ηcp(t) and ηby(t), explain 17% and 13% of the predictable variation in PathShockt, respec-
tively. More interesting than statistical signiﬁcance I ﬁnd that target shocks are negatively correlated to
expectations about the future stance of policy. This is interesting since I learn a non-trivial link between
observed short-term policy actions (target shocks) and the formation of expectations about future policy
actions (path shocks).
[ Insert table 2.8 about here ]
In general the dependence of path shocks on target shocks could take zero, positive, negative values.
If agents form expectations about future policy ignoring current actions I should expect a zero loading in
table 2.8. Alternatively, if agents believe policy shocks are subject to regime shifts and learn that they will
revert in the future, the loadings should be negative. This observation is consistent with Sims and Zha
(2006) who ﬁnds that variance of structural disturbances in Taylor rule regressions are subject to regime
shifting components that are short lived. Alternatively, positive loadings could be rationalised through
a number of behavioural biases such ‘representativeness’ (Tversky and Kahneman (1974)). In this case
agents place put too much weight on recent experiences, such as a series of negative rate cuts, and ex-
trapolate this as the likely path of policy going forward.
A revealing episode to learn about this link is given by the joint dynamics of target rate changes
and PathShockt during the dotcom bubble bust. This was a period that witnessed a large shift in the
non-systematic component of U.S monetary policy. In 1996 Alan Greenspan, then the Chairman of the
Federal Reserve, tried unsuccessfully to talk down the market in the face of an over heating technology
sector.10 However, the housing market and dotcom sector rally continued. In response between June
1996 and May 2000 the Fed raised the target rate from 4.75% to 6.5%. This represented a shift from
standard Taylor rule logic since CPI inﬂation average just ∼ 2.20% over this period. However, the path of
monetary policy was quickly reversed on September 11th 2001. In response to the Trade Center attacks
the Fed acted quickly with a series of rate cuts to shore up market conﬁdence. To support the stock
market, between January 2001 and January 2002 The Fed lower the target rate from 6.5% to 1.75%. The
market forecast was signiﬁcantly surprised by 4 of these rate changes as evidenced by the large negative
realizations for both ηcp(t) and ηbk(t) shocks (see ﬁgure 2.14). However, over this period PathShockt
actually rose. This implies that, as market participants observed large swings in contemporaneous Taylor
rule residuals, they inferred the stance of the Fed would revert in the future.
10Greenspan made a famous ‘irrational exuberance’ speech at the Francis Boyer Lecture of the American En-
terprise Institute for Public Policy Research, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 5, 1996). For the full speech see
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/19961205.htm.
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This narrative and the negative loadings in table 2.15 are consistent with the hypothesis that extreme
policy response will be reversed in the future. This implies path shocks are, on average countercyclical, dif-
ferent than target shocks, which are procyclical. Figure 2.13 makes the counter-cyclicality of PathShockt
clear by comparing the time-series dynamics of path shocks to a proxy of macroeconomic activity (gt)
discussed in the data section above, and NBER recession dates (shaded grey areas). In all three reces-
sions, PathShockt rises when macroeconomic activity drops. Since bond risk premia are known to be
countercyclical (Duﬀee (2002) , Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005b)), this motivates the natural question of
whether its co-movement with PathShockt is also quantitatively important, which constitutes the topic
of the next section.
[Insert Figure 2.8 about here.]
[Insert ﬁgure 2.14 about here.]
[Insert ﬁgure 2.15 about here.]
D. Path Shocks and Risk Premium Proxies
To investigate whether PathShockt, extracted from macroeconomic surveys, is a potential source of
priced risk, I ﬁrst investigate its co-movement with proxies of bond risk premia proposed by other well-
known independent studies. I consider three proxies for bond risk premia, Zt: (i) the slope of the yield
curve as studied by Campbell and Shiller (1991b) (Slopet = y
(5)
t − y
(1)
t ); (ii) the forward rate factor of
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005b) (CPt), and (iii) the two volatility factors constructed by Le and Singleton
(2013b) (LS1t and LS2t). I assess the link between path shocks via linear regressions:
PathShockt = const.+ Z
′
tβ + t. (2.20)
Table 2.9 presents the results of the regressions. There are two conclusions to be drawn. Regardless
of the bond risk premium proxy there is a strong positive statistically signiﬁcant link to PathShock.
Firstly, consistent with the notation that path shocks are counter-cyclical the loading on the slope of
the yield curve is positive, with a t-stat equal to 2.19, and an R2 equal to 8%: when agents expect
monetary policy to revert from a loosening cycle long term bonds command risk positive risk premium.
Second, PathShock co-move positively with CPt and LS2t (t-stats above 2.2 and 2.8, and R
2 equal
to 13% and 24%, respectively), suggesting that beliefs about changes to the future stance of policy are
linked to contemporaneous bond risk premia.11 Figure 2.16 makes this point clear graphically by plotting
PathShock versus the three risk premium proxies.
[Insert Table 2.9 about here.]
The co-movement is intriguing for a number of reasons. Since Slopet, CPt and LS2t are by construc-
tion spanned by the yield curve, this lends support to a link between agents subjective expectations of
future monetary policy and the shape of the yield curve today. This is not obvious ex-ante since survey
11 The factor LS2t is the dominating risk premium factor in Le and Singleton (2013b)
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expectations may diﬀer from the expectations of the marginal investor. The ability of yields to span
path shocks largely depends on the relative diﬀerence in dimensions of the state vector under the physical
versus agents subjective measure. Duﬀee (2011) discusses this point in the context of the invertibility of
the current yield curve to reveal information relevant for bond risk premia. Moreover, the fact that a
proxy for path shocks is correlated with a set of (spanned) risk premia proxies suggests that expectations
of future monetary policy aﬀect the shape of the yield today curve not only through physical expectations
of the short rate but also through a change of measure.
IV. Bond return predictability
This section establishes the key empirical result of this chapter: path shocks drive the time variation of
bond risk premia. I obtain these results via classic return predictability projections of one-year holding
period bond excess returns on lagged PathShock, and test for the statistical and economic signiﬁcance
of the slope coeﬃcient.
I verify the robustness of the results from a variety of perspectives. Firstly, an online appendix presents
an expanded set of results for all speciﬁcations of PathShock, bond maturities, and subsamples. Second, I
assess the statistical and economic signiﬁcance of the slope coeﬃcients in predictive regressions for bonds
with maturities ranging between 2 and 5 years controlling for alternative risk factor proxies. Finally, I
analyze the stability of the coeﬃcients in a subsample that excludes the crisis.
A. Predictability Regressions
Table 2.10 reports the estimation output of regressions:
rx
(n)
t+12 = const.+ β
(n)
PSPathShockt + 
(n)
t+12.
where bond maturities n range from 2 to 5 years. The estimates in the left panel are for the entire
sample (the last excess return is deﬁned between 2011:7 and 2012:7), while those on the right exclude the
ﬁnancial crisis (the last excess return is deﬁned between 2007:6 and 2008:6). Reported R¯2 are adjusted,
and all t-statistics employ Newey-West standard errors (18 lags); all left and right hand side variables are
standardized, so that the coeﬃcients can be interpreted as standard deviation changes of the regressand
for a unit standard deviation change in the regressor.
[Insert Table 2.10 about here.]
In all projections, PathShock explains the time variation in bond excess returns in an economically
and statistically signiﬁcant fashion. Estimated slope coeﬃcients are between 0.35 and 0.40: a one standard
deviation increase in path shocks predicts, on average, an increase of ﬁtted excess returns by ∼ 40% of
its unconditional standard deviation. Adjusted R2 range between 12.00% and 15.53%, so that monetary
policy path shocks also explain a large fraction of the overall variation of realized excess returns. Also, the
statistical signiﬁcance is large: all t-statistics reject the null hypothesis of no predictability at the 1% level.
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Besides a slight decline of the economic magnitude of the slope coeﬃcients for longer maturity bonds,
there are no noticeable patterns across speciﬁcations of the right hand side variable and sample period.
Overall, the results suggest that path shocks are not only a statistically and economically signiﬁcant, but
also robust predictor of future realized excess returns.
B. Real Growth and Inﬂation
Previous literature on return predictability in bond markets has highlighted the importance of real activ-
ity, which is one of the systematic ingredients of the Taylor rule. To evaluate the marginal contribution
of the policy shocks versus the systematic component of the rule, I follow Ludvigson and Ng (2009b))
and construct a real activity factor (gt) from the ﬁrst principle component from a large panel of macroe-
conomic indicators that includes 104 individual macro time series available at monthly frequency. This
is diﬀerent than the real argument of the Taylor used to estimate path shocks but is consistent with the
Fed responding to deviations in real activity from a target. In addition this provides are tougher test for
the marginal ability of path shocks to forecasts returns since the forecasting power of gt is well documented.
Table 2.11 repeats the predictability regressions above controlling for gt. The loadings on gt are neg-
ative and signiﬁcant for all maturities; both the statistical and economic signiﬁcance are strongest for
n = 2 and decrease in maturity. The inclusion of gt in the set of regressors leads to a sizable increase
in the adjusted R2 relative to the univariate case, especially for short maturities and in the 1990-2007
sample. In the case of bonds with 2 years maturities, the average increase in R¯2 is between 10% and 15%
in the 1990-2007 period, and between 5% and 10% for the full sample; the eﬀect decreases in maturity,
becoming negligible for 5 years bonds. Nevertheless, the economic and statistical signiﬁcance of expected
monetary policy path shocks is hardly aﬀected. The conclusion to this section is that the information
content in PathShockt relevant for the bond risk premium is not subsumed by the contemporaneous level
of macroeconomic activity.
A second potential issue is that expected inﬂation is endogenous to the monetary policy shocks. For
instance, Gallmeyer, Holliﬁeld, Palomino, and Zin (2007a) discuss an economy with recursive preferences
and and monetary policy. In this economy inﬂation is endogenous to a Taylor rule which helps match
the historical level of long term yields by introducing negative autocorrelation to the pricing kernel.
Moreover, to the extent that monetary policy aﬀects inﬂation and inﬂation is priced in nominal bond
returns, PathShock may aﬀect bond returns through an inﬂation channel. For these reasons, I run
a second test controlling for consensus expectations on inﬂation from BlueChip surveys. Table 2.12
summarizes the results. I ﬁnd that in the sample period excluding the ﬁnancial crisis, expected inﬂation
does indeed contain marginal information on bond risk premia. The slope coeﬃcients are positive with
comparable economic magnitude of PathShock. However, PathShock retains statistical signiﬁcance even
after controlling for inﬂation. Moreover, in the sample period including the crisis, the predictable content
of expected inﬂation disappears while PathShock maintains its statistical signiﬁcance.
[Insert Table 2.11 and 2.12 about here.]
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C. Discussion: PathShock and the ﬁnancial crisis
Tables 2.10 and 2.11 document that the economic and statistical signiﬁcance of predictability is largely
unaﬀected by the inclusion of the last ﬁnancial crisis in the sample. This may sound, at ﬁrst sight, a
little surprising. Our predictor, PathShock, is based on the notion that the federal fund rate is the
instrument of monetary policy, a tool that has lost its ﬂexibility and eﬀectiveness in the context of the
ZLB (zero lower bound) characterizing the US monetary landscape since the end of 2008.12 Unable to cut
federal funds targets any further, US monetary authorities have started considering forward guidance13
and QE (Quantitative Easing)14 as alternative policy instruments (see Woodford (2012) for an extensive
discussion).
Given such profound changes in the way that monetary policy is implemented, are measures of mone-
tary policy shocks based on Taylor rule residuals appropriate and, more speciﬁcally, is PathShock suitable
to measure exogenous variation in monetary policy? Target shocks, measured as residuals from Taylor
rules estimated on current federal funds, are indeed meaningless for two reasons. First, Taylor rules imply
negative nominal federal funds rates in negative GDP growth and low inﬂation scenarios, thus ceasing to
be adequate representations of the systematic and exogenous components of monetary policy. Second,
surprises about current federal funds targets are little informative about how monetary policy is actually
conducted in practice, since the Federal Reserve Bank has, de facto, switched its policy instrument from
current federal funds targets to forward guidance (at least temporarily). These criticisms, however, do
not apply to residuals from Taylor rules estimated over expected future federal funds, and therefore to
PathShock. First, despite the 0%-0.25% range imposed by the Fed onto current federal funds rates since
December 2008, expected federal funds rates have featured noticeable volatility over the same period (see
Figure ??). Second, expected future short rates are precisely the instrument of policies based on forward
guidance: being a residual from a Taylor rule estimated on expectations of future short rates, PatShock is,
by construction, a measure of the exogenous variation in forward guidance. As a consequence, PathShock
is particularly suitable to measure exogenous monetary policy shocks in the recent monetary environment.
12During the ﬁrst turmoils and Lehmans’ collapse, the Fed engaged in a particularly intense series of target rate cuts:
between 18 September 2007 and 16 December 2008, the target fed funds rate was decreased on each of the 10 FOMC
meetings, going from 4.75% down to a 0%-0.25% range. Between 16 December 2008 and December 2012, the Fed maintained
the target rate in the 0%-0.25% range uninterruptedly.
13Forward guidance represents the result of a decade long process of changes in the strategy underpinning policy commu-
nication. The structure of FOMC statements has been modiﬁed to include: (i) an economic outlook, in January 2000; (ii)
qualitative statements about future policy inclinations, in August 2003; (iii) calendar-based guidance, in August 2011; (iv)
outcome-based guidance, in December 2012.
14Quantitative Easing policies consist of purchases, by the central bank, of speciﬁed quantities of long term ﬁnancial
assets. Our sample includes two instances of QE policies: (i) QE1, between late 2008 and 2009; and (ii) QE2, between
the second quarters of 2010 and 2011. While QE1 consisted of purchases of MBS, Treasuries, and Agency securities,
QE2 focused only on the purchase on long term Treasury securities. See Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack (2011) and
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) for further details about QE policies and their quantitative impact on ﬁnancial
securities.
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V. Conclusion
Much of the term structure literature uses latent factors to model the dynamics of yields without at-
tempting any economic interpretation. Motivated by the link between monetary policy and the short
term interest rate more recent literature has moved towards an explicit role for policy shocks within no-
arbitrage term structure models. This paper asks a more fundamental question: does monetary policy
represent a source of priced risk in bond markets and is it important for understanding time-variation in
the bond risk premium?
To answer this question I examine the reaction of nominal Treasury yields to monetary policy shocks
around FOMC meetings. I construct two types of shock using Federal funds futures and long dated
Eurodollar futures: (i) target shocks that reﬂect current behavior of the policy instrument; and (ii) path
shocks that capture variation in the projected path of monetary policy. I document that while short
dated nominal Treasuries react strongly to target shocks, changes to long dated yields are mainly driven
by path shocks. Exploring the economic source of this variation I construct a bond risk premium proxy
available at daily frequency and show that path shocks command a positive adjusted to risk compensation.
Next, I construct a time-series equivalent for FOMC paths shocks: PathShock. This measure is
constructed in real-time from the residuals of Taylor rules estimated on survey forecasts of federal funds
rates, GDP growth, and inﬂation. Through classical return predictability regressions I establish that
PathShock’s account for 10%-15% of the variance of one-year excess returns for bond maturities between
2 and 5 years and are signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
These results have implications for both asset pricing and monetary policy. First, the evidence suggests
that macro-ﬁnance models of the term structure should include a role for monetary policy not only through
physical expectations of future short rates but also through risk-adjusted ones. Second, the results indicate
that monetary authorities can learn about market expectations for the path of policy from real-time survey
forecasts, and therefore represent a valuable tool in implementing policy today.
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VI. Appendix: Figures
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Figure 2.1. Treasury Yields:
Figure plots time series of the Federal funds target rate, the Fed funds eﬀect rate, and Treasury yields at 6 month,
2 year and 5 year maturities from 1982 - 2014.
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Figure 2.2. Expected vs Unexpected Changes:
Figure plots expected versus unexpected changes in the front month Federal funds futures around all FOMC
meetings. Our sample includes 164 FOMC meetings between 1990.1 and 2008.6
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Figure 2.3. Cumulative Shocks:
Figure plots the cumulative sum of shocks to front and 3rd month contract Federal funds futures (e0,e3), and 6, 9
and 12 month eurodollar rates(E6,E9,E12).
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Figure 2.4. Futures Predictions:
Figure plots predicted changes by the future market. The left panel plots those occasions when the future markets
predicted no change in the eﬀective rate, and the red bars indicate those occasions when a change did occurred.
The right panel shows the occasions when future markets predicted a change. and the red bars indicator those
occasions when a change did actually not occur.
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Figure 2.5. Futures Predictions:
Figure plots unexpected changes in the front month futures contract (y-axis) with respect to changes in the 1-
quarter (3rd month) contract (x-axis). The red line in the plot is the 45 degrees lines; the blue line is the least
squares ﬁt.
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Figure 2.6. Target vs Timing Shock:
Figure plots the time-series behaviour of two components of the change in the 1-quarter contract: (i) the change
in the front month contract (the ‘target’ shock); (ii) the diﬀerence between the shock to the 4 month shock and to
the front-month contract (the ‘timing’ shock)
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Figure 2.7. All Shocks:
Figures plots shocks to the front and third month Federal funds futures and shocks to 6, 9 and 12 month eurodollar
rates around FOMC announcements.
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Figure 2.8. Target vs Path Shocks:
Figures plots target versus path shocks. The left panel plots those occasion when these moved in the same direction
while the right panel plots those occasions when the shocks moved in opposite directions.
84
74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06
−20
−15
−10
−5
0
5
10
15
C
P
date
CP factor at monthly and daily frequency
 
 
CP daily
CP monthly
Figure 2.9. Daily Cochrane-Piazzesi:
Figure compares the behavior of the Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005b) return forecasting factor constructed at
monthly and daily frequency.
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Figure 2.10. Federal Funds Rate Forecasts:
Figure plots 1-quarter to 4-quarter consensus forecasts for the level of the Federal funds rate in percentage points.
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Figure 2.11. Consensus Macro Forecasts:
This ﬁgure plots the time series of consensus forecasts for 1-year inﬂation (πeC,t,12), GDP growth (g
e
C,t,12) and proxy
for the level of macroeconomic activity (gt) described in the data section. Inﬂation and GDP forecasts are plotted
against the right y-axis in percentage points. Macroeconomic activity is plotted on the left axis in standardised
units.
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Figure 2.12. The Performance of BCFFS Forecasts
The ﬁgure plots the time series of the number of agents in the cross-section whose forecast error is, in absolute
value, less than the absolute value of the VAR forecast error (left panels), and the diﬀerence between the absolute
value of the VAR forecast error and the absolute value of the average BCFFS forecast error (right panels). Forecast
horizon: one quarter.
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Figure 2.13. PathShock
This ﬁgure plots monetary policy path shocks PathShock, constructed as cross-sectional averages of the residuals
from Taylor rules estimated over a panel of forecast data. Each series corresponds to one of the 6 speciﬁcations
described in Table 2.7. Sample period: 1990:1 - 2011:7.
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Figure 2.14. Comparing Shocks:
Figure plots PathShock against three proxies for target shocks proposed by the literature: (i) the residuals in a
monthly orthogonalised VAR (ηceet ); (ii) the 1-day change in the 3 month euro-dollar rate around FOMC announce-
ments (ηcpt ); and (iii) the 1-day change in the 1-month Federal funds futures rate around FOMC announcements
(ηbkt ).
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Figure 2.15. Counter-cyclicality of PathShock
This ﬁgure plots monetary policy path shocks PathShock (speciﬁcation 1), and macroeconomic activity, g. Areas
shaded in gray indicate NBER recessions. Sample period: 1990:1 - 2011:7. Time series are standardised for easy
comparison.
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Figure 2.16. Monetary policy shocks and yield curve information
This ﬁgure plots PathShock against three risk premium proxies: (i) the slope of the yield curve Slopet =
y
(5)
t − y(1)t ; (ii) the forward rate factor of Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005b) (CP ); and (iii) a volatility factor from
Le and Singleton (2013b) (LS2).
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VII. Appendix: Table
Table 2.1. Summary Statistics:
table reports summary statistics for expected versus unexpected changes in the front month Federal funds futures
rate, the change in the 3rd month contract, and the change in 6, 9 and 12 month eurodollar rates. Our sample
includes 164 FOMC meetings between 1990.1 and 2008.6.
Δr E[Δr] Δr − E[Δr] ΔFF3 ΔE6 ΔE9 ΔE12
mean −0.0259 0.0060 −0.0319 −0.0226 −0.0138 −0.0155 −0.0140
var 0.0503 0.0457 0.0353 0.0079 0.0255 0.0202 0.0178
Table 2.2. FOMC Announcements: Expected vs Unexpected Changes
Table reports regressions of the daily change in {3, 6}-month bills rates, and {1, 3, 5, 10}-year note rates on target
changes (top panel), and expected versus unexpected components of the target change (bottom panel). OLS t-stats
are reported in parenthesis.
Target Rate Changes
Bill 3m Bill 6m 1yr 3yr 5yr 10yr
target 0.20 0.16 0.11 0.05 0.02 −0.01
(8.33) (5.97) (2.96) (1.34) (0.62) (−0.38)
R2 0.37 0.28 0.11 0.02 −0.00 −0.00
Expected vs Unexpected Changes
expected 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 −0.02 −0.04
(5.84) (5.75) (1.56) (0.02) (−0.73) (−1.44)
unexpected 0.30 0.29 0.22 0.15 0.11 0.04
(6.15) (5.50) (3.70) (2.52) (2.23) (1.12)
R2 0.50 0.50 0.30 0.13 0.10 0.04
Table 2.3. FOMC Announcements: Timing vs Level
Table reports regressions of the daily change in {3, 6}-month bills rates, and {1, 3, 5, 10}-year note rates on level
and timing shocks. OLS t-stats are reported in parenthesis.
Bill 3m Bill 6m 1yr 3yr 5yr 10yr
level 0.55 0.60 0.50 0.44 0.36 0.22
(5.70) (6.34) (4.38) (3.62) (3.16) (2.44)
timing 0.54 0.60 0.49 0.48 0.39 0.27
(5.52) (6.41) (4.13) (3.38) (2.70) (2.12)
R2 0.46 0.59 0.40 0.23 0.17 0.07
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Table 2.4. Factor Decomposition
We stack the shocks to ﬁve contracts (2 Fed funds and 3 Eurodollar) around each FOMC announcement in a T × 5
matrix and perform a principle component decomposition. This tables reports a decomposition of the variance
explained by the ﬁrst three principal components of the covariance matrix of the shocks. OLS t-stats are reported
in parenthesis.
PC1 PC2 PC3
% 61.98 32.97 3.26
Table 2.5. FOMC Announcements: Target vs Path
Table reports regressions of the daily change in {3, 6}-month bills rates, and {1, 3, 5, 10}-year note rates on surprise
and path shocks. OLS t-stats are reported in parenthesis.
Bill 3m Bill 6m 1yr 3yr 5yr 10yr
Surprise 0.68 0.67 0.47 0.28 0.22 0.09
(4.00) (4.27) (3.28) (2.50) (2.41) (1.15)
Path 0.17 0.32 0.49 0.57 0.57 0.56
(1.87) (2.86) (3.11) (3.16) (3.20) (3.31)
R2 0.52 0.63 0.55 0.45 0.41 0.33
Table 2.6. Daily Risk Premium Regressions:
Table reports regressions of the daily change in a Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005b) factor constructed at daily fre-
quency on surprise and path shocks:
ΔCPt = const + βsupriset + γpatht + εt
OLS t-stats are reported in parenthesis.
ΔCPt
surprise −0.20
(−2.46)
Path 0.31
(2.89)
R2 0.10
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Table 2.7. Taylor rule speciﬁcations
This table describes diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the general Taylor rule model
fen,t,h = ρ1f
e
n,t,h−1 + ρ2f
e
n,t,h−2 + (1− ρ)
(
f + β
(
πen,t,i − π∗
)
+ γxen,t,i
)
+ uen,t,h.
The ﬁrst row contains the horizon, in months, of the federal funds rate forecast. The second row contains the
horizon, in months, of inﬂation and output gap forecasts. The third row describes the type of output gap employed;
output gap 1 is constructed using full sample information, while output gap 2 is constructed recursively. The fourth
and ﬁfth rows report the test-statistic and p-value of the F-test for the joint signiﬁcance of the individual eﬀects.
The ﬁnal two rows report the test-statistic and p-value of the Hausman test for systematic diﬀerences between
random and ﬁxed eﬀects coeﬃcients (null hypothesis: random eﬀects is appropriate).
Speciﬁcation 1 2 3 4 5 6
h 12 12 9 9 9 9
i 12 12 9 9 12 12
GAP 1 2 1 2 1 2
F(FE) 7.69 7.56 8.86 8.85 8.19 8.31
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hausman 52.91 50.61 32.71 37.17 31.28 36.23
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 2.8. Path Shocks vs Target Shocks
Table reports results of a regression of PathShockt on test three proxies for target shocks that have been studied
in the literature: (i) the residuals in a monthly orthogonalised VAR (ηceet ); (ii) the 1-day change in the 3 month
euro-dollar rate around FOMC announcements (ηcpt ); and (iii) the 1-day change in the 1-month Federal funds
futures rate around FOMC announcements ηbkt . Panel A reports loadings, t-statistics (White standard errors) and
R2 from
PathShockt = α+ β ηit + εt
while Panel B reports regressions of PackShockt on a 6-month moving sum of past η
i
t shocks
PathShockt = α+ β
6∑
k=1
ηit−k+1 + εt
ηceet η
cp
t η
bk
t
Panel A
β −0.04 −0.03 −0.04
t-stat (−2.03) (−0.99) (−4.70)
R2 0.02 0.01 0.03
Panel B
β −0.02 −0.06 −0.03
t-stat (−2.77) (−4.97) (−4.43)
R2 0.06 0.15 0.10
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Table 2.9. Risk Premium Proxies
The table reports the results from regressions of PathShock on bond risk premia proxies extracted from date t
yield curve information:
PathShockt = const.+ βZ′t + t
The proxies for yield based risk premium proxies Zt are the slope of the yield curve as in Campbell and Shiller
(1991b) (Slopet = y
(5)
t −y(1)t ), the forward rate factor of Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005b) (CPt), and the two volatility
factors estimated by Le and Singleton (2013b) (LS1t and LS2t). T-statistics, reported below in parenthesis are
corrected for auto-correlation and heteroskedasticity using Newey-West errors (18 lags). Both left and right hand
variables are standardized. A constant is included but not reported. Sample period: 1990:1 - 2007:12.
Slopet CPt LS1t LS2t R
2
β 0.29 0.08
t-stat (2.19)
β 0.36 0.12
t-stat (3.03)
β 0.06 0.52 0.23
t-stat (0.32) (2.94)
Table 2.10. Bond Return Predictability: PathShock
The table reports the output from regressions of annual bond excess returns on a constant and expected monetary
policy shocks:
rx
(n)
t+12 = const.+ β
(n)
PSPathShockt + (n)t+12.
Bond maturities (n) range from 2 to 5 years. Each panel reports the results for one of the 6 proxies of expected
monetary policy described by Table 2.7. The left panels report the results for the full sample (the last observation is
the excess return that realized between 2011:7 and 2012:7), while the right panels report the results for the sample
excluding the crisis (the last observation is the excess return that realized between 2007:6 and 2008:6). T-statistics,
reported below in parenthesis are corrected for auto-correlation and heteroskedasticity using Newey-West errors
(18 lags). R¯2 is the adjusted R2. Both left and right hand variables are standardized. A constant is included but
not reported.
1990-2011 1990-2007
n PathShock R¯2 PathShock R¯2
2 0.38 14.00% 0.40 15.53%
(3.13) (3.07)
3 0.37 13.73% 0.39 14.62%
(3.19) (3.00)
4 0.38 14.05% 0.38 13.70%
(3.35) (2.89)
5 0.35 12.05% 0.35 12.00%
(3.19) (2.77)
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Table 2.11. Bond Return Predictability: PathShock and gt
The table reports the output from regressions of annual bond excess returns on a constant, expected monetary
policy shocks, and levels of macroeconomic activity:
rx
(n)
t+12 = const + β
(n)
PSPathShock + β(n)g gt + (n)t+12
Bond maturities (n) range from 2 to 5 years. The left panels report the results for the full sample (the last
observation is the excess return that realized between 2011:7 and 2012:7), while the right panels report the results
for the sample excluding the crisis (the last observation is the excess return that realized between 2007:6 and
2008:6). T-statistics, reported below in parenthesis are corrected for auto-correlation and heteroskedasticity using
Newey-West errors (18 lags). R¯2 is the adjusted R2. Both left and right hand variables are standardized. A
constant is included but not reported.
1990-2011 1990-2007
n PathShock g R¯2 PathShock g R¯2
2 0.35 -0.31 22.97% 0.23 -0.40 28.04%
(3.32) (-2.70) (1.85) (-4.24)
3 0.35 -0.28 21.16% 0.25 -0.32 22.54%
(3.30) (-2.89) (1.95) (-3.57)
4 0.36 -0.23 18.89% 0.26 -0.26 18.78%
(3.27) (-2.41) (2.00) (-3.00)
5 0.33 -0.20 15.90% 0.27 -0.19 14.45%
(3.10) (-2.50) (2.08) (-2.32)
Table 2.12. Bond Return Predictability: PathShock and E[πt]
The table reports the output from regressions of annual bond excess returns on a constant, expected monetary
policy shocks, the consensus forecast for the 4Q-ahead ahead rate of inﬂation activity:
rx
(n)
t+12 = const+ β
(n)
PSPathShock + β(n)g E[πt] + (n)t+12
Bond maturities (n) range from 2 to 5 years. The left panels report the results for the full sample (the last
observation is the excess return that realized between 2011:7 and 2012:7), while the right panels report the results
for the sample excluding the crisis (the last observation is the excess return that realized between 2007:6 and
2008:6). T-statistics, reported below in parenthesis are corrected for auto-correlation and heteroskedasticity using
Newey-West errors (18 lags). R¯2 is the adjusted R2. Both left and right hand variables are standardized. A
constant is included but not reported.
1990-2011 1990-2007
n PathShock E[πt] R¯
2 PathShock E[πt] R¯
2
rx(2) 0.35 0.29 0.22 0.39 0.39 0.30
(2.94) (2.36) (3.20) (3.05)
rx(3) 0.36 0.21 0.18 0.38 0.32 0.25
(2.95) (1.64) (2.88) (2.45)
rx(4) 0.36 0.18 0.17 0.37 0.31 0.23
(3.12) (1.43) (2.74) (2.35)
rx(5) 0.34 0.12 0.13 0.35 0.28 0.19
(3.01) (0.93) (2.59) (2.10)
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Chapter 3
Term Structure Models and Diﬀerences in Belief
This chapter investigates the implications of heterogeneity in macroeconomic beliefs for the term struc-
ture of interest rates. When moving from single to multiple agent models several properties of asset
prices change. Diﬀerences in beliefs aﬀect the equilibrium pricing kernel impacting, at the same time,
the dynamics of short term interest rates, the shape of the yield curve, and expected bond risk premia.
I highlight three sets of empirical implications for the term structure of interest rates and empirically
investigate these properties using historical data on traders beliefs about the state of the economy.
When agents have diﬀerent models to interpret public information, they are rationally induced to
speculate in asset markets. In this case, the equilibrium stochastic discount factor is distorted by a com-
ponent that depends on the characteristics of beliefs. This implies that bond prices generally deviate
from those emerging in a homogeneous economy in which the representative agent is endowed with the
consensus belief. Indeed, in a heterogeneous economy the beliefs of the representative agent include an
aggregation bias that depends on the relative wealth distribution of the agents.1 I consider an economy
with stochastic disagreement, learning and non-myopic agents and derive closed-form solutions for bond
prices that allow us to investigate the marginal eﬀect of diﬀerent characteristics of the economy on the
shape of the yield curve and bond risk premia.2.
A ﬁrst set of implications relates to the behavior of the short term interest rate. When agents are non
myopic, the short term interest rate is aﬀected by disagreement in two ways. The ﬁrst is due to the eﬀect
of the wealth weighted aggregation bias of the beliefs beliefs. This eﬀect is history-dependent: as past
disagreement aﬀects agents’ speculative positions and events unfold, wealth is redistributed endogeneously
over time toward the agent whose model happened to align more closely with the data generating process.
The second eﬀect is due to the optimal hedging demand and depends on whether EIS is greater or smaller
than 1. As agents rely on diﬀerent models, shocks to fundamentals endogenously change the perceived
investment opportunity set, aﬀecting agents future speculative trading opportunities. This occurs even if
1See Jouini, Marin, and Napp (2010) for a discussion on aggregation biases; see, moreover, Xiong and Yan (2010) for an
insightful discussion of the implications of disagreement on bond prices when agents are myopic (γ = 1).
2Important contributions that discuss the asset pricing implications of heterogeneity in beliefs include Basak (2005),
Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006), David (2008), (Buraschi, Trojani, and Vedolin, 2011, 2010), Bhamra and Uppal (2011), and
Gallmeyer and Holliﬁeld (2008).
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fundamentals are homoskedastic as long as agents agree to disagree. For EIS > 1, larger diﬀerences in
beliefs reduce the short term interest rate (negative hedging demand). This is because the substitution
eﬀect dominates the wealth eﬀect and agents reduce current consumption when the investment (specula-
tive) opportunity set is potentially increased by beliefs shocks. The opposite holds for EIS < 1 (positive
hedging demand). This knife edge case for short term interest rates provides an interesting testable re-
striction that makes bond markets a special laboratory to distinguish across alternative speculative models.
The second set of implications relates to the shape of the term structure. When the endowment pro-
cess follows an aﬃne dynamics, bond yields are given by the sum of an exponentially aﬃne function in the
expected economic growth plus a quadratic function in disagreement. I calibrate the economy and show
how wealth distribution, risk aversion and disagreement interact to aﬀect the shape of the yield curve.
A robust feature is that when γ = 1, the yield curve can be upward sloping even when the equivalent
economy with homogeneous investors would give rise to a decreasing yield curve. This is interesting at
the light of the well known diﬃculty for simple single agent economies to produce upward sloping term
structures. This feature crucially depends on the size of the term premium and it does not hold when
agents are myopic. Moreover, bond prices depend on beliefs in a history-dependent way. Since equilibrium
prices depend on agents wealth distribution, which is the result of the way agents traded and shared risks
in the past, distant lags of disagreement should be statistically signiﬁcant to explain the dynamics of both
short term interest rates and today’s cross-section of yields.
The third set of implications that I study are about the properties of bond risk premia. In these
economies, agents marginal utility do not equate in equilibrium state-by-state, even when markets are
dynamically complete. Each agent has his own stochastic discount factor and shocks to their individual
beliefs cannot be fully insured, independently of the number of contingent claims. This is similar to the
eﬀect of labor income shocks in incomplete markets economies, with the diﬀerence that the asset pricing
eﬀects do not require frictions for these individual shocks to aﬀect prices. Agents’ speciﬁc prices of risk are
proportional to the level of diﬀerences in beliefs as this induces larger volatility in individual consumption
shares.
When I study long-run expected bond risk premia under the measure of an unbiased econometrician,
I ﬁnd that their properties diﬀer from those arising in homogeneous economy in several respects. They
are given by three components. The ﬁrst is standard Lucas compensation for consumption that is propor-
tional to the product of risk aversion γ and the volatility of aggregate consumption. It is well known that
this term requires a large risk aversion to generate a bond risk premia similar to those that are observable
in the data. The second component, on the other hand, is inversely proportional to γ. Indeed, for lower
levels of risk aversion agents are willing to speculate more, so that the endogenous quantity of risk that
each agent faces is larger. The net eﬀect of this non linearity is that for γ below a given threshold, the
risk premium can be high even if γ is low. Moreover, an implication is that bond risk premia depend on
lagged disagreement. This is due to the fact that sample periods with larger belief dispersions imply larger
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subsequent redistribution of wealth and more volatile consumption/wealth ratios that, in turn, implies
larger ex-ante conditional bond risk premia. The third component arises from agents’ demand to hedge
future changes in their expected marginal utility due to future shocks to the distribution of beliefs. This
term is increasing in risk aversion γ and it is due to the fact that future changes in beliefs (either their
own or of the other agent) will necessarily aﬀect future wealth redistribution. It is worth noting that the
last term can be signiﬁcant even if today disagreement is zero. Indeed, even in this case, agents know
that they will disagree tomorrow, almost surely. Speculation makes higher order beliefs play a ﬁrst order
eﬀect on long-run risk premia. These properties suggest a clear set of testable implications: disagreement
give rise to endogenous predictability in bond excess returns even if fundamentals are homoskedastic.
Moreover, the lower the risk aversion, the higher the amount of speculation, and the more distant lags of
disagreement may aﬀect the time variation in bond risk premia.
These questions relate to a vast literature that documents the diﬃculty to reconcile the properties of
the yield curve with homogeneous agents macro models (Duﬀee (2012)). A stream of the literature shows
strong evidence of bond return predictability. However, the properties of risk compensation in Treasury
markets appear orthogonal to the properties of bond conditional second moments (see Duﬀee (2002) or
Dai and Singleton (2002)). This has motivated a search for ﬂexible speciﬁcations for the price of risk in
reduced-form models, that often do not have simple counterparts in known structural models.3
I build what is arguably the richest data set on the distribution of expectations of professional fore-
casters for a broad set of macroeconomic variables. This data set merges all the historical paper archives
of BlueChip surveys and is unique in that it is available at a monthly frequency, covers a long history,
and it is based on a large and stable cross-section of forecasters.4 I construct proxies of macroeconomic
disagreement on both (exogenous) economic variables (such as future real economic activity and inﬂation)
and (endogenous) ﬁnancial variables (such as future bond prices).
I obtain a number of empirical results. First, I ﬁnd that both real and nominal short term interest
rates are negatively related to current disagreement about fundamentals. In both cases real disagree-
ment is statistically signiﬁcant with t-statistics of -3.30 and -4.01, respectively. These results supports
heterogeneous beliefs models in which EIS > 1. The results are conﬁrmed when I restate the test in
terms of changes in interest rates controlling for the Fama-Bliss one-year forward spot spread and/or the
Cochrane-Piazzesi factor.
3To address this issue, structural models have been proposed that are capable of generating counter-cyclical risk premia.
Example include habit models (Wachter (2006) Buraschi and Jiltsov (2007b)), long run risk models (Bansal and Shaliastovich
(2012)), and ambiguity aversion models (Gagliardini, Porchia, and Trojani (2009), Ulrich (2011)). While habit models have
proven successful on some aspects, they imply a tight link between past consumption and bond expected excess returns
that can generate excess short term interest rate volatility. Long run risk models generate time-varying risk premia via a
stochastic quantity of risk. Ambiguity models, on the other hand, can generate rich speciﬁcations for the price of risk, with
the caveat that risk factors are inherently unobservable.
4The Survey of Professional Forecasters is available only at quarterly frequency and, especially in some periods, it has
a more restricted cross-section of forecasters. Previously, the commercially available BlueChip economic digital ﬁles started
only in 2007.
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Second, I ﬁnd a strong eﬀect of contemporaneous real disagreement on the slope of the term structure.
A one standard deviation shock to disagreement raises the slope of the yield curve by 0.25 standard devia-
tions with a t-statistic of 4.11. When I test whether past beliefs contain useful information about today’s
cross-section of yields, I ﬁnd that adding a 12 month and then a 24 months lag to the regression for the
level of interest rates raises the R2 to 7% then 27%, respectively. Lagged disagreement is signiﬁcant at
the 1% level. I ﬁnd that lagged disagreement is strongly signiﬁcant also for the slope of the yield curve.
When I add a 12 month lag and a 24 month lag I obtain an R2 of 32% then 49%, respectively. This is
an intriguing result that suggests that past speculative activity, as proxied by lagged disagreement, has a
large eﬀect of the shape of the yield curve today, consistent with the hypothesis that agents are trading
on their beliefs. These results are consistent with models with γ < 1. I run a series of robustness check
to investigate whether the result is due to any spurious features of the time series.
Third, when I run one-year holding period excess returns regression I ﬁnd that a substantial amount
of return predictability is coming from both contemporaneous and lagged dispersion terms. In the case
of 5-year bonds, the R2 of the regression is 16% and the t-statistics on 3 month lagged disagreement
is 3.52. A similar result holds also in the case of longer maturity bonds. I examine the robustness of
these ﬁndings to a number of alternative candidate risk factors. I check whether information in lagged
disagreement is already subsumed by the level of economic activity (as in Ludvigson and Ng (2009a)).
While the results conﬁrm the statistical signiﬁcance of such a business cycle factor, disagreement seems
to capture diﬀerent information and its signiﬁcance persists. I also control for the potential eﬀect of the
dynamics of second moments of fundamentals. This channel is discussed in Bansal and Yaron (2004) and
Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013) and it is potentially important since one may conjecture that beliefs dis-
persion and economic uncertainty are correlated. I also control for the political uncertainty factor studied
in Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2012). In both cases, I ﬁnd that the factor loadings and signiﬁcance on dis-
agreement are almost unchanged. This result is interesting since it suggests that individual consumption
volatility matters more for explaining time variation in risk premia than aggregate consumption volatility,
as predicted by the model.
I. Theoretical Framework
This section studies the properties of bond markets in a multiple agent economy with heterogeneous
beliefs. We begin from a simple structural homoskedastic economy with a representative agent. Then
extending this setting to multiple agents we derive implications for both the cross-section of yields and
the time-series properties of risk premia. In the following section we take the model to the data.
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A. The Homogeneous Benchmark Economy
Consider a simple endowment economy in which a representative agent has CRRA preferences u′(ct) =
e−δtc−γt . The growth rate of endowment is a linear combination of a vector of factors gt, with
dDt/Dt = gtdt+ σDdW
D
t (3.1)
dgt = −κg(gt − θ)dt+ σgdW
g
t , with ρDg = E
(
dWDt dW
g
t
)
(3.2)
When agents have common beliefs about the data generating process, it is well known that bond
prices satisfy a simple representation. This solution has been studied extensively since Vasicek (1977). In
equilibrium, since ct = Dt, then the pricing kernel Mt is given by
Mt = u
′(Dt) (3.3)
Since dMt/Mt = −rtdt − κ
′dWt, using itoˆ’s lemma one ﬁnds that rt = δ + γβgt −
1
2γ(1 + γ)σ
2
D. Thus,
if growth rate are constant, i.e. βgt = g0, so are interest rates and the term structure is ﬂat. When gt is
stochastic, bond prices P (t, T ) can be computed by solving for the Euler condition P (t, T ) = Et [MT /Mt].
In this economy, the term structure is exponentially aﬃne in gt and given by
P (t, T ) = τ exp [A(τ) +B(τ)gt] (3.4)
where τ = e
−δτ . Bond prices belong to the exponentially aﬃne class as characterised by Duﬃe and Kan
(1996) and A(τ) and B(τ) are functions of time until maturity (τ) and the structural parameters of the
economy (see appendix):
A(τ) =
1
2
γ(γ + 1)σ2Dτ +
(
−γθ
κg
+
γ2
κ2g
σDσg,D
)
(κgτ + e
−κgτ − 1) (3.5)
+
1
4
γ2
κ3g
(
σ2g,D + σ
2
g,s
)
(2κgτ + 4e
−κgτ − e−2κgτ − 3) (3.6)
B(τ) =
−γ
κg
(1− e−κgτ ) (3.7)
In this setting, instantaneous bond excess returns are equal to
Et[rx
(T )
t,t+dt] = −Et
[
dP
P
dMt
Mt
]
=
1
P
∂P
∂g
σgγσD〈dW
g
t , dW
D
t 〉 (3.8)
= γσDρDg︸ ︷︷ ︸
Real Price of Risk
× σgB(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Quantity of Risk
(3.9)
When short run shocks (WDt ) are correlated with long run shocks (W
g
t ) the simple benchmark model
restricts expected excess returns to be a scaled multiple of the volatility of macroeconomic fundamen-
tals.5 As E(dWDt dW
g
t ) → 0 the risk premium on bonds converges to zero. The tight connection between
5This is the case when Dt is assumed to be a deterministic aﬃne transformation of gt, i.e. Dt = exp(β
′gt).
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ﬁrst and second conditional moments of bond returns has been discussed in the literature as a prob-
lematic feature of early models of the term structure (see Duﬀee (2002) and Dai and Singleton (2000)).
Moreover, while yield dynamics are predictable because the conditional growth rate of the economy is
time-varying, expected excess returns are constant hence completely unpredictable. To break the tight
link between conditional moments and introduce time-variation in risk compensation the literature has
focused on two directions: (i) models with time-varying quantities of risk (as in Bansal and Yaron (2004)
and Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013)) or (ii) models with time-varying prices of risk (as in the habit mod-
els of Buraschi and Jiltsov (2007b) and Wachter (2006)). In the following we study an alternative channel
in which both prices and quantities of risk are time-varying.
B. Disagreement
The drift of the consumption process is unobservable which means the objective measure is not deﬁned
on either agents’ ﬁltration. In such situations it is easy to imagine the emergence of disagreement about
the correct model for the economy (for discussion along these lines see Hansen, Heaton, and Li (2008)
and Pastor and Stambaugh (2000)).6 The literature has generally focused on two channels for belief
dispersion: (i) subjective priors as in Basak (2000) or Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006); and (ii) subjective
models as in David (2008) or Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009). In both cases agents have common
information sets and ‘agree to disagree’ about how to process information which, mathematically, is
represented by diﬀerent ﬁltered probability spaces {Ω,F it ,P
i}. Regardless of how heterogeneity arises,
since Dt is observable, consistent perceptions of dividend innovations require that
dWD,it = σ
−1
D
(
dDt/Dt − g
i
tdt
)
= dWDt + σ
−1
D
(
gt − g
i
t
)
dt = dWDt + error
e,i
t dt (3.10)
where we have deﬁned standardised forecast error of agent i as errore,ot . Since the above holds for both
agents subjective innovations are related by
dWD,bt = dW
D,a
t + σ
−1
D
(
gat − g
b
t
)
dt = dWD,at + ψtdt (3.11)
where the scaled disagreement process is deﬁned as ψt. The follow section derives a disagreement process
by requiring agents form rational posterior forecasts, in the sense that, they each solve an optimal ﬁltering
problem.
C. Disagreement and Optimal Learning
Agents learn in a Bayesian fashion by ﬁltering the state dynamics from observations of the dividend
process and publicly available information represented by a ﬁltration Ft. Denote agent i’s conditional
6Hansen, Heaton, and Li (2008) argue about the existence of signiﬁcant measurement challenges in quantifying the long-
run risk-return trade-oﬀ and that ‘the same statistical challenges that plague econometricians presumably also plague market
participants’. Pastor and Stambaugh (2000) discuss the statistical properties of predictive systems when the predictors are
autocorrelated but κg is not known.
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forecast gˆit = E
i
t[gt|Ft] and posterior variance ν
i
t = E
i
t[(gˆ
i
t−gt)
2|Ft]. Since state dynamics are conditionally
Gaussian, standard linear ﬁltering results allow a closed form solution for a posteriori means and variances.
Consider a rotation of our state space by writing 3.1 and 3.2 in terms of independent Brownian motions
(W 1t ,W
2
t ):
WDt = W
1
t (3.12)
W gt = ρiW
1
t +
√
1− ρ2iW
2
t (3.13)
where ρi is an agent speciﬁc parameter that determines the perceived correlation between shocks to the
level of consumption versus shocks to the growth rate of consumption. Investors have identical information
sets that include realisations of the dividend process and a signal that is correlated with the stochastic
growth rate of the economy {Dτ , sτ}
t
τ=0. The ﬁltering problem contains three independent Brownian
motions and two measurement equations
dD/D = gtdt+ σDdW
1
t ,
dst = φidW
2
t +
√
1− φ2i dW
3
t ,
where as in Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) we introduce a parameter φi that determines the reaction of
subjective expectations to the arrival of signal shocks. Applying the results of Lipster and Shiryayev
(1974) (theorem 12.7. Page 36) the optimal linear in terms of our original Brownians is given by
dgˆit = −κg(gˆ
i
t − θ)dt+
(
γ∗i
σD
+ σgρi
)
dWˆD,it +
(
σg
√
1− ρ2iφi
)
dst
= −κg(gˆ
i
t − θ)dt+ σ
i
g,DdWˆ
D,i
t + σ
i
g,sdst (3.14)
γ∗i =
⎛
⎝−(κg + ρi σg
σD
)
+
√(
κg + ρi
σg
σD
)2
+
(
σg
σD
)2 [
1− φ2i (1− ρ
2
i )− ρ
2
i
]⎞⎠σ2D (3.15)
The diﬀusion for standardised disagreement can then be written as
dψt = σ
−1
D d(gˆ
a
t − gˆ
b
t )
=
[
−κg
gˆat − gˆ
b
t
σD
−
σbg,D
σD
gˆat − gˆ
b
t
σD
]
dt+ σ−1D (σ
a
g,D − σ
b
g,D)dWˆ
D,a
t + σ
−1
D (σ
a
g,s − σ
b
g,s)dst
= −κψψtdt+ σψ,DdWˆ
D,a
t + σψ,sdst
Note that the disagreement process has a zero long run mean implying that in the long run agents agree
on the state of the economy, but conditionally disagreement can take both positive and negative values,
i.e., growth rate optimists can become growth rate pessimists and vice-versa.
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D. Disagreement and the Radon-Nikodym Derivative
Heterogeneous beliefs models depart from the traditional setting by assuming that agents disagree on some
features of the conditional distribution of the fundamentals. They have diﬀerent models that lead them to
diﬀerent empirical likelihoods. Special cases include disagreement on some parameters values or diﬀerent
priors. The key insight of this literature is that, if agents can trade, the equilibrium SDF is aﬀected
by disagreement. Consider two agents, a and b, each representing its own class with separate subjective
probability measures on the data generating process, denoted as dPat and dP
b
t . Let ( Ω, F , {F
D
t },P
i
t ) be
the ﬁltered probability space of agent i = a, b with FDt being the ﬁltration generated by observations on
the dividend process Dt. The diﬀerence in beliefs between the two agents can be conveniently summarized
by the Radon-Nikodym derivative ηt =
dPbt
dPat
, so that for any random variable Xt that is Ft-measurable,
Eb(XT |F
D
t ) = E
a
(
ηTXT |F
D
t
)
with η0 = 1. (3.16)
The restriction that agents’ measures are absolutely continuous, equation 3.11, and an application of
Girsanov implies that the Radon-Nikodym derivate of agent b’s measure with respect to agent a’s measure
is given by:
ηt =
dPb
dPa
= η0 exp
(
−1/2
∫ t
0
ψ′sψsds−
∫ t
0
ψsdW
a
s
)
Moreover, its diﬀusion satisﬁes
dηt/ηt = −ψtdWˆ
D,a
t (3.17)
which is a martingale on [0, t] with respect to Pa so long as Novikov’s condition holds: 7
Eat exp
(
1/2
∫ t
0
ψ′sψsds
)
< ∞. (3.18)
which can be viewed as a stationarity restriction on agents’ learning.
E. Individual Agent Problem
We examine agents with time seperable utility functions u′t = c
−γ
t , time preferences t = exp[−
∫ t
0 ρ(s)ds],
and an inﬁnite sequence of endowments eit. When markets are dynamically complete, an equilibrium is
deﬁned by a unique stochastic discount factor Mit for each agent and a consumption plan c
i
t that solves
the following intertemporal problem max{ci,Mi}E
i
o
∫∞
0 tu(c
i
t)dt subject to E
i
0
∫∞
0 M
i
t
[
cit − e
i
t
]
dt ≤ 0 such
that markets clear, i.e.
∑
i c
i
t = Dt for ∀t. The ﬁrst order conditions imply that the optimal consumption
policies are of the form cit =
(
t/(αiM
i
t
)
)1/γ , where αi is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
static budget constraint of agent i.
7The Radon-Nikodym derivative deﬁned as ηt =
M
a
t
Mbt
is a martingale with respect to agent as’ measure. In order to ﬁnd
a valid change of measure from the perspective of agents b one simply re-deﬁnes the Radon-Nikodym derivative as ηt =
M
b
t
Mat
.
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Given a subjective discount factor a necessary conditions for consumption markets to clear is that
agents trade until ex-ante expected marginal utilities equate. The equilibrium price of a random payoﬀ
XT then satisﬁes E
b
t
(
u′b(cT )
u′b(ct)
XT
)
= Eat
(
u′a(cT )
u′a(ct)
XT
)
. It is easy to show that this implies the Radon-
Nikodym derivative must be equal to the ratio of the stochastic discount factors of the two agents
ηt =
αb
αa
u′a(ct)
u′b(ct)
=
Mat
Mbt
. (3.19)
Regardless of the micro foundations for heterogeneity, disagreement among agents aﬀects the equilibrium
distribution of consumption for all T < ∞, implying a diﬀerent allocation of state-contingent consumption
cat and c
b
t for the two agents.
Since markets are complete the stochastic discount factor for each agent is unique. Furthermore, the
absence of arbitrage implies the existence of dMnt = −
(
rft dt+ κ
n
t dWˆ
D,n
t
)
, where κnt contains the market
prices of risk for consumption shocks. From equation 3.19 it follows that
dηt/ηt = −
(
κat − κ
b
t
)
dWˆD,at (3.20)
One notices that the disagreement process coincides with the wedge between subjective prices of risk. It
should then be clear that the date t cross-sectional distribution of consumption depends on date t − dt
distribution of beliefs.
F. Representative Agent Problem
The dynamic properties of bond prices depend on the characteristics of the stochastic discount factor of
the representative agent. In complete markets, Basak (2000) extends Cuoco and He (1994) approach to
show how the competitive equilibrium solution can be obtained from the solution of a central planner
problem.8 A representative investor utility function can be constructed is a weighted average of each
individual utilities:
U∗(D(t), λ) := max
ca(t)+cb(t)=D(t)
{λat tua(ca(t)) + λ
b
ttub(cb(t))} (3.21)
Normalising the weight on agent a, a necessary condition for a social optimum is u′a(ca(t)) = λtu
′
b(cb).
From the ﬁrst order condition of the individual agent problems we see that is achieved if the stochastic
weight is set equal to λt =
u′a(ca(t))
u′b(cb(t))
= αaM
a(t)
αbMb(t)
. This implies that the relative weight of the second
set of agents must be proportional to the Radon-Nikodym process ηt: i.e. λt =
αa
αb
ηt. Moreover, since
the Lagrange multipliers are constant, the diﬀusion of the Radon-Nykodym process coincides with the
dynamics of the relative weight: dηt/ηt = dλt/λt. This conﬁrms that ψt directly aﬀects the relative
8Constantinides (1982) extends Negishi (1960)’s results and proves the existence of a representative agent with heteroge-
neous preferences and endowments but with homogeneous beliefs. In an incomplete market setting with homogeneous agents
Cuoco and He (1994) show a representative agent can be constructed from a social welfare function with stochastic weights.
Basak (2000) discuss the aggregation properties in economies with heterogeneous beliefs but complete markets. He shows
that a representative can be constructed from a stochastic weighted average of individuals marginal utilities.
103
marginal utility of the two set of agents in equilibrium. The stochastic discount factor of the representative
agent is obtained from
M∗t = u
′
a(ca(t))
∂ca
∂D
+ λ(t)u′b(cb(t))
∂cb
∂D
= u′a
(
∂ca
∂D
+
∂cb
∂D
)
= αaMa(t) = λ(t)αbMb(t) (3.22)
which from the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics is also competitive equilibrium. Finally,
imposing the aggregate resource constraint (Dt = e
a
t + e
b
t) one obtains individual consumption policies
and the stochastic discount factors for the pricing measure
ca(t) =
Dt
1 + η
1/γ
t
(3.23)
cb(t) = Dt
η
1/γ
t
1 + η
1/γ
t
(3.24)
M∗t = tD
−γ
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Homogeneous CRRA SDF
(
1 + η
1/γ
t
)γ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Belief Distortion
(3.25)
Notice, the heterogeneous agent stochastic discount factor is the product of the SDF of a homogeneous
CRRA economy and a function H (ηt) of disagreement. In fact, most models in the literature give rise
to equilibrium discount factors that can be cast in this form. Moreover, the volatility of this distortion
depends on diﬀerence in beliefs which emerges as an additional state variable.
The Real Short Rate
Market completeness and the absence of arbitrage guarantee the existence of a unique (possibly subjective)
stochastic discount factor for each measure that is absolutely continuous with respect to the risk neutral
measure (Harrison and Kreps (1979)). Applying ito’s lemma to equation 3.25 and equating drift and
diﬀusion coeﬃcients to dMnt = −
(
rtdt+ κ
n(t)dWˆD,nt
)
the equilibrium short rate is given by
rf = ρ−
1
2
γ(γ + 1)σ2D︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lucas-Tree Terms
+ γβ(ωa(ηt)gˆ
a
t + ωb(ηt)gˆ
b
t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Consensus Bias
+
γ − 1
2γ
ωa(ηt)ωb(ηt)ψ
2
t ,︸ ︷︷ ︸
Speculative Demand
(3.26)
where ωi(ηt) = c
i
t/Dt is investor’s i total consumption share.
When the wealth distribution is symmetric (ηt = 1) and disagreement is zero (ψt = 0) the short
term interest rate is given by the Lucas solution. In the heterogeneous case, the short term interest rates
includes two new terms. The ﬁrst is
[
ωa(ηt)gˆ
a
t + ωb(ηt)gˆ
b
t
]
and is due to the standard wealth eﬀect. The
larger the expected growth opportunity, the higher the demand for current consumption, the lower the
demand for savings, thus the higher the interest rate. However, when ηt = 1, this term diﬀers from the
consensus belief 12 gˆ
a
t +
1
2 gˆ
b
t . Speculative activity undertaken in the past aﬀects agents’ relative wealth
today and this term biases the short rate towards the belief of the agent who has been relatively more
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successful.9 The implications of this term for the term structure are rich. For example, an immediate
implication is that the short rate, and hence the entire yield curve, is path dependent even though state
dynamics are Markovian.10 The second term is due to speculative demand given by the product of
ωa(ηt)ωb(ηt) and ψ
2
t .
To understand the intuition for this eﬀect consider the diﬀusion for the relative wealth of agent a11
dωa =
γ − 1
2γ
ωa(ηt)ωb(ηt)ψ
2
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Speculative Demand
[
(γ − 1) + 2γωb(ηt)
γ(γ − 1)
]
dt+
1
γ
ωa(ηt)ωb(ηt)ψtdWˆ
D
t (3.27)
from which we identify the speculative demand in the drift of individual consumption. The reason is be-
cause an increase in ψt changes the investment opportunity set, as it increases speculative opportunities
between agents. The sign of the eﬀect depends on whether γ is greater or smaller than 1. For γ > 1 the
wealth eﬀect dominates: speculation raises the drift of planned consumption, which is ﬁxed today; thus,
interest rates must rise to clear the market. When γ < 1 the substitution eﬀect dominates: speculation
increases expected returns raising the price of current consumption relative to future consumption, low-
ering the drift of planned consumption; thus, interest rates must fall. To visualise the interaction of risk
aversion and disagreement on the short rate consider its sensitivity with respect to ψt
12
∂r
∂ψ
= −γσD
(
η1/γ
1 + η1/γ
)
+
(
γ − 1
γ
)
η1/γ
(1 + η1/γ)2
ψt (3.28)
Figure 3.1 summarizes the results. The left panel shows that when γ < 1 the substitution eﬀect dominates
and short term interest rates are negatively related to disagreement, ∂r/∂ψ< 0. Moreover, in this region
∂r/∂ψ is decreasing in the level of disagreement. For γ > 1 there exists a threshold for ψ above which the
wealth eﬀect dominates so that ∂r/∂ψ> 0. The right panel shows the behavior of ∂r/∂ψ as a continuous
function of γ for diﬀerent levels of disagreement. In economies with larger disagreement and relative risk
aversions, short term interest rates are increasing in disagreement; on the other hand, in economies with
low risk aversion and low relative risk aversion, interest rates are decreasing in disagreement.
[ Insert ﬁgure 3.1 about here ]
9Jouini and Napp (2006) also construct a consensus investor whose SDF prices the term structure and contains an aggre-
gation bias.
10ηt is not Markovian while the couple (ηt, ψt) is Markovian.
11An analogous diﬀusion is obtained for agent b under his measure.
12The gradient with respect to the state (gat , ηt , ψt) is obtained by re-writing the short rate as
rt = δ − 1
2
γ(γ + 1)σ2D + γg
a − ψt
(
η1/γ
1 + η1/γ
)(
γσD − γ − 1
2γ
1
1 + η1/γ
ψt
)
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G. Equilibrium Risk Allocation
Market completeness and the absence of arbitrage ensures agent speciﬁc market prices of risk are given
by
κig(t) = γσD︸︷︷︸
Homogenous Price of Risk
+ ξi(ηt, ψt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Belief Adjustment
(3.29)
where
ξi(ηt, ψt) =
{ ωb(ηt)ψt for i = a
−ωa(ηt)ψt for i = b
An important insight is that the belief adjustment contains two components, one which is backward
looking depending on past trades (ωnt ) and one which is forward looking (ψt) depending on the future
(perceived) investment opportunity set. The price of risk for agent a is increasing in the relative consump-
tion share of agent b since this increases the risk exposure of agent a to agent b’s beliefs. Similarly for
agent b. The sign of the belief adjustment depends on who is the relative optimist / pessimist. Optimists
trade to shift consumption to states of the world in which their subjective probabilities are the highest,
in exchange for a lower consumption in those states they deem less likely. Eﬀectively they sell insurance
to pessimists. If a bad state is revealed tomorrow not only will the optimist be poor but he will also have
to pay out to the pessimist. Optimists expect this so their risk prices are higher. Finally, since markets
are complete agents equilibrium allocations must imply perfect risk sharing. To see this, note that wealth
weighted average prices of risk are the same as in the benchmark homogeneous economy
ωat κ
a
t + ω
b
tκ
b
t = ω
a
t [γσD + ω
b
tψt] + ω
b
t [γσD − ω
a
t ψt] = γσD (3.30)
H. The Term Structure of Bond Prices
The date t price of an T-period default free (real) zero-coupon bond is :
P Tt =
1
Mit
Eit
[
t,TM
i
T
]
(3.31)
P Tt = E
i
t
[
t,T
(
DT
Dt
)−γ (1 + η1/γT
1 + η
1/γ
t
)γ]
(3.32)
where the expectation is taken under agent i’s measure.13 Deﬁning xT = lnDT and yT = ln ηT solving
for bond prices requires computing the joint moment generating
φx,y(T ;u1, u2) = E
i
t
(
eu1xT+u2yT
)
. (3.33)
which is a function of the ‘fundamental’ system φx derived above and the ‘belief’ system
φy = φx,y(T ; 0, u2) = Et (e
u2yT ) . (3.34)
13In equilibrium the solution can be equivalently computed with respect to any probability measure since P (t, T ) = Ea(MaT )
= Eb(MbT ) = E∗(M∗T ).
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Given a solution for characteristic function of (DT , ηT ) we can recover the joint density via inversion
which allows us to compute the price of any contingent claim.14 Setting u1 = −γ I evaluate the (inverse)
bilateral Laplace transform at iu2 using a Fractional Fast Fourier Transform (FrFFT) using the algorithm
suggested by Chourdakis (2004).15
Theorem 1 (Bond Prices). The term structure of bond prices is equal to the product of two deterministic
functions. The ﬁrst is exponentially aﬃne in the posterior growth rate of the endowment; the second is
quadratic function of diﬀerences in beliefs
P (t, T ) = τφx(τ ;−γ)
∫ ∞
0
g(y, T )
g(y, t)
[
1
π
∫ ∞
0
e−iu2yT eu2ytφy(τ ;−γ, u2)du2
]
dy(T ) (3.35)
where
g(y, s) = (1 + (eys)
1
γ )γ (3.36)
φx(τ ;−γ) = e
A(τ)+B(τ)gat (3.37)
φy(τ ;u1, u2) = e
L(τ)+M(τ)ψt+N(τ)ψ2t (3.38)
where A(τ), B(τ), L(τ),M(τ), N(τ) are functions of time and the structural parameters of the economy,
known in closed form.
The dependence of bond prices on gat is exponentially aﬃne because the dividend process is condition-
ally Gaussian. Under incomplete information and learning the term structure also explicitly depends on
the diﬀerence in beliefs ψgt . The dependence on these factors is exponentially quadratic. For the case of
integer γ I can exploit the binomial expansion to obtain an exact analytical result in terms of the state
vector (gat , ηt, ψ
g
t ):
P (t, T ) = τφx(τ ;−γ)(1 + η
1/γ
t )
−γ
γ∑
j=0
(
γ
j
)
(ηt)
j/γ φy(τ ;−γ, j/γ)
from which we see that bond prices in the heterogeneous agent economy are a wealth weighted average
of quadratic term structures. The myopic (log utility) for yields is obtained as a special case:
Corollary 1 (Myopic Term Structures). When agents are myopic heterogeneous equilibrium bond prices
are given as wealth weighted averages of ﬁctitious homogeneous equilibrium bond prices. For the gamma =
1 case we see from equation 3.26 that squared disagreement does not enter the term structure solution.
This is because agents are myopic hence there is no speculative demand to their optimal portfolios. One
14The solution given by Xiong and Yan (2010) only applies to the case of log utility investors. In a portfolio selection context
with irrational investors Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009) show that the joint density of Dt and ηt can be computed in
semi-closed form by Fourier inversion. The spirit of this approach follows methods developed in the option pricing literature by
(for example) Heston (1993), Carr and Madan (1999), and Duﬃe, Pan, and Singleton (2000) for equity, and Chacko and Das
(2002) for interest rates.
15For an overview of numerical inversion recipes in ﬁnance see Kahl and Lord (2010)
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obtains
P (t, T ) = ωat P
a(t, T ) + ωbtP
b(t, T ).
I. The Yield Curve
Given the solution for bond prices given in equation 3.35 a solution for (log) yields for any value of risk
aversion γ ∈ R+ can be computed from
y(t, T ) = δ + a(τ) + b(τ)gat︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aﬃne Homogeneous Yields
+ D(τ,η t, ψ
g
t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Heterogeneous Adjustment
(3.39)
The term structure that falls outside the exponentially aﬃne class (Duﬃe and Kan (1996)). Notice
that the homogeneous benchmark solution appears in the solution, the heterogeneous agent term struc-
ture includes an adjustment D(τ,η t, ψ
g
t ) that depends explicitly on both relative wealths and dispersion in
beliefs. Speciﬁcally the term structure is a wealth weighted average of quadratic functions of disagreement.
I calibrate our model with parameters quantitively similar those used in Brennan and Xia (2001). To
calibrate the correlation ρic,g between consumption shocks and growth rate shocks I compute a VAR(1)
between the date t realised quarterly growth rate of real GDP, and the date t − 4 1-quarter forecast
for GDP computed from surveys.16. During the sample period January 1999 and December 2011 we
ﬁnd that the correlation between short run shocks (dWD) and long run shocks (dW g) is 0.23. In our
calibration I choose subjective ρac,g = 0.20 and ρ
b
c,g = 0.90 to emphasise that fact that short term real
rates in a standard Lucas economy should be pro-cyclical and the bond risk premium should be negative,
i.e., bonds hedge consumption shocks and the term structure is downward sloping. I set the time rate of
preference δ = 0 since this only aﬀects the average level of the term structure. I set the long run mean of
consumption growth equal to 3% and its persistence 0.40, which implies a half life for growth rate shocks
of 1.73 years, and the volatility of consumption is set equal to 5%. Table 3.1 reports the parameter set.
Table 3.1. Calibrated Parameters
δ γ σD κg θ σg φa φb ρ
a
c,g ρ
b
c,g
0 [0.5 , 1.0 , 2.0 , 3.0] 0.05 0.40 0.03 0.02 0.85 0.15 0.20 0.90
To gain insight on the implications of heterogeneity for bond markets I consider the following stylised
examples. Note, for simplicity I assume (a) the unobservable objective gt as its long run mean, i.e.,
gt = θ = 3%; (b) and the agents beliefs are symmetric with respect to gt, i.e., they have a mean preserving
spread around θ.
16 Real GDP is obtained from http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. Survey forecasts for GDP growth are from BlueChip
Financial indicators and discussed in the data section that follows.
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1. gat − g
b
t = 0 and ω
a
t ∈ [0 , 1] (Belief Risk) , γ = [0.5 , 1.0 , 2.0 ]
2. ωa(t) = 0.50 (Symmetric Economy): g
a
t − g
b
t ∈ [0% : 3%] , γ = [0.5 , 1.0 , 2.0 , 3.0]
3. ωa(t) = 0.25 (Pessimistic Economy): g
a
t − g
b
t ∈ [0% : 3%] , γ = [0.5 , 1.0 , 2.0 , 3.0]
4. ωa(t) = 0.75 (Optimistic Economy): g
a
t − g
b
t ∈ [0% : 3%] , γ = [0.5 , 1.0 , 2.0 , 3.0]
Example 1: Belief Risk
Figure 3.2 (left panel) shows that when agents have log utility (γ = 1), agents are myopic and term
structures are bounded above and below by aﬃne homogeneous term structures (Xiong and Yan (2010)).
Since ρc,g > 0 for i = a, b the term structures in both homogeneous and heterogeneous economies is
downward sloping. On the other hand, ﬁgure 3.2 (right panel) shows that when γ = 1 and both investors
are present in the economy (ωa ≈ ωb ≈ 0.5) yields for all maturities are higher than in the homogeneous
case. The reason is: agents know even though they agree today, almost surely, they will disagree tomorrow.
Equilibrium clearing of consumption markets requires
Eb(DT |Ft) = E
a (ηTDT |Ft) .
However, future consumption sharing depends not only on today’s disagreement but also on the path of
future disagreement. The implications of path dependence in consumption sharing is best appreciated
by considering impulse response functions for the dividend process versus the ratio of relative wealths.
Denote DDT and Dω
a
T row vectors that measure the response of the dividend process and relative wealth
of agent a (under his measure) at time T to a 1 unit shock to (dWˆD,at , dst).
17
DDT = DT
(
σD +
1− e−κg(T−t)
κg
[
σgD , σgs
])
DωaT =
1
γ
ωbT
[
ψgt +
∫ T
t
e−κψ(u−t)ψgudu+
∫ T
t
e−κψ(u−t)dWˆD,au · [σψ,D , σψ,s]
]
The important point to note is that, given a shock today and holding all future shocks at zero, the
path of the dividend process is deterministic, while the path of the consumption sharing rule remains
stochastic because of the path dependence due to future disagreement. In the context of bond markets path
dependence plays a particular important role since empirical work on time-variation in bond risk premia
focuses on long run returns (Fama and Bliss (1987), Campbell and Shiller (1991a), Cochrane and Piazzesi
(2005a)), which depend on the long run prices of risk. To see how long term bonds depend on long run
prices consider the impulse response function for P (τ) = Eat
[
M∗(T )
M∗(t)
]
(computed using equation 3.25):
DP (τ) = Eat
[
DM∗(T )
M∗(t)
]
= Eat
[
M∗(T )
M∗(t)
(
γ
DDT
DT
+ ωbT
DηT
ηT
)]
17 Computing continuous time impulse response functions is straightforward using Malliavin calculus, which extends
standard calculus of variations to stochastic process deﬁned on a Wiener space. Speciﬁcally, given a Wiener functional
F = f(Wt1, . . . ,Wtn), the Malliavin derivative DF computes the change in F due to a change in the path of W . For an
extensive application of Malliavin calculus in ﬁnance see Detemple, Garcia, and Rindisbacher (2003).
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The long run price of risk is identiﬁed as κa(T ) = DM
∗(T )
M∗(T ) = γ
DDT
DT
+ ωbT
DηT
ηT
. Expanding the derivative I
obtain
κa(T ) = κa(t) + L(T,ηt, ψt)
where κa(t) is the instantaneous price of risk and
L(T,ηt, ψt) = −B(τ)[σgD , σgs] + (ω
b
T − ω
b
t )ψt
− ωbT
[∫ T
t
e−κψ(u−t)ψgudu+
∫ T
t
e−κψ(u−t)dWˆD,au · [σψ,D , σψ,s]
]
· [σψ,D , σψ,s]
In multiple agent economies long-run returns depend not only on the local properties of ηt but also on
the stream of future values of ηs>t and hence on the path of future beliefs.
18 This means that long run
prices of risk diﬀer from instantaneous prices of risk via a (path) dependence on disagreement. Moreover,
some shocks which are not priced instantaneously, such as shocks to the signal dst, can command long run
risk compensation. Figure 3.2 shows that this leads to an increase in bond yields, especially for medium
and long maturity bonds. In unreported results we obtain similar results for γ < 1. The increase is the
highest for ωat = 0.5 when agents have equal market power. As a consequence, although yield curves in
the homogeneous economies are downward-sloping, yield curves in the heterogeneous economies can be
upward sloping and have a humped shape at medium maturities. This is interesting since a humped-shape
yield curve is common in the data and empirical evidence suggests that concavity of the yield curve (the
level of medium maturities relative to the average of short- and long-term maturities) is a good proxy
for the level of bond risk premia (Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005a) or Campbell, Sunderam, and Viceira
(2009)).
[ Insert ﬁgure 3.2 about here ]
Example 2: Symmetric Economy
Figure 3.3 shows the shape of the term structure for a symmetric economy. The central panel shows that
for the log case (γ = 1) the term structure is always downward for the same reason as the γ = 1 case
discussed directly above. For the γ = 1 case the front end of the curve crucially depends on the level
of risk aversion (see also David (2008) who also discusses this point). For γ < 1 the short term interest
rates are very low and bond yields are generally increasing in their duration. On the other hand, when
γ > 1 short term interest rates are high and the term structure can become negatively sloped for high
disagreement.
Figure 3.4 shows how the average level (deﬁned as 1n
∑n
i=1 y
n
t ) and slope of the term structure respond
to an increase of disagreement. The response of the shape of the yield curve to disagreement crucially
depends on the trade oﬀ between the wealth and substitution eﬀects. For γ < 1 as disagreement increases:
18 John Maynard Keynes famously wrote ‘It is not a case of choosing those that, to the best of one’s judgment, are really
the prettiest, nor even those that average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third degree where
we devote our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be. And there are some, I
believe, who practice the fourth, ﬁfth and higher degrees.’ Keynes (1937).
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(a) the level of the yield curve decreases (left panel), and (b) the slope increases (right panel). On the
other hand, for γ > 1 as disagreement increases: (a) the level of the yield curve increases, (ii) the slope
decreases.
[ Insert ﬁgures 3.3 and 3.4 and about here ]
Example 3 & 4: Pessimistic and Optimistic Economies
Figure 3.5 shows the shape of the term structure for an economy populated mainly by pessimists, so that
ωa(t) = 0.25. The central panel shows that in the γ = 1 case, bond yields are decreasing in disagreement.
In this economy an increase in the mean preserving spread between gˆat and gˆ
b
t increases the diﬀerence
between the arithmetic consensus growth rate and the wealth-weighted average of the expected growth
rates (i.e. (ωa(ηt)gˆ
a
t + ωb(ηt)gˆ
b
t )). Thus, an increase in disagreement increases also the aggregation bias
toward the pessimists. As a result the level of the term structure falls (since beliefs have no intertemporal
eﬀect). In an economy populated mainly by optimists, as in ﬁgure 3.5 with ωa(t) = 0.75, the opposite
holds: an increase in disagreement, increases the aggregation bias toward the optimist so short rates and
the level rise.19
When γ = 1, one needs to account also for the trade-oﬀ between the wealth and substitution eﬀects.
Consider ﬁrst an economy dominated by pessimists (see ﬁgure 3.5, right panel). For γ > 1 short term
rates increase with disagreement so that for large disagreements ψgt the slope becomes negative, while for
γ < 1 short term interest rates fall and the slope becomes positive. Interest rates at the long end do not
respond so aggressively since disagreement is expected to mean-revert: in our example the half life for
dψgt is 0.88 years compared with the half life for dgt of 1.73 years. Studying the γ > 1 case in more detail
one can see the non-linearities in the short rate due to the trade-oﬀ between the aggregation bias and
the intertemporal substitution eﬀects. For small values of disagreement, this results in a level shift; for
large values of disagreement this results in signiﬁcant change of the slope. Figure 3.5 plots the equivalent
results for the optimistic economy which follows similar logic.
J. Instantaneous Risk Premia
The absence of arbitrage and complete markets ensure equilibrium expected excess returns for each agent
are given by Eit[hprx
(T )
t,t+δ] = κ
i(t)σTP,D(t), where σ
T
P,D(t) measures risk exposure to dWˆ
i,D
t , and prices of
risk for agent i = a, b are given by equation 3.29. Notice, subjective expected returns can be opposite
in sign. For example, consider the case of an economy populated mainly by pessimists: since a smaller
mass of optimists must absorb the total risk transfer their risk prices are larger (in magnitude) than
the pessimists. Moreover, optimists prices of risk will be positive while pessimist’s will be negative, and
therefore expected excess returns on long term bonds will be opposite for both agents.
19 In the context of equity markets Jouini and Napp (2006) argue that aggregate pessimism can lead to an increase of the
market price of risk and to a decrease of the risk free rate, and therefore help to resolve the equity premium puzzle.
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To understand the link between subjective physical measures, subjective risk neutral measures, and
the true physical measure ﬁrst note that
P (t, T ) = Eat
[
MaT
Mat
]
= Eat
[
λT
λt
MbT
Mbt
]
= Eat
[
ηT
ηt
MbT
Mbt
]
= Ebt
[
MbT
Mbt
]
bonds can be priced equivalently under the measure of either agent. The discount factor for each agent
can be written as
MT
Mt
= e−
∫ T
t
ruduHT
Ht
where HTHt is an exponential martingale satisfying dHt = −κ
i(t)dWD,at . From Girsanov it follows that the
drift of a maturity T bond under the risk neutral measure, and thus the risk premium, is given by
μQi (t, T ) = μ
P
i (t, T )− κ
iσP,D(t, T ). (3.40)
Moreover, subjective physical drifts are related to the drift observed by unbiased econometrician (who
knows the true gt) by
μPe (t, T ) = μ
P
i (t, T )− error
e,i(t)σP (t, T ) (3.41)
where errore,i(t) is deﬁned in equation 3.10 above. Combining 3.40, 3.41, and 3.30 it follows that the
wealth weighted average risk premium from the perspective of the econometrician is
μPe (t, T )−
(
ωat μ
Q
a (t, T ) + ω
b
tμ
Q
b (t, T )
)
=
(
γσD +
∑
i=a,b
ωiterror
e,i(t)
)
σP (t, T )
In what follows I re-visit example economies 2 (symmetric), 3 (pessimistic), and 4 (optimistic) by
computing expected returns from the perspective of the unbiased econometrician. This requires computing
bond sensitivities to dWDt and dW
s
t shocks
[σP,D(t, T ) , σP,s(t, T )] =
1
P (t, T )
[
∂P (t, T )
∂ga
,
∂P (t, T )
∂η
,
∂P (t, T )
∂ψ
]
·
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
σg,D σg,s
−ψt 0
σψ,D σψ,s
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ (3.42)
which from equation 3.35 are known in semi-closed and given in the appendix. Notice, in heterogeneous
agent models volatility depends explicitly on ηt and ψt and since the term structure is quadratic in ψ
g
t
bond sensitivities to dWˆ at shocks become stochastic.
Example 1: Symmetric Economy
Figure 3.7 summarizes the link between instantaneous risk premia and disagreement for diﬀerent levels
of relative risk aversion. When the economy is equally populated by pessimists and optimists, bond risk
premia are decreasing in disagreement when γ ≤ 1 while they are relatively ﬂat when γ > 1. Even for
γ = 3, however, it can be noticed that the sensitivity of equilibrium risk premia to disagreement is not
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very large in the symmetric economy. The reason is that in the calibrated symmetric economy agents
forecast errors (almost) cancel out. Thus, the large positive distortion in the price of risk of one agent is
broadly compensated by the negative distortion a negative distortion in the price of risk of the other.
The negative average risk premium is due to the assumption in the calibration that ρic,g > 0. In
this case bonds are hedges and always command a negative risk premium in the symmetric economy.
The larger eﬀect on risk premia for γ < 1 is because in this case agents are very willing to substitute
intertemporally driving up bond volatilities as agents engage in trading activity. Notice that belief risk
has no bearing on instantaneous risk premia.
[ Insert ﬁgure 3.7 about here ]
Example 2 & 3: Pessimistic and Optimistic Economies
Consider ﬁrst excess returns for the pessimistic economy (ﬁgure 3.8). At zero disagreement the economy
is populated by homogeneous investors in which bonds are hedges and risk premia slope downward across
maturity. For all values of γ the risk premium is increasing (in magnitude) in disagreement: large in-
stantaneous diﬀerences in belief predict negative returns on long term bonds. This eﬀect comes from two
channels: (i) the objective price of risk is positively skewed, i.e., biased towards the forecast error of the
pessimists; (ii) bond volatility is increasing (in magnitude) in disagreement, driven by an increase in trade.
Considering now excess returns for the optimistic economy. I see for small values of disagreement bonds
remain hedges, however, for intermediate and large values of disagreement bond risk premia change sign.
This is an intriguing feature of the model since empirically expected returns on bonds take both posi-
tive and negative values (see, for example, Dai and Singleton (2002) or Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005a)).
Moreover, for large values of disagreement long term bonds command larger risk compensation regardless
of the magnitude of γ. The ﬂipping of the risk premium follows the same logic as the pessimist case: (i)
the objective price of risk is negatively skewed and can become negative for large enough disagreements;
(ii) bond sensitivities to dWDt shocks are again negative and increasing in disagreement.
[ Insert ﬁgures 3.8 and 3.9 about here ]
II. Testable Implications
The implications of heterogeneous agent models for term structure studied the previous section suggests
a number of empirical tests. In the empirical sections below we focus on the following hypothesis:
• H01 : Short Term Interest Rate.
– disagreement is a state variable driving the short term interest rate due to an intertemporal
hedging demand. The sign of the eﬀect depends on the wealth vs substitution eﬀects dominate,
i.e., whether γ is bigger than or smaller than one.
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• H02 : Yield Curves, Intertemporal demand, and Wealth Weighted Beliefs.
– since disagreement drives short term interest rates it necessarily aﬀects the level and slope
of the term structure. Moreover, the level and slope of the term structure inherit a wealth
weighted aggregation bias from the short rate. To the extent that past diﬀerences in belief
proxy for contemporaneous ﬂuctuations in wealth, distance lags of disagreement should aﬀect
today’s cross-section of yields.
• H03 : Expected Returns, Relative Wealths, and Future Beliefs.
– from the perspective of an unbiased econometrician, average optimism (pessimism) drives pos-
itive (negative) variation in the bond risk premium due to a bias in the wealth weighted belief.
Since the history of speculate bets determines today’s relative wealths, the history of disagree-
ment should predict risk premia after controlling for contemporaneous disagreement. Moreover,
while disagreement does not drive bond risk premia instantaneous it drives long run returns.
III. Data
I use an extensive dataset on the distribution of beliefs to learn about the relative importance of the
channels through which heterogeneity can aﬀect asset prices. This section discusses the data sources
and construction of variables designed to proxy for the state vector (gt, ηt, ψ
g
t ). The appendix contains
descriptions of the remaining variables used in the empirical sections.
BlueChip Financial Forecasts Indicators (BCFF) is a monthly publication providing extensive panel
data on expectations by agents who are working at institutions active in ﬁnancial markets. Unfortunately,
digital copies of BCFF are only currently available since 2001. I obtained, however, the complete BCFF
paper archive directly from Wolters Kluwer and entered the data manually. The digitization process
required inputting around 750, 000 entries of named forecasts plus quality control checking and was
completed in a joint venture with the Federal Reserve Board. The resulting dataset represents an extensive
and unique dataset to investigate the role of formation of expectations about the compensation for bearing
interest rate risk. Each month, BlueChip carry out surveys of professional economists from leading
ﬁnancial institutions and service companies regarding all maturities of the yield curve and economic
fundamentals and are asked to give point forecasts at quarterly horizons out to 5-quarters ahead (6 from
January 1997). While exact timings of the surveys are not published, the survey is usually conducted
between the 25th and 27th of the month and mailed to subscribers within the ﬁrst 5 days of the subsequent
month, thus our empirical analysis is unaﬀected by biases induced by staleness or overlapping observations
between returns and responses.20 An extract from the paper archives is shown in ﬁgure 3.10.
[Insert ﬁgure 3.10 here.]
20An exception to the general rule was the survey for the January 1996 issue when non-essential oﬃces of the U.S.
government were shut down due to a budgetary impasse and at the same time a massive snow storm covered Washington, DC:
www.nytimes.com/1996/01/04/us/battle-over-budget-effects-paralysis-brought-shutdown-begins-seep-private-sector.html.
As a result, the survey was delayed a week.
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BCFF is attractive along a number of dimensions with respect to alternative commonly studied sur-
veys. First, the number of participants in the survey is stable over time. On average 45 respondents are
surveyed with standard deviations of 2.8. The left panel of ﬁgure 3.11 plots a time-series of the number
of respondents and right panel plots a histogram of respondent numbers. Only on rare occasions are
survey numbers less than 40 and no business cycle patterns are visible. In the Survey of Professional
Forecasters, on the other hand, the distribution of respondents displays signiﬁcant variability. While the
mean number of respondents is around 40, the standard deviation is 13, and in some years the number
of contributors is as low as 9.21 While in the early 70’s the number of SPF forecasters was around 60, it
decreased in two major steps in the mid 1970’s and mid 1980’s to as low as 14 forecasters in 1990 and if
one restricts the attention to forecasters who participated to at least 8 surveys, this limits the number of
data point considerably. Second, while our dataset is available at a monthly frequency, SPF is available
only at quarterly frequency. Third, the SPF survey has been administered by diﬀerent agencies over
the years which have changed the form of questions. For a detailed discussion on the issues related to
SPF see D’Amico and Orphanides (2008) and Giordani and Soderlind (2003). Other well known surveys,
such as the ‘University of Michigan Survey of Consumers’ do not provide point estimates from individual
survey respondents. Finally, BCFF survey forecasts for both macro variables and interest rates are highly
competitive with respect to the out-of-sample performance of sophisticated econometric models. Recent
studies documenting the quality of BCFF forecasts include Chun (2012), Faust and Wright (2012), and
Buraschi, Carnelli, and Whelan (2013).
[Insert ﬁgure 3.11 here.]
To proxy for macro economic disagreement I use 1-quarter ahead point forecasts on real GDP and
the GDP deﬂator for consumption growth and inﬂation disagreement, respectively. Individual forecasts
allow us to proxy for belief dispersion in a number of ways. In what follows I choose to proxy for belief
heterogeneity from the cross-sectional inter-quartile range and check the robustness of our ﬁndings with
alternative proxies. In our empirical work I focus on implications for real disagreement (ψgt ) but also inves-
tigate disagreement about inﬂation (ψπt ) as an alternative determinant for bond markets as argued recently
by Wright (2011), Ehling, Gallmeyer, Heyerdahl-Larsen, and Illeditsch (2013) , and Hong, Sraer, and Yu
(2013).
Figure 3.12 plots the time series for our macroeconomic disagreement proxy along with an economic
policy uncertainty factor (UnCt) studied by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2012).
22 Disagreement on the real
economy has a signiﬁcant business cycle component: in all previous three NBER economic recessions
since 1990, ψg is low before the recessions and it increases to peak at the end of the recessions (this
occurs in 1991, 2002, and 2009). This is interesting as large disagreement is often reported at this
stage of the cycle.23 Comparing UnCt to our measures for belief dispersion I ﬁnd large co-movement
with ψg (correlation = 0.58), which is somewhat surprising given that the weight assigned to forecaster
21The SPF survey has been used, among others, by Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006) and Ulrich (2010); it is available at
www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/survey-of-professional-forecasters/.
22The economic uncertainty proxy plotted here is available for down from www.policyuncertainty.com
23In a controversial statement that attracted substantial controversy, in 1991 Normal Lamont - Chancellor of the Exchequer
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disagreement about inﬂation in this index is just 1/6. The remaining components of the index are 1/2
a broad-based news index, 1/6 a tax expiration index and 1/6 a government purchases disagreement
measure. Taken together these measures suggest the existence of a common component in the formation
of expectations which is important since systematic variation is required for time-variation in priced risk
compensation.
[Insert ﬁgure 3.12 here.]
IV. Empirical Results
H01 : Short Term Interest Rate
The model predicts that ψgt should drive short term interest rates even after controlling for fundamentals
(git). This is a result of an optimal hedging demand as opposed to some behavioural bias. More inter-
estingly, the link between ψt and rt depends crucially on whether agents are risk tolerant (γ < 1) or risk
averse (γ > 1). When γ < 1 (or EIS > 1) positive shocks to disagreement map induce negative shock to
rt since the substitution eﬀect dominates, while γ > 1 the should occur since the wealth eﬀect dominates.
I compute time-series for the 3-month real interest rate by subtracting the 3-month expected inﬂation
from BCFF from the 3-month nominal interest rate:
y
r(3m)
t = y
$(3m)
t − βEt[π(t+ 3m)]
Figure 3.13 plots the resulting 3-month real and nominal rate along with consensus GDP growth (Et[g(t+
3m)]) for the sample period January 1990 - December 2011.
[Insert ﬁgure 3.13 about here]
Next I estimate OLS regressions of real and nominal rates on contemporaneous disagreement about
real GDP growth after controlling for consensus real GDP and inﬂation. Table 3.2 reports the results. I
standardise all right hand variables to be zero mean with unit variance which implies the constant each
regression represents the sample mean of 3-month real and nominal interest rates. Considering the factor
loadings I ﬁnd both real and nominal short term interest rates are negatively to ψgt after controlling
for expected fundamentals. In both cases real disagreement is statistically signiﬁcant with t-statistics of
−3.30 and −4.01, respectively. The empirical evidence supports heterogeneous beliefs models with γ < 1.
Indeed, in this case an increase in disagreement reduces the demand for current consumption so short
rates must fall.
of the United Kingdom - labeled the initial sign of the recovery from the S&L recession as ‘green shoots’. Many years later,
Ben Bernanke used the same words in a well-known ‘CBS 60 Minutes’ interview in 2009, which was counterpointed by
Nouriel Roubini who argued his disagreement and labeled those signs as ‘yellow weeds’. The data indeed conﬁrm that
macro-disagreement is usually pervasive in this phase of the cycle.
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Table 3.2. Short Rate Regressions
OLS projections of real (y
r(3m)
t ) and nominal (y
$(3m)
t ) interest rates on disagreement about 1-quarter GDP growth
(ψg) and consensus expectations (E[π(3m)] , E[g(3m)]). t-statistics are corrected for autocorrelation and het-
eroskedasticity. Sample Period: 1990.1 - 2011.12
const E[π(3m)] E[g(3m)] ψg R
2
y
r(3m)
t 1.06 −0.34 0.04
(5.42) (−2.28)
y
r(3m)
t 1.06 −0.02 −0.00
(5.29) (−0.13)
y
r(3m)
t 1.06 −0.40 −0.59 0.07
(5.58) (−1.79) (−3.30)
y
$(3m)
t 3.69 1.40 −0.48 −0.68 0.47
(20.85) (8.83) (−2.61) (−4.01)
A concern with the above short rate regression is that the very short end of the yield curve is controlled
by Federal reserve policy. If the Fed were reacting to market uncertainty (as proxied by dispersion in be-
liefs) the negative loadings should not be interpreted in the context of equilibrium risk sharing, but rather
the result of monetary policy. Indeed, as discussed in the data section above, our proxy for belief dispersion
shares a common component with the economic policy uncertainty factor from Baker, Bloom, and Davis
(2012) (ﬁgure 3.12). In the context of equity markets Buraschi, Trojani, and Vedolin (2011) ﬁnd a strong
link between both ﬁrm speciﬁc and market wide uncertainty (volatility risk premia) and dispersion in be-
liefs. However, while the Fed does control the Federal funds rate (FF) by adjusting the target rate (TR),
the extent to which it chooses to do this is unclear. Moreover, the empirical link between the FF and
rates of longer maturities is weak. For example, for the period 1982 - 2012 Fama (2013) ﬁnds that when
the Fed chooses to adjust the TR they move strongly towards existing short rates. Moreover, changes
in maturities greater than 6-months have almost no correlation with the TR changes. The conclusion
from Fama (2013) is that most of the variation in open market rates is orthogonal to actions of the Fed.
However, if the Fed cannot inﬂuence interest rates then what does? I ask the extent to which disagree-
ment aﬀects 1-year interest rates by considering an augmented Fama and Bliss (1987) complementarity
regression,
y
(1)
t+1 − y
(1)
t = α+ β1(f
1,2
t − y
(1)
t ) + β2CPt + β3ψ
g
t + t+1,
for 1-year yield changes in the 1-year interest rate on the 1-year forward-spot spread, the return forecasting
factor (CPt) from Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005a), and diﬀerences in belief (ψ
g
t ).
24. Table 3.3 replicates
these results in our overlapping sample period. First, row (i) shows that the forward spot spread does
contain some information for expected spot changes. The beta on the forward spot spread is 0.32 (the
expectation hypothesis predicts 1.00) and the t-stat is signiﬁcant at the 10% level. However, after con-
24 This approach closely follows Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005a) who ﬁnd that, not only is there a factor in the cross-section
of yields that drives risk prices, but also that this factor predicts lower short rates in the future. I construct CPt in sample
using 5-forward rates as in Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005a)
117
trolling for CPt I ﬁnd that, conditional of a steep forward curve, the Cochrane-Piazzesi factor predicts an
economically large drop of short term rates over the following year with a standardized point estimate of
−0.46 and a t-stat of −3.38. Row (iii) repeats this exercise replacing CPt with disagreement about the
real economy. Interestingly, I ﬁnd an almost identical result to row (ii), with loadings (t-stats) of −0.39
(−4.05), so that not only is disagreement about real growth contemporaneously negatively correlated
with short rates (as discussed above) but also forecasts declining short rates in the future. Finally, row
(iv) includes the forward spot spread, the Cochrane-Piazzesi factor, and disagreement. The results show
that while the eﬀect of including CPt and disagreement in the Fama-Bliss complementarity regression
have quantitatively similar predictions, they contain largely orthogonal information: the R
2
rises to 35%
including all right hand variables, the economic magnitude of the loadings is unaltered, and both factors
remain signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Table 3.3. Short Rate Regressions
Forecasting regression of 1-year changes in the 1-year yield on the (1, 2) forward spot spread, CPt, and ψ
g
t . t-
statistics are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. Both left and right hand variables are standard-
ized. Sample Period: 1990.1 - 2011.12
f1,2t CPt ψ
g
t R
2
(i) 0.32 0.10
(1.87)
(ii) 0.54 −0.46 0.25
(2.90) (−3.38)
(iii) 0.39 −0.39 0.25
(2.45) (−4.05)
(iv) 0.56 −0.37 −0.32 0.35
(3.41) (−3.56) (−3.00)
H02 : Yield Curves, Intertemporal demand, and Wealth Weighted Beliefs
A vast literature studies the empirical properties of bond markets from the perspective of reduced form
latent factor models. For instance, in aﬃne models date-t risk factors are completely summarised by
linear combinations of date-t yields through yield curve inversion (see, for example, Duﬀee (2002) or
Dai and Singleton (2002)). The resulting latent factors are usually labelled level, slope and curvature
due to the shape of their factor loadings on yields. While this literature has made great advances in
understanding the statistical properties of yields there is little consensus for what these latent factors
represent. In the context of our equilibrium treatment I have a joint testable implication that both the
level and slope of the term structure are a function of ψ(t) and ωi(t). This is an important but challenging
test for the model since I do not observe the cross-sectional distribution of wealth.
I propose a simple test based on the model implication that variations in ωit require that agents hold
subjective (optimal) portfolio allocations due to past diﬀerences in belief. Thus, I propose to test the
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eﬀect of wealth ﬂuctuations using lags of diﬀerence in belief. To understand of why lagged disagreement
should matter empirically consider the stylised example, depicted in ﬁgure 3.14:
[Insert ﬁgure 3.14 about here]
Assume a 3-period sample where in the ﬁrst node agents have equal wealth (ωa0 = ω
b
0) but that agent
a is the relative optimist (ga0 > g
b
o). If in the next period a good (up) state is revealed the wealth of
the optimist will be large than the pessimist (ωau > ω
b
u) since his prediction for fundamentals was ex-post
more accurate than the pessimist. For simplicity assume that the realised endowment and signals are
such that the optimist does not update his beliefs much, since he already predicted a good state, but that
the pessimist has a large forecast revision (gbu >> g
b
o). If in the next period a bad state occurs there will
be a redistribution of wealth towards the pessimist (ωbu < ω
b
ud) that will depend not only on beliefs from
the previous (up) node but also on beliefs from the initial period. Consider now an alternative scenario in
which a bad (down) state occurs following by a good (up) state. Initially the wealth distribution is shifted
towards the pessimist (ωad < ω
b
d) but then subsequently redistributed towards the optimist (ω
a
d < ω
a
du).
Comparing the short rates in the ﬁnal nodes since both agents have higher (lower) growth rate forecasts
estimates in the up-up (down-down) states I have that ruu > rdd. However, while in general rud = rdu
without knowing the path of disagreement (portfolio choices) I cannot rank the short rate in these nodes
rud ≷ rdu. In other words, the interest rate tree is non-recombing since it depend not only the realisation
of the economy but also on agent’s beliefs along each path. In the context of our empirical tests past
disagreement (ψt−τ ) contains important information about todays cross-sectional of yields, conditional
on contemporaneous disagreement (ψt), since the distribution of wealth depends jointly on the path of
beliefs and actual realisations of the economy.
To test this hypothesis I measure the level of the term structure as Levelt =
1
n
∑5
n=1 y
(n)
t and the
slope as the Slopet = y
(5)
t − y
(1)
t . Next, I run contemporaneous regressions of the level and slope of the
term structure on disagreement and lagged disagreement:
Level(t) = const+ β1ψ
g(t) + β2ψ
g(t− 12) + β3ψ
g(t− 24) + εlevelt
Slope(t) = const+ γ1ψ
g(t) + γ2ψ
g(t− 12) + γ3ψ
g(t− 24) + εslopet
Table 3.4 reports the results. Considering the eﬀect of contemporaneous disagreement on the level (i) I
ﬁnd a negative relationship but the factor loading is not signiﬁcant and the R2 is zero. Next, considering
the slope (ii) I ﬁnd a strong eﬀect in terms of both statistical and economic signiﬁcance. Since both
left and right hand variables are standardised the estimated loadings are the response to a one standard
deviation shock to disagreement: a 1-standard deviation shock to ψg(t) raises the slope of the yield curve
by 0.25 standard deviations with a t-statistic is 4.11.
Speciﬁcations (iii) − (vi) tests whether past beliefs contain useful information about today’s cross-
section of yields. Adding ×1 lag then ×2 lags of ψ to the Levelt regression raises the R
2 to 7% then 27%,
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Table 3.4. Short Rate Regressions
OLS regression of the Levelt =
1
n
∑5
n=1 y
(n)
t and Slopet = y
(5)
t − y(1)t of the term structure on disagreement and
lagged disagreement factors. t-statistics are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. Both left and
right hand variables are standardized. A constant is included by not reported. Sample Period: 1990.1 - 2011.12
ψg(t) ψg(t− 12) ψg(t− 24) R
(i)Levelt −0.04 0.00
(−0.48)
(ii)Slopet 0.25 0.06
(4.11)
(iii)Levelt −0.07 −0.24 0.07
(−0.82) (−2.87)
(iv)Slopet 0.17 0.51 0.32
(2.76) (7.17)
(v)Levelt −0.31 −0.20 −0.25 0.27
(−3.95) (−2.73) (−4.09)
(vi)Slopet 0.26 0.41 0.41 0.49
(4.92) (6.06) (9.23)
respectively. In speciﬁcation (v) the estimates on disagreement are signiﬁcant at the 1% level and the
factor loadings are consistently negative. A similar pattern is repeated for the Slopet regressions where I
ﬁnd adding ×1 then ×2 lags of ψ raises the R2 to 32% then 49%, respectively. Again, in speciﬁcation (vi)
I ﬁnd all the estimates are signiﬁcant at the 1% but this time the loadings are consistently positive. This
is an intriguing result that suggests past speculative activity has a large eﬀect of the shape of the yield
curve today, consistent with our hypothesis that agents are trading on their beliefs. One concern with the
above regressions is that since ψgt is measured with error the signiﬁcance of the lagged terms could arise if
lagged disagreement is helping to forecasting the true contemporaneous state of disagreement. However,
if the dependence on past disagreement were arising spuriously then lagged disagreement should have no
signiﬁcance on its own. Table 3.5 tests this conjecture which conﬁrms that past disagreement is individ-
ually statistically signiﬁcant in these tests.
Table 3.5. Path Dependent Forecasting Regression
const ψg(t− 12) R2
Levelt 0.00 −0.37 0.14
(0.00) (−4.26)
Slopet −0.00 0.56 0.31
(−0.00) (7.13)
As a ﬁnal test of the link between bond yields and disagreement I consider the ability of the Levelt and
Slopet to forecast future belief heterogeneity. Indeed, if date t yields are mappings from date t risk factors
they should contain information about the predictable component of the state vector. Thus, an alternative
120
test for the determinants of bond markets is to ask whether Treasury yields contain information about
the future dynamics of the conjectured state vector. The macro-forecasting literature has used this logic
to answer the question of whether GDP growth is important for bonds by testing if there is information
content in the slope of the term structure about future economic activity (see, for example, Harvey
(1988) and Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991)). I follow this approach by running a forecasting regression
for changes in ψ(g) on the date t level and slopes.
ψt+h(g) − ψt(g) = const+ β1Levelt + β2Slopet + εt+h.
Figure 3.15 summarises the results graphically, the left panel plots point estimates and 1-standard
error bounds, while the right panel plots the R
2
for horizon t+ τ . I ﬁnd a striking result that the slope of
the yield curve has large predictable content for for changes in ψg: conditional on observing a steep yield
curve today I expect disagreement to be lower in the future suggesting the slope contains information
about the mean reversion characteristics for dispersion. This result is economically and statistically
meaningful: the factor loadings are signiﬁcant at the 1% for horizons greater than 9 months, and the
degree of variance explained is large, peaking at ∼ 25% at the 18-month horizon.
[Insert ﬁgure 3.15 about here]
H03 : Expected Returns, Relative Wealths, and Future Beliefs
The previous section studied the role of intertemporal demand versus the eﬀect of relative wealth ﬂuc-
tuation in the space of yields. In this section I study risk premia: the third testable implication of the
model is that time-variation in bond risk premia is driven by (i) variations in relative wealths generate
(instantaneous returns); and (ii) beliefs about future beliefs (long run returns). This is an important addi-
tional test of the model since, while the space of yields provides information on the drift of the stochastic
discount factor, the space of excess returns gives us information on its diﬀusion component (prices of
risk). As above, I propose to test relative wealth ﬂuctuations from lags of disagreement. The underlying
assumption is that the ex-post distribution of wealth is shifted towards the agent who holds relatively
more accurate forecasts. Thus, conditional on a sample period with a series of large belief dispersions I
should expect a large subsequent redistribution of wealth.
I repeat brieﬂy how long run return variation arises with multiple agent economies. Optimists insure
pessimists against bad state in exchange for premium in good states. This implies optimists’ prices of
risk are higher than pessimists but because of perfect risk sharing wealth weighted prices of risk are equal
to those in a standard Lucas economy. However, long run prices of risk (the impulse response of the
stochastic discount factor) depend on today’s disagreement ψ(t) and the path of future disagreements
ψ(t + h). Therefore, while under the objective measure ψ(t) does not matter instantaneously, over long
run horizons it drives risk compensation.
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I study these hypotheses by asking whether lags of disagreement, ψg(t−h), contain information about
future excess returns on n = 2, 5 and 10-year zeros
hprx
(n)
t,t+12 = const+ β1ψ
g(t) + β2ψ
g(t− h) + ε
(n)
t,t+12
in addition to contemporaneous disagreement, ψg(t). Table 3.6 reports point estimates and statistics for
h = 1, 3 and 6 month lagged disagreement. Considering expected excess returns on 2-year bonds I ﬁnd
that ψg(t−h) is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level for all lags. Since left and right hand variables are
standardised, the point estimates represent the response of 1-year excess returns to a 1-standard deviation
shock to disagreement. Therefore, the economic signiﬁcance of the lagged terms is of equal importance
to the contemporaneous terms: 0.22 versus 0.34 for h = 3, and 0.31 versus 0.24 for h = 6. In terms
of predictable variation the R
2
’s range from 12% to 24%. For comparison, repeating this exercise as a
univariate forecasting regression with 6-month lagged ψg(t−6) on the right hand side I obtain a t-statistic
of 3.77 and an R2 of 15%. Considering next expected excess returns on 5-year bonds I a similar pattern in
terms of point estimates, t-statistics and R
2
, suggesting that a substantial amount of return predictability
is coming from both contemporaneous dispersion and lagged dispersion terms. Finally, considering the
estimated loadings on 10-year bonds, I ﬁnd an intriguing result that while the lagged terms are highly
signiﬁcant (t-stat = 3.58 , 2.61 , 2.33) for each h, the contemporaneous terms are statistically indistin-
guishable from zero. Overall, these results suggest there is substantial information about expected returns
embedded in distant lags of disagreement consistent with the model implication that ωi(t) is a function
of past ψg(t− h), and contemporaneous disagreement ψg(t) due to time-variation in long run returns.
I examine the robustness of these ﬁndings to a number of alternative candidate risk factors. To save
space I report regressions for 5-year maturity bonds on 6-month lagged disagreement ψ(t − 6) and con-
temporaneous disagreement ψg(t).
Firstly, column (i) reports estimates from a univariate predictability regression including a single
lag of disagreement on the right hand side. This regression conﬁrms the forecasting power of lagged
disagreement from table 3.6: the point estimate (t-stat) is 0.35 (3.56) and the R2 is 12%. Column
(ii) repeats this univariate regression with ψ(t) which shows that contemporaneous disagreement is also
a strong predictor of expected returns with a point estimate (t-stat) equal to 0.33 (3.61) and the R2 is 11%
Secondly, I check whether the information in dispersion factors is subsumed by fundamentals. To test
this I construct a set of macro-activity factors following Ludvigson and Ng (2009a). The data appendix
describes the construction of three macro return forecasting factors {M1t , M2t , M3t}. Constructing
these factors I conﬁrm the predictable content for expected returns available from a large panel of aggre-
gates. For instance, in an unreported regression including only the macro factors the R2 is 14% and each
factor is signiﬁcant. Columns (iii) and (iv) test the marginal contribution of ψg(t − h) and then ψg(t)
after controlling for the macro factors. The estimated loadings are encouraging for the model since the
information content in dispersion factors is largely orthogonal to the macro-economy: the point estimates
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are close to columns (i) and (ii) and the signiﬁcance is unaﬀected. Adding both dispersion factors to
the regression the adjusted R
2
rises to 23% and, importantly, the disagreement factors are signiﬁcant at
the 1% level. This result is important since it suggests that (a) variations in aggregate macro-activity
important for risk compensation are unrelated to relative wealth ﬂuctuations; (b) higher order beliefs are
an important determine of long run bond risk premia
Thirdly, in long run risk economies (Bansal and Yaron (2004)) with recursive preferences predictability
can arise from the dynamics of second moments (economic uncertainty) of fundamentals. One might
suspect that the reported results could arise because beliefs are reacting to macro volatility. To address this
concern I construct conditional variances of gdp growth and inﬂation following Bansal and Shaliastovich
(2013), denoted σ2t (g) and σ
2
t (π), and consider the uncertainty factor studied by Baker, Bloom, and Davis
(2012), denoted UnCt. Column (vi) and (vii) show that these factors have no marginal contribution in
explaining risk premia. This is interesting since it suggests that individual consumption volatility matters
more for explaining time variation in risk premia than aggregrate consumption volatility, as predicted by
the model.
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Table 3.6. Return Predictability Regressions
This table reports estimates from OLS regressions of annual (t → t + 12) excess returns of 2, 5 and 10-year
zero-coupon bonds on disagreement ψgt and lagged disagreement ψ
g(t− h) for horizons h = 1, . . . , 12:
hprx
(n)
t,t+12 = const+ β1ψ
g(t) + β2ψ
g(t− h) + ε(n)t,t+12
t-statistics reported in parentheses are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity using the
Hansen and Hodrick (1983) GMM correction computed with Newey-West lags. Both left and right hand vari-
able are standardised. A constant is included but not reported. R
2
reports the adjusted R2. Sample Period:
1990.1 - 2011.12
h = 1m 3m 6m
n = 2
ψg(t) 0.20 0.22 0.31
(3.51) (3.01) (3.86)
ψg(t− h) 0.30 0.34 0.24
(4.38) (4.27) (2.93)
R
2
0.21 0.24 0.23
n = 5
ψg(t) 0.14 0.14 0.21
(2.58) (2.06) (2.79)
ψg(t− h) 0.25 0.30 0.24
(3.69) (3.52) (2.81)
R
2
0.13 0.16 0.15
n = 10
ψg(t) 0.04 0.07 0.11
(0.76) (1.08) (1.34)
ψg(t− h) 0.21 0.21 0.20
(3.58) (2.61) (2.33)
R
2
0.05 0.06 0.07
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Table 3.7. Return Predictability Robustness
This table reports estimates from OLS regressions of annual (t → t + 12) excess returns of 5-year zero-coupon
bonds 6-month lagged disagreement ψg(t− 6) controlling for alternative risk factor proxies.
hprx
(5)
t,t+12 = const+ βψ
g(t− 6) + γControlst + ε(5)t,t+12
t-statistics reported in parentheses are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity using the
Hansen and Hodrick (1983) GMM correction computed with Newey-West lags. Both left and right hand vari-
able are standardised. A constant is included but not reported. R
2
reports the adjusted R2. Sample Period:
1990.1 - 2011.12
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
ψ(t − 6) 0.35 0.34 0.23 0.24 0.21
(3.56) (3.35) (2.46) (2.54) (2.24)
ψ(t) 0.33 0.34 0.25 0.18 0.19
(3.61) (3.52) (2.96) (2.12) (2.53)
M1t 0.11 0.10 0.10
(2.96) (3.45) (2.60)
M2t 0.15 0.19 0.14
(2.19) (2.60) (1.90)
M3t 0.17 0.18 0.21
(1.56) (1.95) (2.38)
σ2(g) -0.07
(-0.47)
σ2(π) 0.20
(1.27)
UnCt 0.12
(1.34)
R
2
0.12 0.11 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.16 0.16
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V. Conclusion
A vast empirical literature documents the existence of a predictable component in bond excess returns.
At the same time, it shows that it is diﬃcult to reconcile the dynamics of excess bond returns with simple
homogeneous agents models. I investigate two questions. First, what is the extent to which heterogeneity
in macroeconomic beliefs matter in Treasury bond markets? Is this speciﬁc dimension of heterogeneity
empirically important or can it be abstracted away within the simpler single agent paradigm? Second,
what is the exact channel through which disagreement aﬀects asset prices, and which models are consis-
tent with the data?
To answer these questions I derive a general equilibrium economy with multiple agents who hold sub-
jective beliefs regarding unobservable growth rates. In equilibrium, agents engage in speculative trade
because of disagreement, which in turn generates endogenously time-varying wealth ﬂuctuations. I study
a set of testable restrictions about short term interest rates and the cross-sectional distribution of yields
that help distinguish myopic, speculative, and risk sharing models. Moreover, we show that the properties
of long run returns depend crucially on forward looking beliefs.
My empirical results suggest that: (i) heterogeneity is an important channel that cannot be abstracted
way; (ii) agents have a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion γ < 1 (EIS > 1); (iii) both the cross-section
of yields and the bond risk premium are path dependent due to past speculation; and (iv) that long run
returns diﬀer from instantaneous returns because of the risk of changing future beliefs.
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VI. Appendix A: Proofs
A. Single Agent Term Structure of Interest Rates
The date t price of an T-period default free zero-coupon bond is :
P Tt =
1
MtEt [t,TMT ] = Et
[
t,T
(
DT
Dt
)−γ]
Deﬁning xT = lnDT solving for bond prices requires computing the following joint moment generating:
φx(T ;u1) = Et (e
u1xT ) . (3.43)
We denote this the ‘fundamental system’.
B. Fundamental System
From Feynman-Kac this function satisﬁes the following partial diﬀerential equation
0 ≡ Dφx + ∂φx
∂t
(D, g, t, T ;u1)
with initial condition φx(t;u1) = D(t)
u1 and where D is the Dynkin operator for the multivariate process (Dt, gt). Applying
the operator we have
∂φx
∂D
Dtgt − ∂φx
∂g
κg(gt − θ) + 1
2
∂2φx
∂D2
D2t σ
2
D +
1
2
∂2φx
∂(g)2
[
σ2g,D + σ
2
g,s
]
+
∂2φx
∂D∂g
DtσDσg,D +
∂φx
∂t
= 0
Deﬁning τ = T − t the solution has the following form
φx = D
u1
t Et
[(
DT
Dt
)u1]
= Du1t e
A(τ,u1)+B(τ,u1)gt (3.44)
Taking partials with respect to Dt we obtain
u1gˆt −B(τ )[κg(gt − θ)] + 1
2
u1(u1 − 1)σ2D + 12B
2(τ )σ2g + u1B(τ )ρσDσg +
[
∂A
∂t
+
∂B
∂t
gˆt
]
= 0
which are separable ODE’s
∂A
∂τ
= +
1
2
u1(u1 − 1)σ2D + [κgθ + u1ρσDσg]B(τ ) + 12B(τ )
2σ2g
∂B
∂τ
+ κgB(τ ) = u1
with solutions given by
A(τ ) =
1
2
u1(u1 − 1)σ2Dτ +
(
u1θ
κg
+
u21
κ2g
σDσg,D
)
(κgτ + e
−κgτ − 1)
+
1
4
u21
κ3g
(
σ2g,D + σ
2
g,s
)
(2κgτ + 4e
−κgτ − e−2κgτ − 3)
B(τ ) =
u1
κg
(1− e−κgτ )
Identifying u1 = −γ we obtain the functions reported in the body of the paper.
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C. Learning
Denote agent i’s conditional forecast gˆit = E
i
t [gt|Ft] and posterior variance ν)t = Eit[(gˆit − gt)2|Ft]. Write the correlated
Brownians in 3.1 and 3.2 in terms of the independent Brownian motions (W 1t ,W
2
t ):
WDt = W
1
t (3.45)
W gt = ρiW
1
t +
√
1− ρ2iW 2t (3.46)
where ρi is an agent speciﬁc parameter.The ﬁltering problem contains three independent Brownian motions and two mea-
surement equations
dD/D = gtdt+ σDdW
1
t ,
dst = φidW
2
t +
√
1− φ2i dW 3t ,
Writing the unobservable state in terms of our rotated Brownians we have
dgt = −kg(gt − θg)dt+ σgρdW 1t + σg
√
1− ρ2dW 2t
Using notation consistent with Lipster and Shiryayev (1974) we can re-write the measurement equation in vector form
dYt =
[
dDt/Dt , dst
]′
so that
[
dD/D
dst
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
dYt
=
[
0
0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A0
dt+
[
1
0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
gtdt+
[
σD
0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B1
dW 1t +
[
0
φi
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B2
dW 2t +
[
0√
1− φ2i
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B3
dW 3t
dYt = (A0 + A1gt) dt+B1dW
1
t +B2dW
2
t +B3dW
3
t
At the same time, consistent with this notation we can write the state dynamics as:
dgit =
⎛
⎜⎝ a0︸︷︷︸
=κgθ
+ a1︸︷︷︸
=−κg
gˆit
⎞
⎟⎠ dt+ b1︸︷︷︸
=σgρi
dW 1t + b2︸︷︷︸
=σg
√
1−ρ2i
dW 2t + b3︸︷︷︸
=0
dW 3t
Applying the results of Lipster and Shiryayev (1974) (theorem 12.7. Page 36) the optimal linear in terms of our original
Brownians follows as reported in the body of the paper.
D. Term Structure of Interest Rates
The date t price of an T-period default free zero-coupon bond is :
P Tt =
1
Mit
Eit
[
t,TMiT
]
P Tt = E
i
t
[
t,T
(
DT
Dt
)−γ (1 + η1/γT
1 + η
1/γ
t
)γ]
where the expectation is taken under agent i’s measure. Deﬁning xT = lnDT and yT = ln ηT we need to compute the
following joint moment generating:
φx,y(T ;u1, u2) = E
i
t
(
eu1xT+u2yT
)
. (3.47)
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E. Belief System
Setting u1 = 0 in equation F we obtain the following moment generating function for ηT
φy = φx,y(T ; 0, u2) = Et (e
u2yT ) . (3.48)
Feynman-Kac implies the following partial diﬀerential equation
0 ≡ Dφy + ∂φy
∂t
(η, ψ, t, T ;u2)
with initial condition φy(t;u2) = η(t)
u2 . Applying the operator we have
− ∂φy
∂ψ
κψψt + 1/2
∂2φy
∂η2
η2tψ
2
t +
1
2
∂2φy
∂ψ2
(σ2ψ,D + σ
2
ψ,s)− ∂
2φy
∂ψ∂η
ηtψtσψ,D +
∂φy
∂t
= 0
whose solution is aﬃne in the extended state vector (ψt, ψ
2
t )
′
φy = η
u2
t Et
[(
ηT
ηt
)u2]
= ηu2t e
L(τ)+M(τ)ψt+N(τ)ψ
2
t (3.49)
Taking partials with respect to ηt we obtain
− [M(τ ) + 2N(τ )ψt]κψψt + 1
2
u2(u2 − 1)ψ2t + 12(σ
2
ψ,D + σ
2
ψ,s)[2N(τ ) +M(τ )
2 + 4M(τ )N(τ )ψt + 4N(τ )
2ψ2t ]
− [M(τ ) + 2N(τ )ψt]u2σψ,Dψt +
[
L(τ )
∂t
+
M(τ )
∂t
ψt +
N(τ )
∂t
ψ2t
]
= 0
Deﬁning c1 = −(κψ + u2σψ,D) , c2 = 12u2(u2 − 1) , c3 = 12 (σ2ψ,D + σ2ψ,s) we collect the following ODEs
∂L
∂τ
= c3[2N(τ ) +M(τ )
2] (3.50)
∂M
∂τ
= [4c3N(τ ) + c1]M(τ ) (3.51)
∂N
∂τ
= 4c3N(τ )
2 + 2c1N(τ ) + c2 (3.52)
The last ODE is a constant coeﬃcient Riccati equation whose solution is given by
N(τ ) =
q
2c3
1
c˜e2qτ + 1
−
(
q + c1
4c3
)
where q =
√
c21 − 4c3c2 and c˜ =
q − c1
q + c1
Solutions for L(τ ) and M(τ ) can be computed in closed form but we omit these to save space.
Solving the Constant Coeﬃcient (scalar) Riccati Equation
We derive a general solution so the constant coeﬃcient Riccati equations y(x):
dy(x)
dx
= ay(x)2 + by(x) + c
which we can reduce to a second order linear equation via the substitution y(x) = − 1
a
w′(x)
w(x)
yielding
w′′ − bw′ + acw = 0.
The general solution to this ODE is w(x) = C1e
r1x + C2e
r2x where r1 and r2 are the positive and negative roots
r1,2 =
b±√b2 − 4ac
2
=
b± q
2
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and C1,2 are constants determined by the boundary condition. A general solution is then
y(x) = −1
a
C1r1e
r1x + C2r2e
r2x
C1er1x + C2er2x
= −1
a
c˜r1e
qx + r2
c˜eqx + 1
=
1
a
q
c˜eqx + 1
−
(
b+ q
2a
)
where the last step follows by some partial fractions algebra. This result is applied above with an appropriate boundary
condition.
F. Joint Distribution
We now derive the joint moment generating function:
φx,y(T ;u1, u2) = E
i
t
(
eu1xT+u2yT
)
.
which from Feynman-Kac satisﬁes the following partial diﬀerential equation
0 ≡ Dφx,y + ∂φx,y
∂t
(D, η, ga, ψ, t, T ;u1, u2)
with initial condition φx,yt, t; ,χ ) = D(t)
u1η(t)u2 and where D is the Dynkin operator for the multivariate process (Dt, ηt, gat , ψt).
We solve for prices under the measure of agent a and so all parameters and expectations in the following should be understood
from his perspective. Applying the operator (and dropping subscripts on φx,y we have
∂φ
∂D
Dtg
a
t − ∂φ
∂ga
κg(g
a
t − θ)− ∂φ
∂ψ
κψψt +
1
2
∂2φ
∂D2
D2t σ
2
D +
1
2
∂2φ
∂η2
η2tψ
2
t +
1
2
∂2φ
∂(ga)2
[
σ2g,D + σ
2
g,s
]
+
1
2
∂2φ
∂ψ2
[σ2ψ,D + σ
2
ψ,s]
− ∂
2φ
∂D∂η
DtσDηtψt +
∂2φ
∂D∂ga
DtσDσg,D +
∂2φ
∂D∂ψ
DtσDσψ,D − ∂
2φ
∂η∂ga
ηtψtσg,D
− ∂
2φ
∂η∂ψ
ηtψtσψ,D +
∂2φ
∂ga∂ψ
[σg,Dσψ,D + σg,sσψ,s] +
∂φ
∂t
= 0
The solution takes the following form
φ(T ) = Du1t η
u2
t Et
[(
DT
Dt
)u1]
Et
[(
ηT
ηt
)u2]
= Du1t η
u2
t φx(T ;u1)φy(T ;u2)
where φx(T ;u1) = e
A(τ,u1)+B(τ,u1)gt and φy(T ;u1, u2) = e
L(τ)+M(τ)ψt+N(τ)ψ
2
t
Taking partials with respect to Dt and ηt allows us to factor out terms independent of ψt. The solutions for A(τ ) and B(τ )
are then as above. Next, terms in ψt solve
∂φy
∂ψ
[
−κψψt + u1σDσψ,D − u2σψ,Dψt + u1
κg
(1− e−κgτ )(σg,Dσψ,D + σg,sσψ,s)
]
+
1
2
∂2φy
∂ψ2
[
σ2ψ,D + σ
2
ψ,s
]
+ φyu1
(
−u2σD − 1
κg
(1− e−κgτ )u2σg,D
)
ψt + φy
1
2
u2(u2 − 1)ψ2t + ∂φy
∂t
= 0
which we write compactly as
∂φy
∂ψ
[c1ψt + u1b1(τ )] +
∂2φy
∂ψ2
c3 + φyu1b2(τ )ψt + φyc2ψ
2
t +
∂φy
∂t
= 0
where c1, c2, c3 are as above and b1(τ ) and b2(τ ) deﬁned appropriately. Taking partials we ﬁnd
[M(τ ) + 2N(τ )ψt] [c1ψt + u1b1(τ )] + c3[2N(τ ) +M(τ )
2 + 4M(τ )N(τ )ψt + 4N(τ )
2ψ2t ]
u1b2(τ )ψt + c2ψ
2
t +
[
L(τ )
∂t
+
M(τ )
∂t
ψt +
N(τ )
∂t
ψ2t
]
= 0
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from which we obtain the following system of ODE’s
∂L
∂τ
= u1M(τ )b1(τ ) + c3[2N(τ ) +M(τ )
2] (3.53)
∂M
∂τ
= u1b2(τ ) + [4c3N(τ ) + c1]M(τ ) (3.54)
∂N
∂τ
= 4c3N(τ )
2 + 2c1N(τ ) + c2. (3.55)
Firstly, notice that setting u1 = 0 we recover equations 3.50 - 3.52 which characterise the density for η(T ). Equation 3.55
is a again a constant coeﬃcient Ricatti equation whose solution is given in the solution for the ‘belief system’. The solution
for M(τ ) is given by
M(τ ) =
u1u2
κgq(κg − q)(κg + q) (c˜e2qτ + 1)e
−κgτ
(
− c˜(κg − q)(κg + q)eτ(κg+2q) (3.56)
×
(
κgσD + σgD,a + κge
τ(κg+q)((c˜− 1)σD(κg − q)(κg + q) + σgD,a((c˜− 1)κg + c˜q + q)
)
− c˜qσgD,a(κg + q)e2qτ + (κg − q)(κg + q)eκgτ (κgσD + σgD,a) + qσgD,a(q − κg)
)
The solution for L(τ ) follows by direct integration.
Solving γ ∈ R+
Given a solution for characteristic function of (DT , ηT ) we can recover the joint density via inversion which allows us to
compute the price of any contingent claim. Setting u1 = −γ we recover the joint transition density via inversion by evaluating
the (inverse) bilateral Laplace transform at iu2, which equivalent the computing the continuous time Fourier transform
P (t, T ) = T−tφx(τ ;−γ)g(y, t)−1
∫
∞
0
[
g(y, T )
1
π
∫
∞
0
e−iu2yT φy(τ ;−γ, u2)du2
]
dy (3.57)
where
g(y, s) = (1 + (eys)
1
γ )γ (3.58)
φx(τ ;u1) = e
A(τ)+B(τ)gt (3.59)
φy(τ ;u1, u2) = e
L(τ)+M(τ)ψt+N(τ)ψ
2
t (3.60)
with
{
A(τ ),B(τ ), L(τ ),M(τ ),N(τ )
}
reported in the main body of the paper.
Solving γ ∈ N
For integer γ a closed form solution for bond prices can be found using the binomial expansion:
PTt = t,TE
a
t
[(
DT
Dt
)−γ (1 + η1/γT
1 + η
1/γ
t
)γ]
= t,T (ω
a
t )
γ
γ∑
j=0
(
γ
j
)(
ωbt
ωat
)j [(
DT
Dt
)−γ (
ηT
ηt
)j/γ]
= t,TFg(g
a, t, T,−γ)(ωat )γ
γ∑
j=0
(
γ
j
)(
ωbt
ωat
)j
Fψ(ψ, t, T ;−γ, j/γ)
Myopic Term Structures
When agents are myopic heterogeneous equilibrium bond prices are given as wealth weighted averages of ﬁctitious
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homogeneous equilibrium bond prices:
P (t, T ) = τφ
a
x(τ ;−1)ωat
(
1 +
ωbt
ωat
eL(τ)+M(τ)ψ
g
t
)
,
= τ (ω
a
t φ
a
x(τ ;−1) + ωbteA(τ)+B(τ)g
a
t +L(τ)+M(τ)[g
a
t −g
b
t ]/σD ),
= τ (ω
a
t φ
a
x(τ ;−1) + ωbte[A(τ)+L(τ)]+B(τ)g
b
t ),
= ωat P
a(t, T ) + ωbtP
b(t, T ).
since M(τ, u1 = −γ) = −σDB(τ, u1 = −γ).25
Bond Sensitivities
∂ lnP (t, T )
∂ga
= B(τ )
∂ lnP (t, T )
∂η
=
∫
∞
0
[
g(y, T )
∫
∞
0
e−iu2yT u2e
(u2−1)ytφy(τ ;−γ, u2)du2
]
dy(T )∫
∞
0
[
g(y,T )
∫
∞
0
e−iu2yT eu2ytφy(τ ;−γ, u2)du2
]
dy(T )
− η
(1−γ)/γ
t
1 + η
1/γ
t
∂ lnP (t, T )
∂ψ
=
∫
∞
0
[
g(y, T )
∫
∞
0
e−iu2yT eu2ytφy(τ ;−γ, u2) [M(τ ) + 2N(τ )ψt] du2
]
dy(T )∫
∞
0
g(y, T )
[∫
∞
0
e−iu2yT eu2ytφy(τ ;−γ, u2)du2
]
dy(T )
25 An alternative proof is as follows. Myopic agents consume wealth at a rate equal to their time rate of preference:
cit = ρW
i
t . Since agents must agree on tradable prices, E
a
t (
cat
ca
T
P (t + 1, T )) = Ebt (
cbt
cb
T
P (t + 1, T )) this implies ηT = W
b
T /W
a
T
serves as a valid change of measure. Imposing market clearing, cat + c
b
t = Dt, we obtain c
a
t =
1
1+ηt
Dt and c
b
t =
ηt
1+ηt
Dt.
Substituting cat into the price of a bond from the perspective of agent a, and after a change of measure we obtain the desired
result.
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VII. Appendix B: Data
A. Realised Returns
For Treasury bonds data, I use (unsmoothed) discount bonds dataset for maturities 1 to 10 years kindly provides by Robert
Bliss. I introduce notation along the lines of Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005a) by deﬁning the date t log price of a n-year
discount bond as:
p
(n)
t = log price of n-year zero coupon bond. (3.61)
The yield of a bond is deﬁned as y
(n)
t = − 1np
(n)
t . The date-t 1-year forward rate for the year from t + n − 1 and t + n is
f
(n)
t = p
(n)
t − p(n+1)t . The log holding period return is the realised return on an n-year maturity bond bought at date t and
sold as an (n− 1)-year maturity bond at date t+ 12:
r
(n)
t,t+12 = p
(n−1)
t+12 − p(n)t . (3.62)
Excess holding period returns are denoted by:
rx
(n)
t,t+12 = r
(n)
t,t+12 − y(1)t . (3.63)
B. Macro Data
In dynamic single agent equilibrium models of the term structure, factors linked to the marginal productivity of capital
account for the dynamics of interest rates. In such models, the marginal rate of substitution is tightly connected to the
marginal rate of transformation which drives the term structure. Unfortunately, linking variation in yields to observable
macro-economic quantities has met limited success. There are two fundamental problems: Firstly, shocks to real growth
and/or inﬂation explain just a small fraction of shocks to nominal yields. Secondly, there appears to be very little covariance
between bond returns and macro-factors that demand compensation in standard consumption based models.26 An notable
exception is Ludvigson and Ng (2009a) who ﬁnd strong evidence linking variations in the level of macro-economic activity,
obtained from principal components of a very large set of macroeconomic variables, to the time variations of expected
excess bond returns. I study the marginal contribution of disagreement after controlling for the macro-activity factors of
Ludvigson and Ng (2009a). Diﬀerent than in their approach, however, I drop any price based information from their initial
information set.27 This allows us to interpret the factors as pure ‘macro’ that capture the current state of economic activity.
After removing price based information from the panel I end up with 99 macro series, from which I compute the ﬁrst eight
principal components.28 From the resulting dataset I compute the ﬁrst eight principal components F
[1:8]
t then construct a
single ‘pure’ macro return forecasting factor from a regression of average holding period returns on 1 to 10-year bonds:29
1
n
∑
n=1,...,10
rx
(n)
t,t+12 = α+ γ
′F
[1:8]
t + t+12
LNt = γ
′F
[1:8]
t
In long run risk economies (Bansal and Yaron (2004)) with recursive preferences predictability arises from the dynamics of
second moments (economic uncertainty) of the conditional growth rate of fundamentals. Recently, Bansal and Shaliastovich
(2013) discuss the implications of this class of models for bond markets. In their model, equilibrium bond prices depend on
4-factors while risk compensation is time-varying with conditional second moments depending on both inﬂation non-neutrally
and whether agents have a preference for early or late resolution of uncertainty.
26Duﬀee (2012) provides a critical review of macro-ﬁnance models and their ability explain bond markets and concludes
and concludes that the link between bond markets and the macro-economy is at best weak.
27Examples of price variables removed include: S&P dividend yield, the Federal Funds (FF) rate; 10 year T-bond; 10 year
- FF term spread; Baa - FF default spread; and the dollar-Yen exchange rate. A small number of discontinued macro series
were replaced with appropriate alternatives or dropped.
28 A description of each series along with its data source is available on the authors websites.
29 I refer the reading to Ludvigson and Ng (2009a) for additional details
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I proxy for economic uncertainty following Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013) who seeks to exploit the information about
future volatility contained in date t yields using survey forecasts of gdp growth and inﬂation. First, I ﬁt a bivariate VAR(1)
to inﬂation and GDP expectations:
get+1 = 0.63
(0.08)
+ 0.86
(0.02)
get − 0.08
(0.01)
πet + g,t+1
πet+1 = 0.93
(0.12)
− 0.20
(0.03)
get + 0.87
(0.02)
πet + π,t+1,
where πet = E
c
t [πt+12] and g
e
t = E
c
t [gt+12] for ease of notation. Similar to Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013), I ﬁnd that both
processes feature high persistence (their AR(1) coeﬃcient for inﬂation expectations is 0.99, however), and that inﬂation has
a non-neutral eﬀect on growth: the loading of consumption growth on lagged inﬂation is strongly signiﬁcant. Next, I regress
squared residuals between t and t+ 12 on time-t yields:
12∑
k=1
2g,t+k = 0.19
(0.12)
+ 0.21
(0.08)
y
(1)
t − 0.55
(0.35)
y
(3)
t + 0.39
(0.44)
y
(5)
t − 0.04
(0.18)
y
(10)
t + ηg,t+1 R
2 = 0.07
12∑
k=1
2π,t+k = 0.21
(0.14)
+ 0.04
(0.09)
y
(1)
t + 0.04
(0.35)
y
(3)
t − 0.24
(0.49)
y
(5)
t + 0.16
(0.23)
y
(10)
t + ηπ,t+1 R
2 = 0.08,
and take ﬁtted values as an estimate of conditional variances σ2(g) and σ2(π).
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VIII. Appendix C: Figures
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Figure 3.1. Short Rate Sensitivity to Disagreement:
The left panel plots the sensitivity of the short rate with respect to disagreement as a function of the level of
disagreement for risk aversion levels above and below one, while the the right panel plots the short rate sensitivity
with respect to disagreement as a function of risk aversion for diﬀerent levels of disagreement.
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Figure 3.2. Term Structure Example 1: Sentiment Economy
Figure plots the term structure of interest rates for an economy with zero disagreement but varies the relative
wealths between the optimistic and pessimist agents.
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Figure 3.3. Term Structure Example 2: Symmetric Economy
Figure plots the term structure of interest rates for an economy with an symmetric wealth distribution ωat = ω
b
t =
0.50 with gat − gbt =∈ [0% : 3%] for various levels of risk aversion above and below 1.
0 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02 0.025 0.03
−1
0
1
(%
)
disagreement
Equal Wealth Shares.
 
 
5
6
7
γ = 0.5
γ = 2
0 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02 0.025 0.03
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
(%
)
disagreement
Equal Wealth Shares.
 
 
−1.8
−1.6
−1.4
−1.2
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
γ = 0.5
γ = 2
Figure 3.4. Term Structure Example 2: Symmetric Economy
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Figure 3.5. Term Structure Example 3: Pessimistic Economy
Figure plots the term structure of interest rates for an economy which is on average pessimist ωat < ω
b
t with
gat − gbt =∈ [0% : 3%] for various levels of risk aversion above and below 1.
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Figure 3.6. Term Structure Example 4: Optimistic Economy
Figure plots the term structure of interest rates for an economy which is on average optimistic ωat > ω
b
t with
gat − gbt =∈ [0% : 3%] for various levels of risk aversion above and below 1.
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Figure 3.7. Risk Premia Example 1: Symmetric Economy
Figure plots the term structuyre of risk premia (instantaneous expected excess returns) for an economy with an
symmetric wealth distribution ωat = ω
b
t = 0.50 with g
a
t − gbt ∈ [0% : 3%] for risk aversions 0.5, 1.0, 2.0.
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Figure 3.8. Risk Premia Example 2: Pessimistic Economy
Figure plots the term structure of risk premia (instantaneous expected excess returns) for an economy which is on
average pessimist ωat < ω
b
t with g
a
t − gbt ∈ [0% : 3%] for risk aversions 0.5, 1.0, 2.0.
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Figure 3.9. Risk Premia Example 2: Optimistic Economy
Figure plots the term structure of risk premia (instantaneous expected excess returns) for an economy which is on
average optimistic ωat > ω
b
t with g
a
t − gbt ∈ [0% : 3%] for risk aversions 0.5, 1.0, 2.0.
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Figure 3.10. Survey Extract: 1Q ahead Interest Rate Forecasts:
Each month BlueChip Financial Forecasts (BCFF) carries out surveys of professional economists who are asked to
forecast a large cross-section of interest rates from 1-quarter to 5-quarter ahead.
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Figure 3.11. BlueChip Financial Forecasts Contributors
The left panel plots a time-series of the average number of respondents to the BlueChip Financial Forecasts survey.
The right panel plots the distribution of respondents. Sample Period: January 1990 - December 2011.
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Figure 3.12. Diﬀerences in Belief Proxies
Figure plots time-series for diﬀerences in belief about the 1-quarter GDP growth (ψ(g)) along with an uncertainty
proxy studied by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2012). Sample period: January 1990 - December 2011.
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Figure 3.13. Real and Nominal Short Term Interest Rates
Figure plots the time-series of the 3-month nominal interest rate (blue line) taken from the Fama-Bliss short rate
ﬁles on CRSP. The real short rate is constructed by subtracting 3-month consensus inﬂation expected from BCFF:
y
r(3m)
t = y
$(3m)
t − βEt[π(t+ 3m)]
Also plotted is 3-month expected GDP growth (Et[g(t+ 3m)]). Sample period: January 1990 - December 2011
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Figure 3.14. Path Dependence Example:
Figure plots a stylised binomial tree for the evolution of beliefs and relative wealths. The tree begins at the zeroth
node where agents have equal wealths but agent a is the optimist. In subsequent periods agents revise their beliefs
and there is a redistribution of wealth based on the path of beliefs from previous periods.143
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Figure 3.15. Predicting Disagreement about Real Growth
The left panel plots the factor loadings (β1, β2) for horizon h in the forecasting regression
ψt+h(g)− ψt(g) = const + β1Levelt + β2Slopet + εt+h.
Vertical lines plot standard error bounds. The right panel plots associated R
2
’s for each horizon. January 1990 -
December 2011.
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